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Jewish Identity in Conversionary and Mixed Marriages

by PETER Y. MEDDING, GARY A. TOBIN, SYLVIA BARACK FISHMAN, and MORDECHAI RIMOR

INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN JEWS AND NON-JEWS in the United States is now commonplace. The propensity of Jews to marry non-Jews was extremely low until the mid-1960s, but rose sharply thereafter and continued to climb in the 1980s. As a result, in many Jewish communities, among those marrying in recent years, there are more outmarriages than inmarriages.

This change in the underlying social and religious structure of the American Jewish community has important implications for the present and future state of that community. On the one hand, marriage to non-Jews may indicate the successful integration of Jews into American society and their achievement of a high level of social acceptance. On the other, intermarriage may betoken and contribute to the decline of Judaism in America.

The subject of intermarriage evokes considerable passion among Jews because it arouses fears about elemental issues of group survival. One aspect of the matter is quantitative: the offspring of intermarriage may not remain Jewish; within one or two generations there may be fewer Jews and a greatly weakened Jewish community. Another aspect is qualitative: even if intermarriage does not lead to a decrease in the physical number of persons living in households with a Jewish parent, questions remain as to their Jewishness, i.e., the intensity of their communal affiliation, ethnic identification, and religious practice.

This article[1] focuses on the qualitative aspects of Jewish intermarriage in the United States. It presents a theory of Jewish identity which provides a

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[1]This article provides a more extensive and intensive analysis and theoretical treatment of data originally discussed in Sylvia Barack Fishman, Mordechai Rimor, Gary A. Tobin, and Peter Medding, *Intermarriage and American Jews Today: New Findings and Policy Implications. A Summary Report* (Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, 1990).

In addition, Cohen Center researchers have explored aspects of intermarriage in *Research Notes* (Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies): Larry Sternberg, "Intermarriage: A First Look" (1988); Mordechai Rimor, "Intermarriage and Conversion: The Case from the Boston Data" (1988); Mordechai Rimor, "Intermarriage and Jewish Identity" (1989); Mordechai Rimor, "Feelings and Reactions to Intermarriage" (1989).

framework for the systematic empirical analysis of Jewish identification and behavior in households representing three basic marriage types: inmarriage—between two born Jews; conversionary marriage—between a born Jew and a born non-Jew who converts to Judaism; and mixed marriage—between a born Jew and a born non-Jew who does not convert to Judaism. Although, as we will show, they differ greatly, the latter two categories are often referred to collectively as intermarriage or outmarriage.

It has been notably difficult for researchers to assess the quality of Jewish life in intermarried families or to make the kinds of meaningful comparisons between conversionary and mixed-married families that could help to gauge the potential for future Jewish commitment. Among the specific issues calling for clarification are the following: What are the characteristics and extent of Jewish behavior and identification in conversionary and mixed-married households? To what degree do the offspring of conversionary and mixed marriages receive formal Jewish education? To what extent are non-Jewish identities maintained in conversionary and mixed-married households?

In an effort to better understand the relationship between marriage type and level of Jewish identification, this study employs a typology for categorizing patterns of Jewish identification and behavior. The typology makes it possible to clarify whether and under what conditions Jewish identity is maintained in such marriages and to evaluate the character and content of that Jewish identity.

The article begins with a review of the recent literature on intermarriage, indicating how the present analysis goes beyond previous work in the field. It then provides a detailed description of the data set and methodology used in the analysis. Following a discussion of background variables, the article presents a new theory of Jewish identity and a typology of conversionary and mixed marriages. Empirical analysis of the Jewish identification and behavior of the various marriage types follows. This establishes the basis for the construction of an overall index of Jewish identification that makes it possible to quantify the various categories in the typology. The typology is then expanded to include a category we call "dual-identity" households. These households incorporate Jewish and Christian identities simultaneously. The concluding section takes note of the major findings and their implications.

Review of the Literature

Numerous books and articles in the last decade have discussed the effects of the escalating rate of Jewish intermarriage on the character and vitality of individual Jewish identity and the continuity and survival of the Ameri-

can Jewish community as a whole. Observers differ widely in their perceptions of the consequences of the intermarriage phenomenon.[2] At one end of the spectrum are scholars who are comparatively pessimistic, some of whom predict the eventual disappearance of a distinctive Jewish community, seeing only the survival of the Orthodox. At the other end of the spectrum are scholars who are relatively optimistic, who discern the transformation and even revitalization of the American Jewish community. Rising rates of intermarriage, the latter argue, provide an opportunity to strengthen the ranks of American Jewry through an infusion of new blood or "imports"—the born non-Jewish spouses and their children.

During the past ten years, it is the optimists who have dominated the discussion of Jewish intermarriage in the United States. Thus, Egon Mayer, who has written extensively on the subject, derives encouragement from the fact that contemporary intermarried couples tend to feel closer to Judaism than to Christianity. What is more, he argues, the generally higher educational and occupational status of the Jewish spouse enhances this leaning toward Judaism.[3]

Another scholar who leans toward the optimistic view is Steven M. Cohen. He argues that the "concentration of intermarriage among the Jewishly peripheral means it is less threatening to Jewish continuity." He also takes a positive view of conversionary marriages, which "in all likelihood . . . are both quantitative and qualitative assets to the Jewish population." However, Cohen is somewhat less sanguine about the impact of mixed marriages. On the plus side, he observes that "most mixed-married Jews report not one, but several sorts of attachment to Jewish people and Jewish ritual and, less frequently, to organized Jewry." On the negative side, he asserts that "the marriages of Jews to born non-Jews vastly increase the chances that the partners will be less involved in various aspects of Jewish life," even if the Jewish spouse was peripherally involved to begin with. On the whole, Cohen maintains, intermarriage does not present a "grave threat to the Jewish continuity of large numbers of American Jewry."[4]

A significant scholarly exchange on the subject of intermarriage appeared in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, volume 5. Israeli demographers Sergio DellaPergola and U.O. Schmelz interpret not only rising rates of intermar-

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[2]Interpersonal relationships in intermarried households are explored in Paul and Rachel Cowan, *Mixed Blessings: Marriage Between Jews and Christians* (New York, 1987) and in Susan Weidman Schneider, *Intermarriage: The Challenge of Living with Differences Between Christians and Jews* (New York, 1989).

[3]Egon Mayer, "Processes and Outcomes in Marriages Betweeen Jews and Non-Jews," *American Behavioral Scientist* 23, no. 4, Mar./Apr. 1980, pp. 487–518.

[4]Steven M. Cohen, "Reason for Optimism," in Steven M. Cohen and Charles S. Liebman, *The Quality of Jewish Life—Two Views* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1987), pp. 13–17; 26–27.

riage, but also trends toward postponement of marriage and nonmarriage, low fertility rates, increasing divorce, etc., as pointing to the "decline of the conventional Jewish family." Reviewing the available survey data, they argue that "as a result of more frequent out-marriage, particularly mixed marriage, Jewish identity is generally weakened, often amalgamated with the ethnocultural heritage of an originally non-Jewish spouse or parent and frequently lost in the longer run."[5]

Aiming to refute this position, Calvin Goldscheider asserts that "there is currently about a 20 percent gain of Jewish adults through conversion relative to total in-marriages."[6] Goldscheider argues that the "growing acceptance of intermarriage and the intermarried into Jewish life" and the "increasing similarity between the intermarried and the nonintermarried in measures of Jewishness" make for a situation in which a relationship between intermarriage and Jewish discontinuity is "weak and growing weaker." Goldscheider concludes: "Concerns over the demographic implications of Jewish intermarriage for survival of the group seem exaggerated."[7]

In this debate about its quantitative implications, the impact of intermarriage on the nature and intensity of Jewish identification and behavior has been relatively neglected. Thus, while Mayer, Goldscheider, and Cohen[8] all have data showing that persons living in intermarried households are generally less Jewishly involved than those in inmarried households (except for conversionary marrieds in matters of religious performance), these qualitative aspects of intermarriage have not been subjected to systematic and detailed analysis.

This study focuses directly on the nature and intensity of Jewish identification and behavior in conversionary and mixed marriages. The analysis highlights two significant factors that elsewhere have gone unnoticed: the Jewish denominational identification of the various types of households and the simultaneous presence within them of Christian symbols and practices. Moreover, the large size of the sample used in this study[9] permits a more

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[5]Sergio DellaPergola and Usiel O. Schmelz, "Demographic Transformations of American Jewry: Marriage and Mixed Marriage in the 1980s," and "American Jewish Marriages: Transformation and Erosion—A Rejoinder to Calvin Goldscheider," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 5, ed. Peter Y. Medding (New York and Oxford, 1989), pp. 169–200; 209–214; at 193.

[6]Calvin Goldscheider, "American Jewish Marriages: Erosion or Transformation?" *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 5, pp. 201–208; at 204.

[7]Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington, 1986), p. 28.

[8]Egon Mayer and Carl Sheingold, *Intermarriage and the Jewish Future: A National Study in Summary* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1979); Egon Mayer, *Love and Tradition* (New York, 1985); Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change*; Steven M. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?* (Bloomington, 1988).

[9]Thus, Goldscheider's sample of the Boston community contained 934 cases; Cohen's study

in-depth statistical analysis of qualitative data than ever previously undertaken.

Methodology

This article is based on data collected in eight different Jewish communities in the United States: Baltimore, Boston, Essex and Morris counties (New Jersey), Providence (Rhode Island), and Worcester, all in the eastern United States; Cleveland in the Midwest; Dallas in the Southwest; and the San Francisco Bay area in the West.[10]

These eight communities were selected from the many Jewish population surveys on file at the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University on the basis of four criteria. They reflect the current regional spread of American Jewry; the samples were fully representative; the data were collected between 1985 and 1988; and the questions relating to key variables were mostly identical, which permitted the files to be merged.

The analysis focuses on married couples, who are also referred to as households. In constructing a merged data set, therefore, the first step was to remove all unmarried respondents—i.e., the widowed, the divorced, the separated, singles—from the data files of each of the eight communities. Following this, a consecutive merged file was constructed via the SPSSX Data Analysis System. Consecutive merging of the variables was facilitated by the identical or almost identical wording of the questions, relating to the items (variables) that were included in the merged file.

In each of the individual community surveys a weighting factor had been applied to enable projections to be made corresponding to the estimated numbers of individuals and households in a particular community. The

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of New York was based on 1,566 cases, and Mayer and Sheingold's sample totaled 446 cases. As will be explained below, the present study includes 6,673 households.

[10] *Jewish Population Study of Greater Baltimore*. Prepared for Associated Jewish Charities and Welfare Fund. Data collected during 1985. Principal investigator: Gary A. Tobin. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Boston*. Prepared for the Combined Jewish Philanthropies. Data gathered during 1985. Principal investigator: Sherry Israel. *Jewish Population Study of MetroWest, New Jersey*. Prepared for the United Jewish Federation of MetroWest. Data gathered during 1985 and 1986. Principal investigator: Gary A. Tobin. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Worcester*. Prepared for the Worcester Jewish Federation. Data gathered during 1986. Principal investigator: Gary A. Tobin. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Cleveland*. Prepared for the Jewish Community Federation. Data gathered during 1987. Principal investigator: Ann Schorr. *Jewish Population Study of Rhode Island*. Prepared for the Jewish Federation of Rhode Island. Data gathered during 1987. Principal investigators: Calvin Goldscheider and Sidney Goldstein. *Jewish Population Study of the Bay Area*. Prepared for the Jewish Federations of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose. Data gathered during 1986. Principal investigator: Gary A. Tobin. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Dallas*. Prepared for the Jewish Federation of Greater Dallas. Data gathered during 1988. Principal investigator: Gary A. Tobin.

merged file is based on these projected totals. Consequently, the weight applied to each community in the merged file is determined by its projected Jewish population, and not by the actual numbers in the original sample used in each community survey. As such, the merged file is fully representative of the eight communities.

No attempt has been made to weight or correct the merged file further in order to seek to make it representative of the actual proportions of these communities within American Jewry as a whole. However, the same basic trends, relationships, and patterns relating to marriage types are found in each of the individual communities. As a result, merging the file does not erase, or average out, contradictory trends and patterns in the different communities.

The total projected number of households in the merged file is 197,078, representing a total Jewish population in the eight communities of over 433,104 individuals in inmarried households, 35,266 in conversionary households, and 106,163 individuals in mixed-married households—in all, 574,533 individuals, or about 9.75 percent of American Jewry. All percentage calculations have been made on the basis of these projected numbers. However, the numbers of cases (Ns) given in the tables are the actual or unweighted Ns in the merged file for each particular question, based on a total of 6,673 households. The Ns for each variable differ somewhat, because sometimes respondents did not answer a specific question, and in some cities certain questions were not asked. Moreover, placing the actual Ns in the tables is necessary to ensure that the number of cases in any cell is large enough for statistical analysis. As cells with an actual N lower than 10 must be treated with extreme caution on statistical grounds, they have been excluded from analysis and discussion. A note to this effect appears in the tables each time this occurs.

Levels of statistical significance have been computed using the gamma value. The data in the tables presented are statistically significant at the .001 level. ("Gamma" is a measure of association used for ordinal scales and in cross-tabulations that have more than 2x2 cells. It expresses the intensity of this association, and thus provides a more rigorous measure of significance than the yes/no character of the chi-square.)

The present analysis focuses on differences between marriage types, as reflected in the pattern of identification or behavior of the household as a unit. Occasionally, however, the analysis focuses on the attributes or achievements of the individual Jewish spouse or spouses, as, for example, is the case with most of the background variables (except for income, which is a household attribute). Thus, the incidence of the various types of marriage within the different age groups, for example, is arrived at by counting each individual Jewish spouse as a single unit.

The sum of the individual Jewish spouses in all marriage types will always be greater than the sum of couples or households. Put simply, one marriage of each type (inmarriage, conversionary, mixed) adds up to three marriages. However, the sum of born Jewish partners in these three marriages is four (two in the inmarriage, and one in each of the other types). Specifically, each N in tables 3–8, 10–11, and 13–14 represents the sum of the individual Jewish spouses who answered the relevant question and may be as high as 11,120. (The N in table 5 is slightly smaller because the question was not asked in every city.) In tables 1–2, 9, 12, and 15–35, the Ns are for households.

Household intermarriage rates—the percentage of intermarried couples as a proportion of all couples, households, or marriages—are always higher than individual rates—the percentage of born Jews in intermarriages as a proportion of the total of married Jewish individuals. Thus, in the example above, the individual intermarriage rate is 50 percent (two out of four Jews are in intermarriages), while the household intermarriage rate is 66 percent (two out of three marriages are intermarriages). Or, to take actual figures from table 3: for the decade 1980–1989, the individual rates shown—62 percent inmarriage, 5 percent conversionary marriage, and 33 percent mixed marriage—have computed equivalent household rates of 45 percent inmarriage, 7 percent conversionary marriage, and 48 percent mixed marriage.

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND MARRIAGE TYPES

Rates of Inmarriage and Intermarriage

As seen in table 1, the distribution of marriage types varies by community. For example, approximately 80 percent or more of marriages in Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, Essex/Morris counties, and Providence are inmarriages, whereas in San Francisco and Dallas the proportions are 60 percent and 66 percent, respectively. In the merged sample, as reported in table 2, 73 percent of all marriages are inmarriages, 5 percent are conversionary, and 21 percent are mixed marriages.

Decade of Marriage

The overall distribution of marriages in the merged sample shows a consistent increase in the incidence of intermarriage since 1960 (table 3). Almost 94 percent of Jewish individuals who married prior to 1960 are

inmarried; only 2 percent are in conversionary marriages and 5 percent in mixed marriages. The proportion inmarrying declines by about 10 percent in the 1960s, and by another 10 percent in the 1970s. This process becomes accelerated in the 1980s, when the rate of inmarriage declines by a further 13 percent. Conversely, the proportion entering into mixed marriages rises dramatically over time. By the 1980s, 33 percent of Jewish individuals are entering into mixed marriages.

Significantly, since the 1960s, the proportion of individuals entering into conversionary marriages has remained fairly steady, at about 5 percent. Despite what some have claimed, converts do not constitute an increasing proportion of the intermarried. To the contrary, the figures in table 3 show that they constitute a rapidly declining proportion of the intermarried, from 28–29 percent before 1970 to 13 percent in the 1980s.

Age and Generation

The basic pattern with regard to intermarriage is confirmed by examining marriages within age and generation, as presented in tables 4 and 5. The incidence of inmarriage declines steadily with age, from well over 90 percent among Jews aged 55 and older, to 70 percent among those aged 18–34. There has been a fivefold increase in the incidence of mixed marriage among younger age groups; 5 percent of those in the two oldest age groups are mixed-married, as compared with 25 percent of those aged 18–34. At the same time, the incidence of conversionary marriage more than doubles, rising from about 2 percent for those aged 55 and older, to 5 percent for those under age 44.

Tabulation of marriages by generation as presented in table 5 produces a similar but even more pronounced pattern than that seen in tables 3 and 4. While 93 percent of first-generation Jews are inmarried, only 56 percent of the fourth generation are. At the same time, the proportion of Jews entering into conversionary marriages increases threefold, from 2 percent in the first generation to 6 percent in the fourth. However, the proportion of those in mixed marriages increases more than sevenfold—from 5 percent in the first generation to 38 percent in the fourth.

Gender

In the past, Jewish men were much more likely than Jewish women to intermarry. Although rates of intermarriage and mixed marriage for both men and women have risen steadily over time, Jewish men are still more likely than Jewish women to intermarry. As seen in table 6, overall, 82 percent of Jewish men are inmarried, as compared with 90 percent of Jewish

women. The proportion of inmarriages among Jewish men declines by 35 percent in three decades, from 90 percent for the period before 1960 to 55 percent in the decade of the 1980s. For Jewish women, the proportion of inmarriages declines by 28 percent during the same period, from 98 percent to 70 percent. Significantly, since the 1960s, the decline in the proportion of inmarriages for the two sexes has proceeded apace, with a 23-percent decline among Jewish men and a 21-percent decline among Jewish women. Apart from the fact that both groups are subject to the same societal influences, the two rates are also integrally connected to each other: as increasing proportions of Jewish men intermarry, there will be fewer available Jewish males for Jewish women.

In all decades of marriage, Jewish men are consistently more likely than Jewish women to be involved in conversionary marriages, indicating the greater propensity of non-Jewish women to convert to Judaism, as compared with non-Jewish men married to Jewish women. Over three decades, the proportion of mixed marriages among Jewish women increases from 2 percent to 28 percent, while among Jewish men it increases from 8 percent to 38 percent.

Multiple Marriages

Intermarriages are more common in subsequent marriages than in first marriages, as seen in table 7. While 86 percent of first marriages are inmarriages, the proportion drops to 70 percent in second marriages and 54 percent in third or subsequent marriages. Conversely, rates of mixed marriage rise with the number of marriages, while conversionary marriages remain fairly static. Other data, not reported in table 7, indicate that individuals under the age of 45 are more likely to have multiple marriages than those over age 45. Nevertheless, when controls for age are introduced, mixed marriages are still more common in the case of multiple marriages. Multiple marriage, it appears, lowers the likelihood of choice of Jewish marriage partners, possibly because religiously suitable partners are less readily available. In addition, factors related to starting and raising a family may no longer be relevant, which may also influence these trends.

Age at First Marriage

Table 8 examines mean age at first marriage. For the entire sample, the mean age is 25 years. Inmarried men have a mean age of 25.9 years, while for women it is 23.2 years. The mean age jumps to 27.8 years for males and to 25.7 years for females in conversionary marriages, and to 27.9 years for males and 26 years for females in mixed marriages. The tendency of conver-

sionary and mixed marriages to occur at a later age than inmarriages suggests that a substantial proportion of never-married individuals currently in their thirties and forties are likely to marry non-Jews.

Children at Home

The distribution of marriage types among households with children at home, as presented in table 9, more or less mirrors that of the whole sample (see table 2). If anything, there are slightly more mixed-married households with children at home than the proportion of mixed-marrieds in the total sample, reflecting the increased incidence of mixed marriage among the younger age groups. Overall, 24 percent of households with children at home are mixed marriages, and 4 percent are conversionary marriages. Thus, nearly three in ten families with children at home have one spouse who was not born Jewish, and the vast majority of these constitute mixed marriages.

Education, Occupation, Income

Marriage type is related to socioeconomic status, but in ways that defy conventional wisdom, which associates intermarriage with high socioeconomic achievement and integration. The data reported here indicate the opposite—higher socioeconomic status is associated with lower levels of mixed marriage, higher rates of conversion, and higher rates of inmarriage. Education, occupation, and income alone are weakly associated with marriage-type variation, but these associations are stronger when age group is introduced as a variable. Generally, lower socioeconomic status is associated with higher rates of intermarriage and much higher rates of mixed marriage. This is particularly noticeable in the 18–34 age group, as seen in table 10. For example, 74 percent of those with a graduate degree in that age group are inmarried, compared with 69 percent of those with a college degree, 63 percent of those with some college, and 59 percent of those with a high-school diploma or less. Conversely, 41 percent of those with a high-school education are in mixed marriages, but only 19 percent of those with graduate degrees. There are also differences in the incidence of conversionary marriages. In the 18–34 age group, 7 percent of those with graduate degrees are in conversionary marriages, as compared with under 1 percent of those with a high-school diploma or less. Overall, similar but less pronounced marriage patterns appear for the 35–44 age group but are not present among those aged over 45 years.

Again, as the data in table 11 indicate, in the 18–34 age group, between 72 percent and 75 percent of those in professional, executive, and sales

positions are inmarried, as compared to 61 percent of those in clerical positions, and 54 percent of those in blue-collar and service occupations. Conversely, while the proportion of mixed-marrieds is about 20 percent in the three highest occupational categories in the 18–34 age group, it climbs to 45 percent in the lowest occupational category. As with education, these patterns are apparent, but less so, in the 35–44 age group, but for the most part are not present in the older age groups.

This general picture is further corroborated by the household income data. While table 12 shows that the proportion of mixed marriages is at its lowest where income is highest, that is, among those earning over $150,000, the opposite does not appear to be true, and there does not appear to be any association between lower income and higher rates of mixed marriage. However, when broader income categories are used, lower income does turn out to be associated with mixed marriage. Overall, 26 percent of those with incomes below $75,000 are mixed-married as compared with 18 percent of those earning over $75,000. The picture is sharpened further when we control for age, as shown in table 13.

The data demonstrate clearly that there is a strong association between lower income and higher rates of mixed marriage among those aged under 45, but that it does not exist at all among those over 45. Thus in the under 45 age group, 37 percent of those earning under $30,000 and 33 percent of those earning between $30,000 and $75,000 are mixed-married, while 21 percent among those earning over $75,000 are. Conversely, 56 and 59 percent, respectively, of the two lower income groups are inmarried, compared with 72 percent of those earning over $75,000. Turning to those over 45 years, the differences between the rates of mixed marriage of the three income groups are extremely small. The rate of mixed marriage is slightly higher in the middle income group (17 percent) than among the lower and higher income earners (12 percent and 15 percent, respectively).

In all, greater proportions of younger Jews than of older Jews are better educated, in more prestigious occupations, and earn higher incomes. Why they are more likely to inmarry than those young people who do not achieve these educational, occupational, and income levels, and why the latter are more likely to marry out, is not clear from our data. One possible explanation is that within a community in which high levels of achievement are the norm, low achievers will be less attractive marriage partners and more limited in their choices than high achievers. Conversely, low achievers in terms of Jewish norms may still be relatively high achievers by the norms of American society as a whole and may seek to maximize these assets outside the Jewish community rather than compete within it against higher achievers.

Jewish Education

The data relating to Jewish education, as reported in table 14, seem to indicate that individuals who have had some Jewish education and those who have had none at all are almost equally likely to be involved in conversionary and mixed marriages. However, closer examination of the data does reveal differences based on duration of Jewish education, particularly so in younger age groups. In general, as can be seen in table 15, going from older to younger age groups, there is a linear increase in the proportion of individuals receiving more than six years of Jewish education, strikingly so among women. Thus, 45 percent of women aged 18–34, as against 21 percent of women over 65 years of age, received six or more years of Jewish education; the comparable figures for men are 46 percent and 35 percent. Similarly, the proportion of women receiving no Jewish education at all declines markedly, from 45 percent of those aged 65 and over, to 25 percent of those in the 18–34 age group. By way of contrast, the proportion of men of all age groups with no Jewish education at all is consistently much lower—in the range of 11 percent to 20 percent—and there is no linear relationship with age.

While Jewish women are both less likely than Jewish men to have received any Jewish education at all, and to have received it for more than six years, older Jewish women are also less likely to intermarry. This suggests a complex relationship between Jewish education and the propensity to intermarry. To control for these factors, table 15 presents the figures for years of Jewish education broken down by both age and gender. A comparison of those with more than six years of Jewish education and those with less or none at all confirms that Jewish education is clearly associated with higher rates of inmarriage and lower rates of mixed marriage. While this holds true for both men and women in all age groups, the association between more than six years of Jewish education and inmarriage is strongest in younger age groups: especially among men aged 35–54, and is also weakly present in the 18–34 age group; for women it is strongest among those under age 45 (particularly in the 18–34 age group).

Among those with less than six years of Jewish education, there does not appear to be a consistent relationship between number of years of Jewish education and the propensity to inmarry. In only two out of ten cases (Jewish males aged 35–44 and Jewish males aged 45–54) is there a clear linear relationship between the two, with those having up to five years of Jewish education more likely to be inmarried than those without any Jewish education. In four other cases the opposite is true—those who have not received any Jewish education are more likely to be inmarried than those with up to five years of Jewish education. In yet another four cases there is little or no difference at all.

In general, the association between inmarriage and a lengthy period of Jewish education appears strongest at a time when the incidence of intermarriage is relatively high, as can be seen among younger men and women, and appears weakest when the incidence of intermarriage is relatively low, as in the case of older men and women. Clearly, the relationship between these two elements is not linear but is mediated by other powerful social and psychological factors, most especially the character and salience of personal Jewish identity at the time of marriage.

These background data have been concerned with the question of which Jews have a greater or lesser propensity to intermarry. Overall, they indicate that age, generation, and gender are more highly associated with intermarriage than are the other background factors. Intermarriage rates are highest among younger and fourth-generation American Jews, particularly males. The data also show an increased incidence of mixed marriage over time, with the rates of conversionary marriage remaining fairly stable.

By the 1980s, just under half of the marriages involving Jews were mixed, forming families in which one spouse was Jewish and the other was a non-Jew. Consistently, the incidence of mixed marriage was found to be highest in the younger age groups, among whom it was only slightly lowered by long exposure to Jewish education. Thus, in the youngest age cohorts, even those who received more than six years of Jewish education manifest a relatively high rate of mixed marriage, peaking at 25 percent among males aged 18–34 years (see table 15).

This finding of increasing mixed marriage even among strongly identified Jews suggests a hitherto unappreciated and intriguing possibility: the increasing incidence of mixed marriage may be associated with underlying changes in the nature of Jewish personal and group identity. These changes, in turn, have led to expectations or hopes that Jewish identity can still be maintained and transmitted in mixed marriages.

Given the increasing incidence of intermarriage, how these hopes and expectations play themselves out—in short, what happens to Jewish identity in conversionary and mixed marriages—is a particularly crucial question for investigation. We begin with a theoretical analysis of the nature of contemporary Jewish identity, the underlying changes within it, and the implications for different marriage types.

CONTEMPORARY JEWISH IDENTITY AND INTERMARRIAGE

Jewish identity is located at the core of personal identity, which Herbert Kelman defines as "the enduring aspects of the person's definition of himself . . . the individual's conception of who he is and what he is over time and across situations." Included in this is "the child's cultural and ethnic heritage—the groups into which he is born." These form "an inherent part of his identity . . . by virtue of the fact that the group[s] to which he belongs are usually an inevitable part of his life experience." Thus, Kelman notes, an individual's ethnic and cultural heritage "enters into who and what he is, just as his biological heritage does." The individual, therefore, "must somehow take his cultural as well as his biological heritage into account if he is to develop a firm personal identity." The group's definition of itself, its own conception of its basic values, enters into the individual's personal identity as an ongoing cultural heritage that exists independently of the individuals that bear it, being expressed in written documents, oral traditions, institutions, and symbols.[11]

A Partial Community of Shared Feelings[12]

In the past, the common denominator of Jewish identity was a community of belief based on a system of shared prescriptive values. Over the last century, however, this has shifted in the direction of a community of shared individual feelings. The community of belief constituted a total system that controlled the individual's environment with a detailed pattern of prescribed actions and fixed roles. Group membership was thus clearly defined. In contrast, the contemporary community of shared individual feelings is a voluntary and partial community of personal choice, with unclear boundaries and undefined membership. It is characterized by emotions and attachments, which, while often deep, are not always clearly articulated.

This shift in Jewish identity is paralleled and reinforced by the trend in American society in the direction of what Richard Merelman has called "the decline of group belongingness and the rise of individualization." Merelman notes that in contemporary America, "many people continue to be members and identify with groups, [but] they believe their group identities to be matters of individual choice, which can be changed without

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[11]Herbert C. Kelman, "The Place of Jewish Identity in the Development of Personal Identity." Working paper prepared for the American Jewish Committee's Colloquium on Jewish Education and Jewish Identity, Nov. 1974, mimeo, pp. 1–3.

[12]The next two sections further develop the theory first propounded in Peter Y. Medding, "Segmented Ethnicity and the New Jewish Politics," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 3 (New York and Oxford, 1987), ed. Ezra Mendelsohn, pp. 26–45.

stigma. Group membership thus becomes voluntary, contingent, fluid, not 'given,' fixed and rigid." [13] The process that Merelman is describing shows itself in the fact that many American Jews give strong expression to feelings of Jewishness as a central component of their personal identity even when they fail to uphold major Jewish religious beliefs and rituals. As documented in many studies, being Jewish is very important to such individuals: they express considerable Jewish pride, are comfortable with their Jewishness, are happy that they were born Jewish, relate to other Jews as family, and want their children to remain Jewish.

Despite the shift away from the community of shared belief, the religious value system remains a distinctive defining characteristic of the Jewish group at the normative and cultural levels. Popular religious observances—i.e., those relating to *rites de passage* and the holidays—continue to provide personal identity with its group aspects, even though the practices may have been selectively detached from a coherent and consistent whole. They serve as a vehicle for expressing shared feelings in familial and communal contexts, which reinforce and heighten the positive emotional affect of group belonging at the core of personal identity.

At the same time, religion differentiates and separates Jews from other groups. This implies, first and foremost, a rejection of the dominant Christian culture.[14] In Robert Bellah's words, "It is part of Jewish identity and the maintenance of the boundaries of the Jewish community to deny that Jesus is the Christ, the Messiah. This is to claim, however tacitly, that Christianity is a false religion."[15] Paradoxically, as the religious aspects of Judaism have become relatively less central to the core of Jewish identity, and shared feelings have become more important, being *not* Christian has taken on greater salience as a defining element of Jewishness.[16]

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[13]Richard M. Merelman, *Making Something of Ourselves: On Culture and Politics in the United States* (Berkeley, 1984), p. 30.

[14]As Ben Halpern puts it, "America is really a Christian country." See the illuminating discussion in his *Jews and Blacks: The Classic American Minorities* (New York, 1971). The citation is on p. 60.

[15]Robert N. Bellah, "Competing Visions of the Role of Religion in American Society," in *Uncivil Religion: Interreligious Hostility in America*, eds. Robert N. Bellah and Frederick E. Greenspahn (New York, 1987), p. 228.

[16]Psychologist Joel Crohn, who has worked in marital counseling and ethnotherapy groups with ethnic and religious intermarriages, reports that "Christian symbols were often perceived by the Jewish partners as unwelcome and even dangerous reminders of the dominance of the Christian world." Some "perceived irreconcilable differences between the Jewish and Christian worlds." One intermarried Jewish subject in such a group, when asked by another group member, "Do you feel like learning about Christianity is somehow betraying who you are—like it's entering the bowels of the demon?" replied, "Yeah. I feel like it's a big betrayal." See Joel Crohn, *Ethnic Identity and Marital Conflict: Jews, Italians and WASPs* (New York, Institute for American Pluralism, American Jewish Committee, 1986), pp. 33, 36.

In the partial community of shared individual feelings, Jewishness forms part of the core of self-identity. As such, it can be significant without requiring the individual to raise it constantly to the level of conscious awareness. But there are also occasions in the life of the individual which do characteristically raise the issue of Jewish identity to the level of conscious awareness, among them being when choosing a marriage partner, at the birth of a child, and when making decisions about whether and how to transmit an ethnic heritage to the children. Similarly, events that affect the larger Jewish group, such as episodes of prejudice and discrimination—rejection of the group by others—may be experienced as personal rejection. Such rejection threatens all members of the community of shared individual feelings—constituting an attack on the core of personality—whether or not the attack is directed at them personally and however tenuous their own ties with the group.

Segmented and Unambiguous Jewish Identity

The Jewishness of the community of shared feelings in contemporary American society has become segmented in a number of different ways.

First, Jewishness constitutes only one segment of personal identity, existing alongside others, such as those deriving from being an American, college-educated, a high-income earner, or a social and political liberal, for example. Needless to say, the various aspects of personal identity inform and shape each other. Thus, the trait of Jewishness plays a part in how Jews act out their various roles in American society, while their various roles in American society influence their Jewish identity.

Second, the multiple aspects of identity coexist independently rather than coalescing to form a larger, integrated whole. The result is what might be termed a pluralistic personality. The significance and salience for the individual of any particular segment of his or her personal identity will vary with particular circumstances—personal, societal, historical, and so forth.

Third, neither the extent nor the intensity of the Jewish segment of personal identity is fixed. The Jewish segment may be very broad, taking in many aspects of contemporary Jewish group identity (such as religion, Israel, philanthropy, culture, group defense, friendship) or only one or a few of these. At the same time, involvement in even a single, narrow segment of Jewishness may be very intense, whereas simultaneous involvement in a number of aspects may be attenuated.

While contemporary Jewish identity is segmented in these various ways, the core of Jewishness remains unambiguous, in the sense that it is perceived by both Jews and others to be exclusively connected with the Jewish group's cultural and ethnic heritage. Thus, in families in which both parents are

Jewish and continue to identify as such, the Jewish ethnic and cultural self-identity imparted to their children is unambiguous, even when it is weak or generates ambivalence. They are Jewish and nothing else. The Jewish self-identity of these individuals defines both who they are and who they are not, irrespective of the extent and intensity of its particular form. The process of unambiguous Jewish identity formation is reinforced by values in American society encouraging individuals to build on their own cultural roots for purposes of self-esteem, individual happiness, and positive intergroup relations. Under these conditions, an unambiguous ethnic identity provides the foundation for a secure personal identity.[17]

Segmented Jewish Identity and Mixed Marriage

The existence of a segmented and unambiguous Jewish identity encourages Jews who enter into mixed marriages to assume that this will not prevent them from continuing to affirm and maintain the Jewish element at the core of their personal identity. (By the same token, their non-Jewish spouses, if they so choose, will be able to maintain a culturally different personal identity.) They see Jewish identity as a personal issue and are convinced that participation in a mixed family is compatible with strong personal expressions of Jewishness: to feel part of the Jewish people, to be proud of one's Jewishness, to attend synagogue, to perform Jewish rituals, or to support Israel. The experience of diversity and pluralism within the family may be deemed personally enriching. The rationale of mixed marriage, therefore, is that neither partner's personal identity need impinge on the other.

The structural realities of American Jewish life predispose young American Jews to meet, date, and marry non-Jews. The segmented and unambiguous character of their Jewish identity often leads them to assume or hope that intermarriage will have little effect on their Jewish feelings and commitments. Many also believe that their children will likewise be Jewish and that mixed families are not a bar to the transmission of a Jewish personal identity. These expectations are not always realized, however, and indeed run counter to the fundamental dynamics of mixed families in America. Thus, an unambiguous Jewish identity in the parental generation may turn out to be a terminal Jewish identity in the next. In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine the identity dynamics in mixed and conversionary marriages.

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[17]See Perry London and Barry Chazan, *Psychology and Jewish Identity Education* (American Jewish Committee, 1990), p. 9, who cite the theory of Henry Tajfel and John Turner that "feeling positive toward one's group is a major factor in enhancing one's self-image and self-esteem," and that "strong group identity promotes a positive sense of self."

Identity Dynamics in Conversionary and Mixed Marriages

Conversionary and mixed marriages reflect very different hopes and goals, and set in motion opposing processes. Conversion to Judaism generally indicates a desire to create an environment for identity formation that avoids competing and conflicting identities within the family and thereby increases the chances of developing an unambiguous Jewish identity in the children. Conversion to Judaism, however, is a process, not an act, and as such it is by no means easy, quick, or inexorable. Some who convert may not proceed very far along the road, may stop, or go backward, while others do indeed reach the final destination. Conversion involves a change of personal and group identity by the non-Jew, necessitating, on the one hand, distancing, disaffiliation, and cutting off ties with the usually Christian spiritual heritage and identity of the family into which the individual was born, and the adoption of Jewish symbols, behavior, and identity, on the other.

Conversion to Judaism may trigger a number of difficulties. In the first place, a Christian core identity may prove resistant to change, and may therefore manifest or reassert itself on symbolic occasions during the cycle of the year, or at critical junctures of the life cycle, unless it is consciously rejected. Secondly, it is often not clear what becoming Jewish entails in terms of the Jewish partner's desires and expectations. If it entails conversion to Judaism as a religion, then it is clear what that means and how it can be achieved. But if Jewishness involves an ethnic dimension—a relationship in blood, membership in a people characterized by shared feelings and history—it is not so clear how this may be attained, even after formal religious conversion. It may take time and experience before the convert to Judaism "feels" Jewish.

Mixed marriage involves a very different situation. A mixed family creates an environment for identity formation that is founded on the competing heritages of the Jewish and the non-Jewish spouses, both of which enter into the child's core identity. Mixed marriage thus not only decreases the likelihood that an unambiguous Jewish identity will be formed, but also raises the possibility that no Jewish identity at all will emerge. As Nathan Glazer has explained, "Their children have alternatives before them that the children of families in which both parents were born Jewish do not—they have legitimate alternative identities."[18]

In mixed-married families, the absence of agreement about fundamental matters of identity confronts the children with a choice between four alternatives: they can incorporate the identity of the Jewish parent, that of the

[18]Nathan Glazer, *New Perspectives in American Jewish Sociology* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1987), p. 13.

non-Jewish parent, that of both, or that of neither. Identifying wholly with one parent may prove traumatic to the extent that it involves the rejection of the other parent, as well as part of the self. Maintaining both identities simultaneously may create tensions and conflicts that prevent the development of an integrated personal identity. Thus, the most commonly chosen solution may turn out to be identifying with neither parent and focusing on shared, general, secular values.

The range of possible Jewish identity outcomes from both conversionary and mixed marriages can be presented in the form of a typology with six cells or subtypes.

CONVERSIONARY AND MIXED-MARRIAGE TYPOLOGY

Marriage Type	Jewish Identification Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Conversionary	LC	MC	HC
Mixed	LM	MM	HM

The cells are based on the intersection of Jewish identification and marriage type. As there are three levels of Jewish identification (low, medium, and high) and two marriage types (conversionary and mixed) this results in six subtypes, three for each marriage type.

At this point, this typology does not take account of the possible simultaneous presence within the various marriage types and subtypes of a Christian identity, assuming an inverse relationship between Jewish identity and Christian elements. The existence of marriages in which Jewish and Christian identities are both maintained will be examined at a later stage and will result in an expanded typology.

Having established a theoretical framework for the examination of Jewish identity in mixed and conversionary marriages, let us now turn to the empirical data.

MARRIAGE TYPE AND JEWISH IDENTIFICATION

Denomination

Jewish identity is formed not only within the family but also within formal religious structures, such as synagogues and schools, which are

generally affiliated with organized Jewish religious movements. These denominations, as they are known, represent alternative normative patterns of Jewish belief and behavior, each having different standards and expectations on a whole range of matters, including conversion to Judaism and mixed marriage.

It was argued above that, in the community of shared feelings, the religious aspect of Jewish identity continues to be central to the core of individual and group identity. One expression of this is the overwhelming extent to which American Jews think of themselves as being Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform Jews, even when they are not formally affiliated with a synagogue or temple.[19] (In the survey files, there is an additional category of "Just Jewish." Sometimes it is a specific denominational alternative; when not, it is a residual category for all who give some other broad general term of Jewish identification.) In all, denomination is likely to be strongly associated with differences in the pattern of individual Jewish identification and behavior.

The need to control for denomination is underscored by the differential distribution of the four denominations within each marriage type, as shown in table 16. Thus, Conservative Jews constitute over one-third of the total sample, but only 12 percent of the mixed-marrieds. Conversely, those who identify as Just Jewish represent less than 14 percent of the total sample but make up over one-third of the mixed-marrieds. Finally, Reform Jews represent 45 percent of the total sample but constitute 57 percent of the conversionary marrieds.

These patterns of discrepant representation are a result of the clear relationship between denominational identification and marriage type, as shown in table 17. In the case of the inmarrieds, the rank order is Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Just Jewish, while in the case of the mixed-marrieds it is the reverse. About nine in ten Orthodox and Conservative Jews are inmarried, as against seven in ten Reform Jews, and five in ten of the Just Jewish. Conversely, nearly half of the persons calling themselves Just Jewish are mixed-marrieds, as are over one-fifth of those identifying as Reform Jews, but only one in 15 of those calling themselves Orthodox and Conservative Jews. The overall level of conversionary marriages is low among all denominational groups—ranging between 2 percent and 7 percent—with the rank order being Reform, Conservative, Just Jewish, and Orthodox. (The very small number of Orthodox conversionary and mixed-marrieds in our sample necessitates their exclusion from all further statisti-

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[19]See Jack Wertheimer, "Recent Trends in American Judaism," AJYB 1989, vol. 89, pp. 63–162, for a broad-ranging analysis of denominationalism in American Jewish life. Denominational self-identification in 27 recent community studies ranged between 70 and 95 percent. In the same communities, between 26 and 84 percent were currently synagogue members.

cal analyses involving denominations, leaving only Orthodox inmarrieds).

It is clear, then, that persons identifying themselves with different wings of American Judaism exhibit very different marriage profiles. While Orthodox and Conservative Jews are predominantly inmarried, among those who identify as Reform, three in ten are either conversionary marrieds or mixed-marrieds, as are half of the Just Jewish. It must be emphasized, however, that these denominational figures are based on current self-identification, and their relationship to family of origin is unknown. Thus, a person who grew up in an Orthodox home and married a convert might decide that he or she would be more comfortable affiliating with a Conservative or Reform congregation. One cannot draw any conclusions from these data about possible linkages between the denomination of the family of origin and the propensity to engage in conversionary or mixed marriages.

Religious Affiliation and Identification

Synagogue membership and attendance give public expression to religious affiliation and identification. On a more private, familial level, ritual practice plays the same role.

Data on Jewish religious affiliation and identification—as measured by synagogue membership, synagogue attendance, and ritual practice—appear in tables 18, 19, and 20 for marriage types within denominations, for marriage types alone, and for denominations alone. The overall data for marriage types show that the differences between inmarrieds and conversionary marrieds are very narrow and not unidirectional. Inmarrieds are slightly more likely than conversionary marrieds to belong to synagogues, but conversionary marrieds are more likely than inmarrieds to attend synagogue regularly. Thus, 60 percent of inmarrieds belong to synagogues and 28 percent attend regularly, while among the conversionary marrieds the figures are 56 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Inmarrieds and conversionary marrieds perform Jewish rituals with almost identical degrees of frequency: 87 percent of both groups attend a Passover seder, 85 percent and 84 percent light Hanukkah candles, 68 percent fast on Yom Kippur, and 38 percent and 32 percent, respectively, light Sabbath candles.

The most striking feature of the data contained in these tables is the marked difference between inmarrieds and conversionary marrieds, on the one hand, and mixed-marrieds, on the other. For all three measures, mixed-marrieds score 30 percent to 40 percent lower than the inmarrieds and the conversionary marrieds: 15 percent of mixed-marrieds belong to a synagogue; 6 percent attend synagogue regularly (53 percent never attend); 52 percent participate in a seder; 52 percent light Hanukkah candles; 34 percent fast on Yom Kippur; and 3 percent light Sabbath candles.

For all three marriage types, the same denominational rank order from highest to lowest—Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Just Jewish—is evident. Thus, 36 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds are synagogue members, as against 21 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds, and 5 percent of Just Jewish mixed-marrieds. The comparable figures for regular synagogue attendance are 75 percent, 63 percent, and 25 percent, respectively. The practice of all the Jewish rituals in table 20 follows a similar pattern. For example, 76 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds fast on Yom Kippur, as against 40 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds, and 17 percent of Just Jewish mixed-marrieds. The three apparent exceptions to this pattern do not alter this basic finding.[20]

Comparison of the different marriage types within denominations shows that Conservative and Reform conversionary marrieds are less likely than their inmarried counterparts to belong to synagogues, but are more likely to attend synagogue. The differences in synagogue membership are greatest among Conservative Jews: 68 percent of Conservative inmarrieds belong to synagogues, but only 54 percent of Conservative conversionary marrieds do; 59 percent of Reform inmarrieds and 57 percent of Reform conversionary marrieds belong. With regard to synagogue attendance, in both denominations the margin in favor of conversionary marrieds is about 10 percent: 42 percent of Conservative conversionary marrieds attend synagogue regularly, as do 32 percent of Conservative inmarrieds; among Reform Jews the equivalent figures are 33 percent and 22 percent. However, no clear pattern emerges for ritual performance: in both denominations, inmarrieds and conversionary marrieds are variously higher on different rituals. Moreover, the margins between them are very narrow, usually a few percent.

In contrast, Just Jewish conversionary marrieds consistently score higher, and sometimes much higher, than Just Jewish inmarrieds on all three measures of religious affiliation and identification. Thus, 49 percent of Just Jewish conversionary marrieds belong to synagogues, as compared with 23 percent of Just Jewish inmarrieds; 66 percent of the conversionaries attend synagogue at least a few times a year, but only 43 percent of the inmarrieds do so. Again, 86 percent of Just Jewish conversionary marrieds light Hanukkah candles and 60 percent fast on Yom Kippur, as compared with 52 percent and 33 percent, respectively, of Just Jewish inmarrieds. The differences between the two groups indicate an underlying secular orienta-

[20]In two cases (higher figures for seder attendance and Hanukkah candle lighting by Conservative inmarrieds than Orthodox inmarrieds and higher synagogue membership among Reform conversionary marrieds than among Conservative conversionary marrieds), the percentage differences are marginal. In the third case (higher levels of ritual performance by Just Jewish conversionary marrieds than by Reform conversionary marrieds), the actual numbers of Just Jewish conversionary marrieds are so small that these results must be treated with caution.

tion among Just Jewish inmarrieds, and a more religious orientation on the part of Just Jewish conversionary marrieds, even when this is not accompanied by current denominational identification. (There may, of course, have been some denominational affiliation in the past, during the conversion process.) Given the relatively small actual numbers of Just Jewish conversionary marrieds, however, all findings relating to them must remain somewhat tentative and will therefore be excluded from further analysis.

The considerably lower levels of religious involvement of mixed-marrieds are maintained within the various denominations. On average, mixed-marrieds are 25 percent lower than the other two marriage types on all measures of religious identification and affiliation. Thus, 36 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds, 21 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds, and 5 percent of Just Jewish mixed-marrieds belong to a synagogue, as compared to 68 percent, 59 percent, and 23 percent, respectively, of comparable inmarrieds. Similarly, 76 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds, 68 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds, and 35 percent of Just Jewish mixed-marrieds light Hanukkah candles, while 95 percent, 86 percent, and 52 percent of equivalent inmarrieds do so.

Mixed-marrieds calling themselves Conservative are more likely to belong to synagogues (36 percent) than Reform mixed-marrieds (21 percent). This is true despite the Reform movement's recognition of patrilineal descent and greater Conservative ideological opposition to mixed marriage.

Denominational identification is closely associated with level of religious involvement. As seen in tables 18, 19, and 20, Conservative and Reform mixed-marrieds are on average about 30 percent more likely than Just Jewish mixed-marrieds to have current synagogue membership, to attend synagogue, and to participate in ritual practice. Clearly, among mixed-marrieds a denominational self-definition is associated with a higher level of religious involvement, while Just Jewish as a self-definition indicates conscious distancing from Jewish religious identification.

The strength and stability of the relationship between marriage type and religious affiliation and identification were tested by controlling for the effects of age and family type (not shown in table). For age, the sample was divided into two groups: under 45 years of age and over 45 years of age. For family type, the sample was divided into two groups: couples with no children at all and couples with unmarried children, whether living at home or not. These controls were applied to the questions relating to synagogue membership, synagogue attendance, and ritual practice, for the three marriage types, both by themselves and within denomination. The results indicate that while both age and family type are themselves influential, the impact of marriage type and denomination are still clearly evident within age groups and family types. In general, the expected age-related and life-

cycle-related influences do not diminish the strength of the association between denomination and marriage type on the one hand, and Jewish religious affiliation and identification, on the other.

Two aspects of the relationship between marriage type and Jewish religious identification and affiliation are particularly noteworthy. The first is the extent to which conversionary marriages are like inmarriages, both as a whole and within denomination. Clearly, conversion often leads to the maintenance of Jewish religious practices. At the same time, a significant proportion of conversionary marriages are low in their levels of Jewish religious practice, which raises questions about the quality and meaning of such conversions. The second aspect is the low overall level of Jewish religious affiliation and practice of mixed-marrieds, although these levels are slightly higher among those who are denominationally identified. Mixed marriage clearly militates against Jewish religious affiliation and practice.

Organizational Membership and Ties to Israel

The broad pattern of organizational membership for the three marriage types, as presented in table 21, generally parallels that for synagogue membership (see table 18). Indeed, the same rank order is evident—inmarrieds, conversionary marrieds, and mixed-marrieds. At the same time, there are some significant variations.

The data for marriage types as a whole (at the base of table 21) show that inmarrieds and mixed-marrieds respond uniformly to both organizational and synagogue membership, but with one fundamental difference: inmarrieds are uniformly quite high in their membership levels, while mixed-marrieds are uniformly low. Thus, 57 percent of inmarrieds belong to Jewish organizations and 60 percent to synagogues, whereas 16 percent of mixed-marrieds belong to Jewish organizations and 15 percent to synagogues. In contrast, however, among conversionary marrieds, the level of Jewish organizational membership is significantly lower than that for synagogue membership—45 percent belong to Jewish organizations and 56 percent to synagogues.

When the data for membership in synagogues and other Jewish organizations are combined, it is found that 40 percent of inmarrieds belong to both and 24 percent to neither, 31 percent of conversionary marrieds belong to both and 30 percent to neither, and 5 percent of mixed-marrieds belong to both and 75 percent to neither.

From the data it would appear that conversion to Judaism in the sense of religious integration proceeds faster than communal integration. Apparently it takes longer to acquire and develop Jewish communal ties than it does to adopt new religious beliefs and practices. At the same time, the

obstacles placed by mixed marriage in the path of Jewish self-identity seem to apply equally to both the religious and communal dimensions.

Ties to Israel were probed by means of a question asking whether any member of the household had ever made a trip to Israel. The data at the base of table 22 replicate the rank order seen previously: inmarrieds, conversionary marrieds, and mixed-marrieds. Overall, 47 percent of inmarrieds have visited Israel, as compared to 39 percent of conversionary marrieds, and 21 percent of mixed-marrieds.

When the denominational factor is taken into account (see the base of tables 21 and 22), some noteworthy exceptions emerge. On the one hand, the expected rank order for both organizational membership and visits to Israel of Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Just Jewish is maintained. However, with regard to visiting Israel, differences between the Just Jewish and the other denominations are rather small; indeed, only 2 percent separates Reform Jews and the Just Jewish in this regard. For Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews, the level of synagogue membership is higher than the level of organizational membership, which in turn is higher than the level of Israel visits. For the Just Jewish, however, the reverse is true: the level of Israel visits is highest (34 percent), followed by organizational membership (26 percent), with the level of synagogue membership (16 percent) lowest. These data further demonstrate the underlying secular orientation of the Just Jewish, in all marriage types.

When marriage types within denominations are examined, there is a striking exception to the expected pattern: Conservative conversionary marrieds are almost as likely as Conservative inmarrieds to belong to Jewish organizations (56 percent as against 59 percent) and more likely to visit Israel (55 percent as against 47 percent). Based on this finding, the earlier suggestion that conversionary marrieds generally have a lower level of ethnic and communal identification as compared to their religious identification must be revised, since it holds only for Reform, but not for Conservatives. The explanation may lie in the interaction between denomination and conversion, perhaps in the differing standards and expectations of Conservative and Reform conversions, combined with a process of self-selection among those undertaking conversion.

Within each denomination, mixed-marrieds are consistently less likely than other marriage types to belong to Jewish organizations and to visit Israel. Moreover, their levels of participation are lower than their already low levels of religious affiliation and identification. Thus, 33 percent of Conservative, 17 percent of Reform, and 7 percent of Just Jewish mixed-marrieds belong to Jewish organizations; the comparable figures for visiting Israel are 16 percent, 20 percent, and 24 percent.

When controls are introduced for age, the results (not shown in a table)

clarify further the differential processes at work among Conservative and Reform conversionary marrieds. While both Conservative and Reform inmarrieds and mixed-marrieds over the age of 45 are much more likely to have visited Israel than those under the age of 45, with Conservative and Reform conversionary marrieds the situation is reversed. Among Conservative conversionary marrieds under the age of 45, 61 percent have visited Israel, as compared to 34 percent of those over the age of 45; among Reform conversionary marrieds, 27 percent of those under the age of 45 have visited Israel, as compared to 18 percent of those over the age of 45.

It would appear that the increasing centrality given to Israel in contemporary Jewish life has in recent years found direct expression in visits to Israel as part of the conversion process, whether formally or informally. This seems particularly evident in the case of young Conservative conversionary marrieds. This process is augmented within the Conservative movement by membership in Jewish organizations: 63 percent of Conservative conversionary marrieds under the age of 45 belong to Jewish organizations, as compared with 39 percent over the age of 45. In contrast, among Reform conversionary marrieds, membership in Jewish organizations is slightly lower for those under the age of 45 than for those over the age of 45.

Jewish Philanthropy

Researchers have consistently found that contributing to Jewish causes is highly correlated with other measures of Jewish identification.[21] According to Jonathan Woocher, philanthropy constitutes one of the central tenets of American Jewry's civil religion of "sacred survival." And, indeed, in the study described here, some 80 percent of respondents report that their households contribute to Jewish causes.

The pattern of giving to Jewish causes, as seen in table 23, follows the rank order of the marriage types previously encountered for other measures of Jewish identification: inmarried (86 percent), conversionary married (81 percent), and mixed-married (57 percent). Similarly, the denominational rank order replicates the standard pattern: Orthodox (87 percent), Conservative (86 percent), Reform (83 percent), and Just Jewish (65 percent). However, the differences between Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews with regard to philanthropy are narrower than for any of the other measures. Moreover, the level of participation of the Just Jewish in Jewish philanthropy is higher than for all other items of religious and communal identification. When marriage type is combined with denomination, the

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[21]See, for example, Mordechai Rimor and Gary A. Tobin, "Jewish Giving Patterns to Jewish and Non-Jewish Philanthropy," in *Faith and Philanthropy in America*, ed. Robert Wuthnow and Virginia A. Hodgkinson (San Francisco, 1990), pp. 134–64.

same pattern of relationship between marriage type and Jewish philanthropy is maintained.

By way of comparison, 72 percent of households report that they give to non-Jewish or nonsectarian causes, which is slightly lower than the overall rate of Jewish giving. Differences between marriage type and denomination and between combinations of the two are much narrower for general philanthropic giving than for donations to Jewish causes. When giving to both types of causes is compared, within all denominations inmarrieds are more likely to give to Jewish than to non-Jewish causes, while the opposite is the case with mixed-marrieds.

Friendship Patterns

Jewish religious identification and communal affiliation are reinforced by primary groups such as family and close friends. Thus it is important to examine the relationship between marriage type and the ethnic character of friendship groups.

The patterns of friendship of the three marriage types are reported in table 24, which presents them in two categories: a predominantly Jewish friendship pattern, in which two or all of one's three closest friends are Jewish; and a predominantly non-Jewish friendship pattern, in which only one or none of one's three closest friends are Jewish.

The figures at the base of table 24 indicate an extremely strong relationship between marriage type and friends, with each marriage type maintaining its own distinctive pattern of friendship. Exactly three-quarters of the inmarrieds have predominantly Jewish friends, while one-quarter have mainly non-Jewish friends. Among the conversionary marrieds, exactly half mix with predominantly Jewish friends, while the other half have mainly non-Jewish friends. The friendship pattern of the mixed-marrieds is more or less the reverse of that of the inmarrieds: about seven in ten have predominantly non-Jewish friends, while three in ten have predominantly Jewish friends.

A somewhat more complex picture of friendship patterns emerges when denomination is taken into account. Overall, the familiar denominational rank order is evident: the Orthodox have the highest proportion of predominantly Jewish friends, followed by Conservative Jews, Reform Jews, and the Just Jewish. It is worth noting that when marriage types are compared within and across denominations, the expected distance between Conservative and Reform inmarrieds is virtually erased. However, the major deviation from the expected rank order occurs among the conversionary marrieds: Conservative conversionary marrieds are less likely to have predominantly Jewish friends (41 percent) than are both Reform

conversionary marrieds (54 percent) and Conservative mixed-marrieds (49 percent).

When controls for age are introduced, as reported in table 25, the expected denominational and marriage-type rank orders are reinstated for those aged 45 and older. In this age group, 84 percent of Conservative conversionary marrieds have predominantly Jewish friends, as compared with 63 percent of Reform conversionary marrieds, and 65 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds. But among those under 45 years of age, the previously noted deviations from the expected denominational and marriage-type rank orders are even more marked. Only 34 percent of the younger Conservative conversionary marrieds have predominantly Jewish friends, as compared with 54 percent of Reform conversionary marrieds, and 43 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds.

The low proportion of predominantly Jewish friends among younger Conservative conversionary marrieds is consistent with the general relationship between age and friendship patterns seen in table 25: except for the Orthodox inmarrieds, for every combination of denomination and marriage type, those under the age of 45 are less likely to have predominantly Jewish friends than those over age 45. However, the difference between the two Conservative conversionary married age groups—50 percent—is twice that of the age groups for other denominational marriage types. Why this is so—since younger Conservative conversionary marrieds score relatively high on all other dimensions of Jewish identification—is not clear.

Jewish Education for the Children

The relationship between marriage type and the provision of formal Jewish education to children during the key period, ages 10–13, is shown at the base of table 26. Among the inmarried, formal Jewish education for children in the pre-bar/bat mitzvah years is almost universal (95 percent), and its incidence is only slightly lower among the conversionary marrieds (84 percent). However, the proportion receiving Jewish education drops to 41 percent among the children of mixed marriages.

This rank order among marriage types remains intact when denomination is taken into account, but some striking variations are apparent. First, among all marriage types the differences between Conservative and Reform Jews in the provision of Jewish education are minimal. Second, within both denominations, the differences between the inmarried and the conversionary marrieds, on the one hand, and the mixed-marrieds, on the other, are greatly reduced, while among the Just Jewish the gap between them is increased to the maximum. Among Conservative Jews the difference between the mixed-marrieds and the other two marriage types in providing

children with formal Jewish education is 19 percent, among Reform Jews it ranges from 12 to 14 percent, but among the Just Jewish it is 100 percent. While all the Just Jewish inmarrieds provide their children with formal Jewish education, no Just Jewish mixed-marrieds do so.

Denominational identification is closely related to the provision of Jewish education to the children of mixed marriages. Over 80 percent of mixed-marrieds who identify with a denomination give their children Jewish educations, but mixed-marrieds without a denominational identification do not. In all likelihood, this relationship is two-directional: attendance at Jewish schools that are denominationally affiliated usually entails formal synagogue or temple affiliation, thus providing children with a clear denominational identification. Conversely, denominational self-identification facilitates formal synagogue or temple membership, which in turn encourages the provision of Jewish education for the children.

Three main conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing analysis of the relationship between marriage type and various aspects of Jewish identification. First, there is a strong, direct relationship between marriage type and all measures of Jewish identification. Second, within the marriage types themselves, there are recurring variations that point to the existence of separate subtypes. Third, these patterns continue to show themselves even when account is taken of the strong and consistent influence of denomination, which variously mutes or reinforces the impact of marriage type but never overrides it completely. This is even more the case when the weaker and less consistent influences of family type and age are considered.

Index of Jewish Identification

Taking the analysis a step further, an index of Jewish identification was constructed, making it possible to identify the different marriage subtypes, as well as to determine the relative weight of each within the broader marriage type, within the denomination, and within the total sample.

The index of Jewish identification was constructed by combining all the various elements of Jewish identity into a single numerical score on an additive (Likert) scale. Eleven items were included: synagogue membership, synagogue attendance; Sabbath candle lighting; participation in a Passover seder; fasting on Yom Kippur; lighting Hanukkah candles; membership in a Jewish organization; donating to a Jewish charity; visiting Israel; and having predominantly Jewish close friends. In each case one point was assigned for a positive response, except for synagogue attendance, where one point was given for attendance on the High Holy Days and a few times a year, and two points for attending monthly or weekly. In order to avoid

problems of standardization, only respondents who answered all of the questions were scored, thus excluding those in communities in which not all of the questions were asked and those who, for whatever reason, did not answer particular questions. As a result, the total number of respondents was reduced by about one-third. The range of possible scores is 0–11, and, following the shape of the frequency distribution, it is divided into three categories: low Jewish identification: 0–4 points; medium Jewish identification: 5–8 points; and high Jewish identification: 9–11 points.

It should be noted that the index does not include items indicating higher levels of Jewish identification, such as strict Sabbath and festival observance, keeping kosher, and daily synagogue attendance. Although the original Jewish population surveys contain such data, these and similar items that reflect traditional standards of Jewish religious identification were excluded in order to reduce the range of the index, thereby lowering the threshholds for the medium and high levels. The net effect, therefore, is to include within these two categories many individuals who would not otherwise have been included.

Measured by the index of Jewish identification, 25 percent of all respondents score high, 45 percent medium, and 30 percent low. When divided according to marriage type, as reported in table 27, the data show the same relationship between marriage type and Jewish identification for the overall index as for the individual items—there is little difference between inmarrieds and conversionary marrieds on the index, but the gap between them and mixed-marrieds is quite wide.

These data also serve as the basis for identifying and locating the various marriage subtypes in the typology of conversionary and mixed marriages and assessing their relative weights. Thus, the vast majority of conversionary marrieds (83 percent) are to be found at the middle and upper levels of Jewish identification. One-third of them (33 percent) are "high-Jewish-identification conversionary marrieds," indicating the considerable value and identity change, if not total transformation, that has resulted from conversion. Half of the total (50 percent) are "medium-Jewish-identification conversionary marrieds." The smallest group, about one-sixth (17 percent), are "low-Jewish-identification conversionary marrieds," in which conversion may be described as nominal or pro forma, to the extent that it has resulted in little or no change in identification or behavior.

The pattern for mixed-marrieds is strikingly different. Indeed, judging by these figures, mixed marriage represents an almost insuperable bar to the achievement of a high level of Jewish identification. Thus, only 1 percent are "high-Jewish-identification mixed-marrieds," who have created a family environment in which a strong Jewish identity is being maintained and transmitted. The largest single group by far, just under seven in ten (69

percent), are at the opposite end of the scale, "low-Jewish-identification mixed-marrieds." In these households, Jewish identification and behavior are peripheral. Finally, three in ten mixed marriages (30 percent) are "medium-Jewish-identification mixed-marrieds," mainly households that emphasize ritual home practices rather than communal or ethnic ties.

Taking denomination into account (see table 28) sharpens the picture even further. Looking first at differences within denomination, Conservative conversionary marrieds score somewhat higher than Conservative inmarrieds, while the pattern within Reform is dichotomous—Reform conversionary marrieds are represented more at the high and low levels of Jewish identification, and less at the medium level, than are Reform inmarrieds. Mixed-marrieds among all the denominations score much lower than the other marriage types.

Turning to differences across denominations, just under half (48 percent) of Conservative conversionary marrieds, but only a little more than a quarter of Reform conversionary marrieds (27 percent), exhibit high levels of Jewish identification. Conversely, very few Conservative conversionary marrieds (3 percent) show low levels of Jewish identification as compared with nearly a quarter (23 percent) among Reform conversionary marrieds. The largest groups in both denominations are those with medium Jewish identification; they represent about half of all conversionary marrieds.

The differences between Conservative mixed-marrieds and Reform mixed-marrieds, in contrast, are narrower, and are concentrated at the lower and middle levels of the Jewish identification index. Very few Conservative mixed-marrieds or Reform mixed-marrieds exhibit high Jewish identification, but 53 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds are at the medium level, as compared with 41 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds. At the bottom of the scale the situation is reversed: 57 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds show low Jewish identification, as compared with 42 percent of Conservative mixed-marrieds. However, the largest differences are between Conservative and Reform mixed-marrieds on the one hand, and the Just Jewish mixed-marrieds on the other. There are no Just Jewish mixed-marrieds with high Jewish identification and only 13 percent are at the medium level; the vast majority (87 percent) are at the low level.

Identification with Non-Jewish Cultural and Religious Symbols

The foregoing discussion analyzed the extent and strength of key aspects of Jewish identification in different marriage types. Our theory of Jewish identity posited that being *not* Christian was a major defining element of Jewish identity. The creation of an unambiguous Jewish identity entails, at the very least, the absence from the home of Christian symbols and prac-

tices, even if the level of Jewish identification is low. Empirically, we can then hypothesize that Jewish identification and the incorporation of Christian practices and symbols in the home will vary inversely. Thus, in homes with medium and high levels of Jewish identification we would not expect to find Christian symbols and practices, while such symbols would be present only when Jewish identification had disappeared completely or was at a low level.

This hypothesis is explored by means of a question about having a Christmas tree at home. While this single question serves clearly to identify those who have introduced a central Christian symbol into the home, it does not indicate whether it is an isolated practice or the tip of the iceberg—part of a more extensive incorporation of Christian symbols and values into the home. However, the surveys contain no further questions that might resolve this issue. The results are reported in table 29.

It is clear that inmarrieds shun the practice: 98 percent do not have a Christmas tree. Such an unequivocal response strongly supports our theory that among inmarrieds, at least, there exists an unambiguous Jewish identity, in which being *not* Christian is a defining element. Among conversionary marrieds, 78 percent do not have a Christmas tree while 22 percent do. In contrast, among mixed-marrieds, 62 percent have a Christmas tree while 38 percent do not. Quite remarkably, more mixed-marrieds have Christmas trees than perform any single Jewish ritual. (The most widely practiced rituals are attending a Passover seder and the lighting of Hanukkah candles, which, as was previously shown in table 20, are engaged in by 52 percent of the mixed-marrieds.)

The expected denominational rank order remains firm in this area. Overall, 3 percent of Orthodox Jews have Christmas trees, as do 4 percent of Conservative Jews, 18 percent of Reform Jews, and 33 percent of the Just Jewish. The same rank order is maintained when marriage types are compared across denomination. Thus, 8 percent of Conservative conversionary marrieds as against 33 percent of Reform conversionary marrieds have Christmas trees; among mixed-marrieds, the comparable figures are 41 percent and 63 percent, and 66 percent for the Just Jewish.

Introducing controls for age, family type, and the ethnic character of friendship groups does not alter the above patterns. Indeed, family type itself is seen to have a marked impact, shown in table 30: within every denomination and marriage type (and particularly among mixed-marrieds), those who have children are consistently more likely to have a Christmas tree than those who have no children. Where marriage type, denomination, and family type are mutually reinforcing, the proportion having a Christmas tree reaches a peak. Thus, 81 percent of Just Jewish mixed-marrieds with a child at home have a Christmas tree. When controls for age are

introduced, the impact of marriage type, denomination, and family is clearly apparent, both among those under 45 and those over 45. In contrast, the impact of close friends is less clear-cut (not shown in a table). While Conservative conversionary marrieds and Conservative mixed-marrieds with predominantly non-Jewish friends are more likely to have a Christmas tree than those with predominantly Jewish friends, this is not the case among Reform conversionary marrieds and Reform mixed-marrieds.

Dual-Identity Households

As we have seen, virtually all inmarried households manifest a single, unambiguous Jewish identity by virtue of the fact that Christian symbols are barred, irrespective of the level of Jewish identification. Thus, inmarried Jews, including those with a low level of Jewish identification and those without denominational identification, overwhelmingly reject the practice of having a Christmas tree in the house.

Among intermarrieds, however, the situation is more complex. Conversionary and mixed marriages constitute arenas within which various theoretically possible identity resolutions or outcomes that come to characterize the household work themselves out. Unambiguous Jewish single-identity households are one possible identity outcome, as are Christian single-identity households, secular-identity (religiously and ethnically neutral) households, and dual-identity households. A *dual-identity* household is one in which both Jewish and Christian symbols and identification are maintained side by side, even when Jewish identification is at a medium level, or higher. Indeed, under certain circumstances, Christian symbols and practices are more likely to be found in such households when Jewish practices are present than when the latter are absent.

The existence of single-identity and dual-identity households among conversionary and mixed marriages makes it necessary to expand the typology presented above. Each of the previously specified subtypes can now be divided into those that have a Christmas tree and those that do not. The expanded typology in table 31 has 12 cells instead of the previous 6, although only 11 are actually filled.

Among conversionary marrieds, "dual low-Jewish-identification conversionary-marriage households" represent a partial or incomplete conversionary process, one that has not resulted in an unambiguous Jewish identification, even at a low level, due to the simultaneous retention of a Christian identification. "Dual medium-Jewish-identification conversionary-marriage households" represent a conversionary process that involves a moderate, if not modal, acceptance of Jewish identification and values, yet is bivalent to the extent that it also incorporates certain Christian elements in the home.

In "dual high-Jewish-identification conversionary-marriage households" the value and identity transformation is still not fully achieved, since Christian symbols show themselves. The existence of a dual identity where Jewish identification is high will in all likelihood create considerable dissonance within the family.

Among mixed-marrieds, the combination of low Jewish identification and a Christmas tree in the house—"dual low-Jewish-identification mixed-marriage households"—points to people on the margins of two heritages, and perhaps even marginal in the classic sociological sense of not quite belonging to either. As against this, "dual medium-Jewish-identification mixed-marriage households" exhibit a marked degree of religious syncretism. The "dual high-Jewish-identification mixed-marriage household" cell is empty, as a result of the absence of a dual-identity subtype that both maintains and transmits a high level of Jewish identification and simultaneously incorporates Christian symbols.

The data in table 31 show 62 percent of all mixed-marrieds to be in dual-identity households, as compared with 20 percent of conversionary marrieds. Most of the conversionary marrieds in the dual-identity category exhibit medium and high levels of Jewish identification, while most of the mixed-marrieds are at the low level. Taken together, among all conversionary and mixed marriages, dual-identity households outnumber single-identity households 54 percent to 46 percent.

When denomination is examined (see table 32), it becomes clear that the formation of dual-identity households is closely related to the standard denominational rank order. Thus, among conversionary marrieds, 7 percent of Conservative Jews and 30 percent of Reform Jews are in dual-identity households, while among mixed-marrieds, 33 percent of Conservative Jews, 65 percent of Reform Jews, and 69 percent of the Just Jewish are in that category. Overall, 20 percent of all Conservative conversionary and mixed-marrieds are in dual-identity households, as compared with 56 percent in the Reform denomination. The small proportion of "dual high-Jewish-identification conversionary-marriage households" are all found among Reform Jews; there are none in the Conservative denomination.

Higher levels of Jewish identification are generally associated with single-identity households. Over two-thirds of all conversionary marrieds with medium or high Jewish identification, and 90 percent of the Conservative Jews among them, are not in dual-identity households. At the opposite end of the scale, 35 percent of the Reform, and 63 percent of the Just Jewish, low-Jewish-identification mixed-marrieds are in dual-identity households.

At the same time, a not insubstantial number of households at reasonably high levels of Jewish practice maintain Christian practices simultaneously. Thus, in the medium- and high-Jewish-identification categories, 14 percent

of Conservative mixed-marrieds, 23 percent of Reform conversionary marrieds, and 29 percent of Reform mixed-marrieds are in dual-identity households. In the case of the latter, the dual-identity outcome is by far the most popular, outnumbering the single-identity households by a ratio of more than two to one.

Introducing controls for age provides a clear indication of the direction of these trends among the mixed-marrieds. Three features stand out when those under age 45 are compared with those over age 45. First, as shown in table 33, Reform identification is far more prevalent within younger mixed-married households than older ones. Thus, while 40 percent of mixed-marrieds over age 45 call themselves Reform, 60 percent of those under age 45 do so. This increase has come at the expense of the non-denominationally identified Just Jewish mixed-marrieds, whose proportion is 49 percent in the older age group and 31 percent in the younger one.

Second, the proportion of Reform mixed-marrieds in dual-identity households has increased dramatically (see table 34). While just over half (54 percent) of those over 45 are in dual-identity households, nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of those under 45 are. (Among the Just Jewish mixed-marrieds, the equivalent proportions decline from 76 percent to 68 percent.)

Third, much higher proportions of younger than of older Reform Jews with medium and high Jewish identification are in dual-identity households. Among Reform mixed-marrieds, 34 percent of those with medium and high Jewish identification under age 45 are in dual-identity households, as compared with 19 percent of those over age 45. The equivalent figures for medium- and high-Jewish-identification Reform conversionary marrieds are 29 percent and 9 percent, respectively, indicating an even greater movement in the direction of dual-identity households.

The total extent of this change is clearly illustrated in table 35, which compares the distribution of marriage types in the two age categories. Nearly one-quarter of all households (23 percent) in the under-45 age group are dual-identity intermarried households, and about one-sixth (16 percent) are single-identity intermarried households, as against 8 percent and 7 percent, respectively, in the over-45 age group. Conversely, inmarriages, which constitute the overwhelming majority of households in the older group (85 percent), represent only six in ten (61 percent) in the younger group.

CONCLUSION

The data reported above demonstrate and quantify the dramatic changes in the marriage choices of American Jews in the last four decades. With

every passing generation and the coming of age of every younger cohort, more Jews have been marrying non-Jews, and mixed marriages represent an increasingly larger proportion of married couples. While males are more likely than females to marry non-Jews, the greatly heightened propensity of Jewish women to do so has narrowed the difference between them. Rates of intermarriage are consistently higher among those with lesser socioeconomic achievement, as measured by education, occupation, and income, than among those with greater achievement.

The finding that intensive Jewish education alone has not acted as a bar to intermarriage suggests that the increase in the propensity of Jews to marry non-Jews and to establish mixed families is associated with the nature and quality of contemporary Jewish identity. It was argued that the core of Jewish personal and group identity is distinguished less by "shared beliefs" and more by "shared feelings." This has led to the development of a Jewish personal identity that is both secure and unambiguous, and at the same time segmented, individualistic, pluralistic, and varied in intensity and salience.

A Jewish identity of this nature can facilitate mixed marriage by permitting Jews to marry non-Jews in the hope or assumption that they will be able to maintain their personal Jewish identity. That is to say, they will not be called upon to surrender part or all of the religious core of their personality or to deny their ethnic heritage (neither will their non-Jewish spouses), and they will be able to transmit that Jewish identity to their offspring. How these hopes and assumptions actually turn out—how Jewish identification fares in conversionary and mixed marriages—constitutes the central focus of this study. In what follows, the key findings relating to it are briefly summarized and linked to our theoretical framework, and their implications for future trends are discussed.

Conversionary Marriages

Overall, Jewish identification fares well in conversionary marriages, or at least as well as in inmarriages, if the identical proportions of both marriage types at each level of Jewish identification are the criterion. Indeed, the Jewish identification of conversionary marrieds fares even better when they are denominationally connected: the overall level of Jewish identification among Conservative and Reform conversionary marrieds turns out to be higher than that of their respective inmarrieds.

However, conversionary marriages do not fare so consistently well in developing an unambiguous Jewish identity. Here denominational differences are decisive. While very few Conservative conversionary marriages result in dual-identity households, nearly a third of Reform conversionary marriages do so.

In sum, these findings indicate that conversion usually leads to the achievement of medium and high levels of Jewish identification, and more often than not brings about a qualitative identity transformation that results in the acquisition of an unambiguous Jewish identity by the convert and the establishment of a single-identity household. At the same time, the existence of significant proportions of conversionary marrieds who remain at low levels of Jewish identification and those who maintain dual-identity households suggests that conversion "does not always work." Clearly, there are different types and levels of conversionary marriage, and in differentiating among them, greater attention needs to be paid to the content and character of the conversion process and its denominational auspices. Similarly, the effect of the actual timing of conversion—whether it takes place before or after marriage—about which we had no data, is an issue meriting further analysis.

Mixed Marriages

Despite the hopes and assumptions, Jewish identification does not fare well in mixed marriages. The overall level of Jewish identification among the overwhelming majority of mixed-marrieds is low, and in only one case (Conservative mixed-marrieds) are less than a majority in the low-Jewish-identification category. In all, the data indicate that mixed marriage and the level of Jewish identification are strongly negatively related. So few mixed-marrieds manifest a high level of Jewish identification, and denominational connection makes so little impact in this regard, that mixed marriage must be regarded as a virtual bar to the achievement of a high level of Jewish identification.

Predominantly, Jewish identification in mixed marriages is accompanied by the presence of symbols of Christian identification, resulting in dual-identity households at all levels of Jewish identification. Contrary to what might have been expected, among Reform mixed-marrieds there was clear evidence of a positive relationship between the level of Jewish identification and the incorporation of Christian symbols. That is to say, as the level of Jewish identification rises to medium, so too does the proportion of dual-identity households. This tendency has increased over time and reaches its peak in the younger age groups.

Overall, the chances of a mixed marriage resulting in a single-identity household at any level of Jewish identification are extremely slim, and the chances of it resulting in a single-identity household at a high level of Jewish identification are infinitesimal. Under these circumstances, the likelihood of creating an unambiguous Jewish identity, should such indeed be the intention or the desire, is virtually nil.

Dual-identity households are segmented and pluralist, responding to the individual needs of both partners in an intermarriage and catering to their different if not competing religious and ethnic heritages. The longer-term viability of such marriages and the actual identity resolutions arrived at by the children in these households, the bearers of both traditions, are at present unknown. If the theory of personal identity and of the unambiguous character of Jewish identity elaborated above is correct, then the least likely resolution of all is the development of a new synthesis of Judaism and Christianity, a modern version of the ancient Judeo-Christians, or Christian-Jews. It is more likely that, over time, choices will have to be made between being either Jewish or Christian or neither. The low level of Jewish identification in these households to begin with, the pull of the majority, and the strength and attraction of common secular and general values do not augur well for the choice of an unambiguous Jewish identity. Rather than meeting the hope of being able to transmit Jewish identity, mixed marriages may prove to be terminal for Jewish identity.

However these choices turn out in the future, one thing is certain. The American Jewish community as we know it, formerly based upon a heavy predominance of inmarriage that transmitted an unambiguous Jewish identity—even if the latter was not always strong and was sometimes the source of ambivalence—is rapidly being transformed. The increased rate of mixed marriage has already produced an age cohort under 45 whose marriage profile is very different from that of the cohort over 45. As we have noted, only six in ten of all households under 45 are inmarriages, and about a quarter are dual-identity households.

If the rate of mixed marriage continues to increase and present trends continue, the already low overall level of Jewish identification is likely to fall further, and dual-identity households may eventually rival if not outnumber single-identity households. Unambiguous Jewish identity may become the mark of a minority. Whether such a Jewish community can command the will and resources to support the network of Jewish institutions, causes, and activities within the community, in American society and politics, and abroad, is an open question. But the answer to it will determine the future of American Jewry.

It can be argued that current trends and patterns are neither inexorable nor irreversible and may be influenced by changes in individual attitudes and communal policies. Both individual Jews and communal leaders may take a passive or more active response to the issues. The critical differences between conversionary and mixed-married households clearly revealed by the data suggest that a more activist approach to conversion, including conversion after marriage, could have a considerable impact on future developments. By the same token, the ambiguous character of mixed-mar-

ried households provides opportunities for activist policies aimed at encouraging a degree of identity transformation that might lead to conversion rather than result from it.

Moreover, the quality of Jewish life of the core of the Jewish community—the inmarried couples—may be enhanced or diluted as time goes on. Such changes will directly affect the intermarried Jewish population as well. Thus, the strength and viability of the American Jewish community will be affected at least as much by the strength and growth of the most deeply committed Jewish groups as by its success in drawing less committed groups closer to Judaism.

The size of the Jewish population, the vitality of Jewish life, and the future of the American Jewish community all depend upon a clear understanding of these phenomena and appropriate actions by individual Jews, scholars, and communal leaders.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. MARRIAGE-TYPE DISTRIBUTION, BY COMMUNITY

Community	Number of Cases	Marriage Type: Inmarriage (%)	Marriage Type: Conversionary Marriage (%)	Marriage Type: Mixed Marriage (%)	Total (%)
Baltimore	769	80	5	15	100
Boston	787	78	3	19	100
Cleveland	582	79	4	17	100
Dallas	598	66	9	24	99*
Essex/Morris County (NJ)	1,215	83	3	14	100
Providence (RI)	676	86	6	9	101*
San Francisco	1,679	60	8	31	99*
Worcester (MA)	367	71	10	19	100
Total	6,673				

*Rounding error.

TABLE 2. MARRIAGE TYPES IN TOTAL SAMPLE

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Projected Frequency	Percent
Inmarriage	5,225	144,711	73.4
Conversionary marriage	409	10,610	5.4
Mixed marriage	1,037	41,757	21.2
Total	6,671	197,078	100.0

TABLE 3. DECADE OF MARRIAGE OF INDIVIDUALS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Prior to 1960 (%)	1960–1969 (%)	1970–1979 (%)	1980–1989 (%)
Inmarriage	7,645	94	84	75	62
Conversionary marriage	335	2	5	6	5
Mixed marriage	874	5	12	19	33
Total	8,854	101*	101*	100	100

*Rounding error.

TABLE 4. AGE OF INDIVIDUALS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE

Marriage Type	18–34 (%)	35–44 (%)	45–54 (%)	55–64 (%)	65+ (%)
Inmarriage	70	78	86	93	94
Conversionary marriage	5	5	3	3	1
Mixed marriage	25	17	11	5	5
Total percent	100	100	100	101*	100
Number of cases	1,543	3,081	2,164	2,179	2,154

*Rounding error.

TABLE 5. GENERATION OF INDIVIDUALS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE

Marriage Type	First Generation (%)	Second Generation (%)	Third Generation (%)	Fourth Generation (%)
Inmarriage	93	87	70	56
Conversionary marriage	2	2	4	6
Mixed marriage	5	11	26	38
Total percent	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	807	4,659	2,127	399

TABLE 6. GENDER OF INDIVIDUALS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DECADE OF MARRIAGE

Decade/ Gender	Number of Cases	Marriage Type: Inmarriage (%)	Conversionary Marriage (%)	Mixed Marriage (%)	Total (%)
Prior to 1960	3,927	94	2	5	101*
Male	2,001	90	3	8	101*
Female	1,926	98	1	2	101*
1960–1969	2,056	84	5	12	101*
Male	1,074	78	8	15	101*
Female	982	91	1	8	100
1970–1979	1,900	75	6	19	100
Male	1,008	70	9	21	100
Female	892	79	3	18	100
1980–1989	952	62	5	33	100
Male	502	55	7	38	100
Female	450	70	2	28	100
Total					
Male	6,149	82	5	13	100
Female	5,681	90	1	9	100

*Rounding error.

Note: In some tables, the "Total" may differ from the sum of the Ns. This is because sometimes respondents did not answer a specific question, and in some cities certain questions were not asked.

TABLE 7. CURRENT MARRIAGE TYPE OF INDIVIDUALS IN FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD (+) MARRIAGES

Marriage Type	First Marriage (%)	Second Marriage (%)	Third (+) Marriage (%)
Inmarriage	86	70	54
Conversionary marriage	3	6	6
Mixed marriage	11	24	40
Total percent	100	100	100
Number of cases	9,774	1,240	103

TABLE 8. MEAN AGE OF INDIVIDUALS AT FIRST MARRIAGE, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND GENDER

Marriage Type/Gender	Mean Age
Total population	25.0
Inmarriage	24.6
Male	25.9
Female	23.2
Conversionary marriage	27.6
Male	27.8
Female	25.7
Mixed marriage	26.9
Male	27.9
Female	26.0
Total	
Male	26.3
Female	23.6

TABLE 9. PRESENCE OF CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD, BY MARRIAGE TYPE

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Children in Household (%)
Inmarriage	1,629	73
Conversionary marriage	89	4
Mixed marriage	535	24
Total	2,253	101*

*Rounding error.

TABLE 10. SECULAR EDUCATION OF INDIVIDUALS,† BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND AGE

	Marriage Type			
Education/Age	Inmarriage (%)	Conversionary Marriage (%)	Mixed Marriage (%)	Total (%)
High school or less	88	1	10	100
18–34	59	—	41	100
35–44	61	11	28	100
45–54	86	1	13	100
55–64	95	2	4	101*
65+	95	1	4	100
Some college	86	3	11	100
18–34	63	5	33	101*
35–44	79	6	15	100
45–54	92	3	5	100
55–64	94	2	4	100
65+	95	1	4	100
College degree	83	3	14	100
18–34	69	5	26	100
35–44	79	4	18	101*
45–54	85	3	11	99*
55–64	95	2	3	100
65+	94	2	4	100
Graduate degree	81	5	14	100
18–34	74	7	19	100
35–44	80	5	15	100
45–54	84	4	12	100
55–64	87	4	9	100
65+	88	2	10	100
Number of cases	9,522	401	1,019	10,942

*Rounding error.
†Jewish respondents and spouses only.
—Less than one-half of 1%.

TABLE 11. OCCUPATION OF INDIVIDUALS,† BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND AGE

Occupation/Age	Marriage Type: Inmarriage (%)	Conversionary Marriage (%)	Mixed Marriage (%)	Total (%)
Professional/technical	82	4	14	100
18–34	74	6	20	100
35–44	80	4	16	100
45–54	83	3	14	100
55–64	90	3	7	100
65+	91	2	7	100
Executive/managerial	82	5	13	100
18–34	72	5	23	100
35–44	76	7	17	100
45–54	84	6	10	100
55–64	89	6	6	101*
65+	93	1	6	100
Sales	85	4	11	100
18–34	75	5	21	101*
35–44	75	8	18	101*
45–54	88	4	8	100
55–64	96	1	3	100
65+	92	2	7	101*
Clerical	89	2	9	100
18–34	61	5	34	100
35–44	87	3	11	101*
45–54	95	—	5	100
55–64	96	1	4	101*
65+	98	—	2	100

TABLE 11.—*(Continued)*

Occupation/Age	Marriage Type: Inmarriage (%)	Conversionary Marriage (%)	Mixed Marriage (%)	Total (%)
Service/blue collar	77	2	21	100
18–34	54	1	45	100
35–44	66	4	30	100
45–54	84	1	15	100
55–64	88	3	9	100
65+	93	1	6	100
Number of cases	8,848	390	974	10,212

*Rounding error.
†Jewish respondents and spouses only.
—Less than one-half of 1%.

TABLE 12. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY MARRIAGE TYPE

Marriage Type	$5,000–10,000 (%)	$10,001–30,000 (%)	$30,001–50,000 (%)	$50,001–75,000 (%)	$75,001–150,000 (%)	$150,000+ (%)
Inmarriage	67	73	65	68	72	85
Conversionary marriage	17	4	6	7	7	3
Mixed marriage	17	23	29	25	22	12
Total percent	101*	100	100	100	101*	100
Number of cases	87	695	1,430	1,203	964	487

*Rounding error.

TABLE 13. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND AGE

	Under 45 Years			Over 45 Years		
Marriage Type	$5,000–30,000 (%)	$30,001–75,000 (%)	$75,001–150,000 (%)	$5,000–30,000 (%)	$30,001–75,000 (%)	$75,001–150,000 (%)
Inmarriage	56	59	72	85	79	82
Conversionary marriage	8	8	7	3	4	4
Mixed marriage	37	33	21	12	17	15
Total percent	101*	100	100	100	100	101*
Number of cases	279	1,477	792	475	1,048	613

*Rounding error.

TABLE 14. JEWISH EDUCATION OF INDIVIDUALS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE

Marriage Type	Previously Received Jewish Education (%)	Did Not Previously Receive Jewish Education (%)
Inmarriage	83	86
Conversionary marriage	4	2
Mixed marriage	13	12
Total percent	100	100
Number of cases	9,158	1,862

TABLE 15. YEARS OF JEWISH EDUCATION, BY MARRIAGE TYPE, GENDER, AND AGE

Marriage Type	Age and Years of Jewish Education														
	18–34 No. Yrs.			35–44 No. Yrs.			45–54 No. Yrs.			55–64 No. Yrs.			65+ No. Yrs.		
	None (%)	<5 (%)	6+ (%)	None (%)	<5 (%)	6+ (%)	None (%)	<5 (%)	6+ (%)	None (%)	<5 (%)	6+ (%)	None (%)	<5 (%)	6+ (%)
Male															
Inmarriage	62	59	67	58	70	79	71	79	91	91	83	94	93	88	94
Conversionary marriage	7	9	9	10	8	7	2	6	3	3	4	4	1	2	1
Mixed marriage	31	33	25	32	22	14	27	15	6	6	13	2	7	10	5
Number of cases	59	230	372	127	642	696	101	442	467	125	474	426	231	466	503
Age-group percentages	14	40	46	11	49	41	15	49	37	12	50	38	20	45	35
Female															
Inmarriage	65	65	86	85	78	88	91	92	96	97	97	98	99	99	98
Conversionary marriage	1	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Mixed marriage	34	32	12	13	20	10	9	7	4	2	2	2	1	1	1
Number of cases	154	236	404	295	539	568	256	416	295	325	360	292	316	279	222
Age-group percentages	25	30	45	25	39	36	30	42	27	39	36	25	45	34	21

TABLE 16. DENOMINATIONAL* DISTRIBUTION WITHIN MARRIAGE TYPES

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Orthodox (%)	Conservative (%)	Reform (%)	Just Jewish (%)	Total (%)
Inmarriage	5,042	9	39	43	9	100
Conversionary marriage	395	3	30	57	10	100
Mixed marriage	860	2	12	52	34	100
Total	6,297					

*Use of the term "denomination" always refers to the self-identification of respondents.

TABLE 17. MARRIAGE-TYPE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN DENOMINATIONS

		Marriage Type			
Denomination	Number of Cases	Inmarriage (%)	Conversionary Marriage (%)	Mixed Marriage (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox	471	92	2	6	100
Conservative	2,274	88	5	7	100
Reform	2,857	71	7	22	100
Just Jewish	695	50	4	46	100
Total	6,297				

TABLE 18. SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Do Belong (%)	Do Not Belong (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox				
Inmarriage	435	78	22	100
Conservative				
Inmarriage	2,011	68	32	100
Conversionary marriage	124	54	46	100
Mixed marriage	130	36	64	100
Reform				
Inmarriage	2,206	59	41	100
Conversionary marriage	224	57	43	100
Mixed marriage	416	21	79	100
Just Jewish				
Inmarriage	371	23	77	100
Conversionary marriage	34	49	51	100
Mixed marriage	279	5	95	100
Total marriage type				
Inmarriage	5,023	60	40	100
Conversionary marriage	382	56	44	100
Mixed marriage	825	15	85	100
Total denomination				
Orthodox	469	74	26	100
Conservative	2,265	65	35	100
Reform	2,846	51	49	100
Just Jewish	684	16	84	100

TABLE 19. SYNAGOGUE ATTENDANCE, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Never, or Bar/Bat Mitzvah, Weddings, Etc. (%)	High Holidays or Few Times Per Year (%)	Monthly, Weekly, or More (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox					
Inmarriage	428	10	27	64	101*
Conservative					
Inmarriage	1,973	6	62	32	100
Conversionary marriage	120	5	53	42	100
Mixed marriage	125	25	65	10	100
Reform					
Inmarriage	2,147	16	62	22	100
Conversionary marriage	217	14	53	33	100
Mixed marriage	397	37	53	10	100
Just Jewish					
Inmarriage	361	58	35	8	101*
Conversionary marriage	32	34	52	14**	100
Mixed marriage	265	75	24	1	100
Total marriage type					
Inmarriage	4,909	16	56	28	100
Conversionary marriage	369	13	53	34	100
Mixed marriage	787	53	41	6	100

TABLE 19.—*(Continued)*

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Never, or Bar/Bat Mitzvah, Weddings, Etc. (%)	High Holidays or Few Times Per Year (%)	Monthly, Weekly, or More (%)	Total (%)
Total denomination					
Orthodox	461	12	28	60	100
Conservative	2,218	7	62	31	100
Reform	2,761	20	60	20	100
Just Jewish	658	65	31	5	101*

*Rounding error.
**Cell size too small for analysis.

TABLE 20. RITUAL PRACTICE, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Sabbath Candles: Do Prac. (%)	Sabbath Candles: Do Not Prac. (%)	Passover Seder: Do Prac. (%)	Passover Seder: Do Not Prac. (%)	Yom Kippur: Do Prac. (%)	Yom Kippur: Do Not Prac. (%)	Number of Cases	Hanukkah Candles*: Do Prac. (%)	Hanukkah Candles*: Do Not Prac. (%)
Orthodox										
Inmarriage	396	76	24	89	11	93	7	195	92	8
Conservative										
Inmarriage	1,834	50	50	94	6	82	18	1,166	95	5
Conversionary marriage	117	46	54	98	2	88	12	99	99	1
Mixed marriage	112	11	89	71	29	76	24	69	76	24
Reform										
Inmarriage	1,979	27	73	88	12	59	41	1,437	86	14
Conversionary marriage	210	22	78	84	16	61	39	160	77	23
Mixed marriage	365	4	96	67	33	40	60	274	68	32
Just Jewish										
Inmarriage	362	13	87	60	40	33	67	213	52	48
Conversionary marriage	32	39	61	83	17	60	40	23	86	14**
Mixed marriage	264	0	100	38	62	17	83	167	35	65

TABLE 20.—*(Continued)*

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Sabbath Candles		Passover Seder		Yom Kippur		Number of Cases	Hanukkah Candles*	
		Do Prac. (%)	Do Not Prac. (%)	Do Prac. (%)	Do Not Prac. (%)	Do Prac. (%)	Do Not Prac. (%)		Do Prac. (%)	Do Not Prac. (%)
Total marriage type										
Inmarriage	4,571	38	62	87	13	68	32	3,131	85	15
Conversionary marriage	359	32	68	87	13	68	32	303	84	16
Mixed marriage	741	3	97	52	48	34	66	657	52	48
Total denomination										
Orthodox	426	71	29	86	14	92	8	217	86	14
Conservative	2,063	47	53	92	8	82	18	1,334	94	6
Reform	2,554	21	79	83	17	55	45	1,871	81	19
Just Jewish	658	8	92	51	49	27	73	403	46	54

*This question was not asked in all cities.
**Cell size too small for analysis.

TABLE 21. ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Do Belong (%)	Do Not Belong (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox				
Inmarriage	427	64	36	100
Conservative				
Inmarriage	1,975	59	41	100
Conversionary marriage	122	56	44	100
Mixed marriage	129	33	67	100
Reform				
Inmarriage	2,194	57	43	100
Conversionary marriage	222	39	61	100
Mixed marriage	407	17	83	100
Just Jewish				
Inmarriage	373	43	57	100
Conversionary marriage	33	34	66	100
Mixed marriage	281	7	93	100
Total marriage type				
Inmarriage	4,969	57	43	100
Conversionary marriage	377	45	55	100
Mixed marriage	817	16	84	100
Total denomination				
Orthodox	461	62	38	100
Conservative	2,226	57	43	100
Reform	2,823	47	53	100
Just Jewish	687	26	74	100

TABLE 22 VISIT TO ISRAEL, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Did Visit (%)	Did Not Visit (%)	Total
Orthodox				
Inmarriage	43	61	39	100
Conservative				
Inmarriage	2,007	47	53	100
Conversionary marriage	123	55	45	100
Mixed marriage	129	16	84	100
Reform				
Inmarriage	2,208	42	58	100
Conversionary marriage	224	26	74	100
Mixed marriage	418	20	80	100
Just Jewish				
Inmarriage	373	41	59	100
Conversionary marriage	34	55	45	100
Mixed marriage	281	24	76	100
Total marriage type				
Inmarriage	5,022	47	54	101*
Conversionary marriage	381	39	61	100
Mixed marriage	828	21	79	100
Total denomination				
Orthodox	468	58	42	100
Conservative	2,259	45	55	100
Reform	2,850	36	64	100
Just Jewish	688	34	66	100

*Rounding error.

TABLE 23. CONTRIBUTION TO CHARITIES, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Jewish Causes			Non-Jewish Causes		
	Number of Cases	Do Give (%)	Do Not Give (%)	Number of Cases	Do Give (%)	Do Not Give (%)
Orthodox						
Inmarriage	415	88	12	412	66	34
Conservative						
Inmarriage	1,942	88	12	1,911	72	28
Conversionary marriage	117	86	14	119	72	28
Mixed marriage	128	64	36	126	79	21
Reform						
Inmarriage	2,143	88	12	2,122	76	24
Conversionary marriage	221	81	19	219	80	20
Mixed marriage	415	67	33	407	70	30
Just Jewish						
Inmarriage	370	75	25	366	69	31
Conversionary marriage	33	65	35	33	65	35
Mixed marriage	277	55	45	276	72	28
Total marriage type						
Inmarriage	4,870	86	13	4,939	72	28
Conversionary marriage	371	81	19	395	77	23
Mixed marriage	820	57	43	1,001	72	28
Total denomination						
Orthodox	448	87	13	445	66	34
Conservative	2,187	86	14	2,156	72	28
Reform	2,779	83	17	2,748	75	25
Just Jewish	680	65	35	675	70	30

TABLE 24. RELIGION OF 3 CLOSEST-FRIENDS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	0–1 Jewish (%)	2–3 Jewish (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox				
Inmarriage	342	8	92	100
Conservative				
Inmarriage	1,502	22	78	100
Conversionary marriage	110	59	41	100
Mixed marriage	99	51	49	100
Reform				
Inmarriage	1,699	23	77	100
Conversionary marriage	189	46	54	100
Mixed marriage	330	62	38	100
Just Jewish				
Inmarriage	274	49	51	100
Conversionary marriage	29	36	64	100
Mixed marriage	231	79	21	100
Total marriage type				
Inmarriage	3,817	25	75	100
Conversionary marriage	328	50	50	100
Mixed marriage	660	69	31	100
Total denomination				
Orthodox	372	13	88	101*
Conservative	1,711	26	74	100
Reform	2,218	34	66	100
Just Jewish	534	63	37	100

*Rounding error.

TABLE 25. RELIGION OF 3 CLOSEST FRIENDS, BY MARRIAGE TYPE, DENOMINATION, AND AGE

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Under 45 Years of Age				Over 45 Years of Age			
	Number of Cases	0–1 Jewish (%)	2–3 Jewish (%)	Total (%)	Number of Cases	0–1 Jewish (%)	2–3 Jewish (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox								
Inmarriage	131	4	96	100	201	12	88	100
Conservative								
Inmarriage	654	26	74	100	800	15	85	100
Conversionary marriage	78	66	34	100	21	16	84	100
Mixed marriage	70	57	43	100	25	35	65	100
Reform								
Inmarriage	716	27	73	100	937	19	81	100
Conversionary marriage	124	46	54	100	52	37	63	100
Mixed marriage	238	64	36	100	66	51	49	100
Just Jewish								
Inmarriage	104	55	45	100	159	41	59	100
Conversionary marriage	**				**			
Mixed marriage	148	86	14	100	72	60	40	100

TABLE 25.—*(Continued)*

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Under 45 Years of Age				Over 45 Years of Age			
	Number of Cases	0–1 Jewish (%)	2–3 Jewish (%)	Total (%)	Number of Cases	0–1 Jewish (%)	2–3 Jewish (%)	Total (%)
Total marriage type								
Inmarriage	1,605	29	71	100	2,097	19	81	100
Conversionary marriage	220	51	49	100	82	40	60	100
Mixed marriage	456	71	29	100	163	60	40	100
Total denomination								
Orthodox	148	10	90	100	213	15	85	100
Conservative	802	33	67	100	846	16	84	100
Reform	1,078	40	60	100	1,055	22	78	100
Just Jewish	270	72	28	100	240	48	52	100

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TABLE 26. JEWISH EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AGES 10–13, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Receiving Jewish Education	
	Yes (%)	No (%)
Orthodox		
Inmarriage	100	
Conservative		
Inmarriage	100	
Conversionary marriage	100	
Mixed marriage	81	19
Reform		
Inmarriage	95	5
Conversionary marriage	93	7
Mixed marriage	81	19
Just Jewish		
Inmarriage	100	
Conversionary marriage**		
Mixed marriage		100
Total marriage type		
Inmarriage	95	5
Conversionary marriage	84	16
Mixed marriage	41	59
Number of cases	1,037	105

**Cells too small for analysis.

TABLE 27. CONVERSIONARY AND MIXED-MARRIAGE TYPOLOGY

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Jewish Identification Index: Low (%)	Medium (%)	High (%)	Total (%)
Inmarriage	3,378	18	50	32	100
Conversionary marriage	343	(LC)	(MC)	(HC)	
		17	50	33	100
Mixed marriage	678	(LM)	(MM)	(HM)	
		69	30	1	100
Total	4,399	30	45	25	100

Key: LC Low-Jewish-Identification Conversionary Marriages
MC Medium-Jewish-Identification Conversionary Marriages
HC High-Jewish-Identification Conversionary Marriages
LM Low-Jewish-Identification Mixed Marriages
MM Medium-Jewish-Identification Mixed Marriages
HM High-Jewish-Identification Mixed Marriages

TABLE 28. CONVERSIONARY AND MIXED-MARRIAGE TYPOLOGY, BY DENOMINATION

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Jewish Identification Index: Low (%)	Medium (%)	High (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox					
Inmarriage	194	8	26	66	100
Conservative					
Inmarriage	1,232	8	49	43	100
Conversionary marriage	110	(LC)	(MC)	(HC)	
		3	49	48	100
Mixed marriage	76	(LM)	(MM)	(HM)	
		42	53	5	100
Reform					
Inmarriage	1,609	16	59	25	100
Conversionary marriage	187	(LC)	(MC)	(HC)	
		23	50	27	100
Mixed marriage	286	(LM)	(MM)	(HM)	
		57	41	2	100
Just Jewish					
Inmarriage	226	62	30	8	100
Conversionary marriage	**				
Mixed marriage	167	(LM)	(MM)	(HM)	
		87	13	0	100

Key: See table 27.
**Cells too small for analysis.

TABLE 29. HAVING CHRISTMAS TREE, BY MARRIAGE TYPE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Do Have Tree (%)	Do Not Have Tree (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox				
Inmarriage	396	1	99	100
Conservative				
Inmarriage	1,834	1	99	100
Conversionary marriage	117	8	92	100
Mixed marriage	111	41	59	100
Reform				
Inmarriage	1,985	3	97	100
Conversionary marriage	210	33	67	100
Mixed marriage	367	63	37	100
Just Jewish				
Inmarriage	361	5	95	100
Conversionary marriage	32	10**	90	100
Mixed marriage	263	66	34	100
Total marriage type				
Inmarriage	4,576	2	98	100
Conversionary marriage	359	22	78	100
Mixed marriage	741	62	38	100
Total denomination				
Orthodox	426	3	97	100
Conservative	2,062	4	96	100
Reform	2,562	18	82	100
Just Jewish	656	33	67	100

**Cell size too small for analysis

TABLE 30. HAVING CHRISTMAS TREE, BY MARRIAGE TYPE, DENOMINATION, AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN

Denomination/ Marriage Type	No Children			Children Present		
	Number of Cases	Do Have Tree (%)	Do Not Have Tree (%)	Number of Cases	Do Have Tree (%)	Do Not Have Tree (%)
Orthodox						
Inmarriage	168	1	99	210	—	100
Conservative						
Inmarriage	700	1	99	1,018	1	99
Conversionary marriage	27	8	92	88	8	92
Mixed marriage	39	22	78	71	52	48
Reform						
Inmarriage	853	4	96	1,036	2	98
Conversionary marriage	61	26	74	141	39	61
Mixed marriage	144	55	45	217	69	31
Just Jewish						
Inmarriage	193	6	94	150	5	95
Conversionary marriage	**			**		
Mixed marriage	108	47	53	145	81	19

**Cells too small for analysis.

TABLE 31. EXPANDED CONVERSIONARY AND MIXED-MARRIAGE TYPOLOGY, BY HAVING CHRISTMAS TREE

Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Jewish Identification Index: Low — Do Have Tree (%)	Low — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Not Have Tree (%)	High — Do Have Tree (%)	High — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Total (%)
Conversionary marriage	343	(DLC)	(SLC)	(DMC)	(SMC)	(DHC)	(SHC)	
		4	13	14	36	2	31	100
Mixed marriage	678	(DLM)	(SLM)	(DMM)	(SMM)	(DHM)	(SHM)	
		45	24	17	13		1	100

Key: SLC Single Low-Jewish-Identification Conversionary-Marriage Households
SMC Single Medium-Jewish-Identification Conversionary-Marriage Households
SHC Single High-Jewish-Identification Conversionary-Marriage Households
SLM Single Low-Jewish-Identification Mixed-Marriage Households
SMM Single Medium-Jewish-Identification Mixed-Marriage Households
SHM Single High-Jewish-Identification Mixed-Marriage Households
DLC Dual Low-Jewish-Identification Conversionary-Marriage Households
DMC Dual Medium-Jewish-Identification Conversionary-Marriage Households
DHC Dual High-Jewish-Identification Conversionary-Marriage Households
DLM Dual Low-Jewish-Identification Mixed-Marriage Households
DMM Dual Medium-Jewish-Identification Mixed-Marriage Households
DHM Dual High-Jewish-Identification Mixed-Marriage Households

TABLE 32. EXPANDED CONVERSIONARY AND MIXED-MARRIAGE TYPOLOGY, BY HAVING CHRISTMAS TREE AND DENOMINATION

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Jewish Identification Index: Low — Do Have Tree (%)	Low — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Not Have Tree (%)	High — Do Have Tree (%)	High — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Total (%)
Orthodox								
Inmarriage	190	0	8	0	26	0	66	100
Conservative								
Inmarriage	1,232	0	8	1	48	0	43	100
Conversionary marriage	110	(DLC) 0	(LC) 3	(DMC) 7	(MC) 42	(DHC) 0	(HC) 48	100
Mixed marriage	77	(DLM) 18	(LM) 24	(DMM) 14	(MM) 39	0	(HM) 5	100
Reform								
Inmarriage	1,609	1	15	2	57	0	25	100
Conversionary marriage	187	(DLC) 7	(LC) 16	(DMC) 19	(MC) 31	(DHC) 4	(HC) 23	100
Mixed marriage	286	(DLM) 35	(LM) 22	(DMM) 29	(MM) 12	0	(HM) 2	100
Just Jewish								
Inmarriage	226	4	58	1	29	0	8	100
Conversionary marriage	**							
Mixed marriage	167	(DLM) 63	(LM) 24	(DMM) 6	(MM) 7	0	(HM) 0	100

Key: See table 31.
**Cells too small for analysis.

TABLE 33. DENOMINATIONAL IDENTIFICATION OF MIXED-MARRIEDS, BY AGE

Mixed-Marrieds/Age	Number of Cases	Conservative (%)	Reform (%)	Just Jewish (%)	Total (%)
Under age 45	307	9	60	31	100
Over age 45	109	11	40	49	100

TABLE 34. EXPANDED CONVERSIONARY AND MIXED-MARRIAGE TYPOLOGY, BY HAVING CHRISTMAS TREE, DENOMINATION, AND AGE

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Jewish Identification Index: Low — Do Have Tree (%)	Low — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Not Have Tree (%)	High — Do Have Tree (%)	High — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Total (%)
Under Age 45								
Conservative								
Conversionary marriage	58	(DLC) 0	(SLC) 4	(DMC) 10	(SMC) 41	(DHC) 0	(SHC) 45	100
Mixed marriage	43	(DLM) 16	(SLM) 24	(DMM) 16	(SMM) 37	(DHM) 1	(SHM) 6	100
Reform								
Conversionary marriage	98	(DLC) 5	(SLC) 22	(DMC) 25	(SMC) 21	(DHC) 4	(SHC) 23	100
Mixed marriage	170	(DLM) 39	(SLM) 17	(DMM) 34	(SMM) 9	(DHM) 0	(SHM) 1	101*
Just Jewish								
Conversionary marriage	**							
Mixed marriage	94	(DLM) 64	(SLM) 23	(DMM) 4	(SMM) 9	(DHM) 0	(SHM) 0	100
Total marriage type								
Inmarriage	1,199	1	14	2	52	0	31	100
Conversionary marriage	181	(DLC) 3	(SLC) 14	(DMC) 18	(SMC) 32	(DHC) 3	(SHC) 31	101*
Mixed marriage	375	(DLM) 48	(SLM) 21	(DMM) 19	(SMM) 11	(DHM) 0	(SHM) 1	100

TABLE 34—(*Continued*)

Denomination/ Marriage Type	Number of Cases	Jewish Identification Index: Low — Do Have Tree (%)	Low — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Have Tree (%)	Medium — Do Not Have Tree (%)	High — Do Have Tree (%)	High — Do Not Have Tree (%)	Total (%)
				Over Age 45				
Conservative								
Conversionary marriage	18	(DLC)	(SLC)	(DMC)	(SMC)	(DHC)	(SHC)	
		0	0	0	48	0	52	100
Mixed marriage	17	(DLM)	(SLM)	(DMM)	(SMM)	(DHM)	(SHM)	
		36	23	12	29	0	0	100
Reform								
Conversionary marriage	39	(DLC)	(SLC)	(DMC)	(SMC)	(DHC)	(SHC)	
		23	11	8	35	1	22	100
Mixed marriage	47	(DLM)	(SLM)	(DMM)	(SMM)	(DHM)	(SHM)	
		35	28	18	16	1	2	100
Just Jewish								
Conversionary marriage	**							
Mixed marriage	45	(DLM)	(SLM)	(DMM)	(SMM)	(DHM)	(SHM)	
		68	19	8	5	0	0	100
Total marriage type								
Inmarriage	1,534	2	19	1	47	0	31	100
Conversionary marriage	69	(DLC)	(SLC)	(DMC)	(SMC)	(DHC)	(SHC)	
		14	19	5	35	1	26	100
Mixed marriage	144	(DLM)	(SLM)	(DMM)	(SMM)	(DHM)	(SHM)	
		53	25	10	12	0	0	100

*Rounding error.
**Cells too small for analysis.
Key: See table 31.

TABLE 35. HOUSEHOLD IDENTITY OUTCOMES, BY AGE

Household Identity	Under Age 45 (%)	Over Age 45 (%)
Inmarried	61	85
Single-identity intermarried	16	7
Dual-identity intermarried	23	8
Number of cases	1,755	1,747

Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey

by SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN

IN THE INTRODUCTION TO *The Jews in America*, Chaim Potok points up the key challenge facing the American Jewish community in the 1990s.[1] In contrast to the situation in Europe, he emphasizes, Jews have become part of the very fabric of American life. This has created both enormous opportunities and significant risks, including the potential for the disintegration of core Jewish values and the splintering of the Jewish community into a multiplicity of factions. The issue that remains open, Potok argues, is whether Jews in the United States will succeed in fashioning an authentic American-Jewish civilization, one rich in new forms of individual and communal expression, or whether they will become fully absorbed into the larger culture and disappear as a distinct group.

Epitomizing Potok's concern in the extreme is the "silent Holocaust" described by Leslie Fiedler:[2] "Not a single one of my own eight children has, at the present moment, a Jewish mate; nor for that matter do I. . . . In any case, there is no one to say kaddish for me when I die. I am, in short, not just as I have long known, a minimal Jew—my Judaism nearly non-existent—but, as I have only recently become aware, a terminal one as well, the last of a four-thousand-year line. Yet, whatever regrets I may feel, I cannot deny that I have wanted this, worked for it."

Neither the concerns embodied in Potok's assessment nor the outcome implied in Fiedler's family account are new; they have been expressed and debated for years by leading observers of the Jewish scene.[3] Some have held that American Jewry is progressively weakening demographically as a result of low fertility, high intermarriage, significant dispersion, and assimilatory losses.[4] Others argue that the demographic issues are of marginal

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[1]Chaim Potok, "Introduction," in *The Jews in America*, ed. David Cohen (San Francisco, 1989), pp. 10–11.

[2]Leslie Fiedler, *Fiedler on the Roof* (Boston, 1991), as quoted in the *New York Times Book Review*, Aug. 4, 1991, p. 3.

[3]Edward Norden, "Counting the Jews," *Commentary*, Oct. 1991, pp. 36–43; Gideon Shimoni, "How Central Is Israel?" *Moment*, Oct. 1991, pp. 24–27.

[4]See, e.g., U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in American Jewish Demography*, Jewish Demography Papers (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1988).

importance and that what counts is the quality of Jewish life.[5] In the latter view, concerns about population size, growth, fertility, and migration represent misplaced emphases; concerns should focus on Judaism, Jewish culture, Jewish education, the perpetuation of Jewish communal institutions, and the linkages between the American Jewish community and Israel.

Regrettably, the evidence needed to assess the validity of the different perspectives remains limited. To the extent that quality and quantity are inexorably linked in a complex fashion, it is generally recognized that we must be concerned about both, and about the connections between them. The need to do so is made all the more important by the impressive success of American Jews in their struggle over the last century for acceptance into the larger American society. Jews have reached new heights in educational achievement and occupational choice, as well as greater freedom in selection of place of residence, memberships, friends, and spouses. Together, these changes help explain associated demographic features such as later age at marriage, low fertility, more intermarriage and divorce, and high mobility. The major question is the extent to which these changes have contributed to the weakening of American Jewry, especially in terms of the ties of individual Jews to the Jewish community.

The issues are intensified because the American Jewish community has evolved from a collection of largely self-contained local communities into a national Jewish community, judged demographically by the increasing proportion of the population that is third, fourth, and higher generation American, by the extensive dispersal of the population across the United States, and by the movement of population among communities.[6] Some of the unique features of local Jewish communities—features grounded in their historic development, particular sociodemographic composition, and institutional structure—may continue and, in some cases, may even be exacerbated. But overlying such differences, ongoing trends have led individuals, both movers and stayers, to become part of familial, social, and economic networks that span the nation, reinforcing the national character of the community.

THE SEARCH FOR DATA

Recognition of the importance of a national perspective and the multiplicity of interactions between the national and the local communities has reinforced the need for demographic, social, and economic information at

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[5] Cf. Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986).

[6] *The Emergence of a Continental Jewish Community: Implications for the Federations*, Sidney Hollander Memorial Colloquium (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1987).

both levels. Because separation of church and state precludes a question on religion in the U.S. Census, there is no core of information about those who identify themselves as Jewish by religion. It has thus been necessary to look for alternate sources of data needed for assessment and planning purposes.[7]

A variety of alternate sources have been tapped or developed, but most have had limitations for an analysis of American Jewry. Omnibus sample surveys directed at the general population, such as the Gallup Poll, seldom include more than a few hundred Jews and often considerably fewer, so that the number of Jews is inadequate for in-depth assessment.[8] Aggregating the results of several years of such surveys helps to overcome the small-numbers problem but raises new concerns about comparability of information from year to year and about possible changes in attitudes and behavior over the interval encompassed by the surveys.

Use of census data on country of birth, and in recent censuses on ancestry, on the assumption that those born in Russia are largely Jewish, runs the risk of error due to lack of exact comparability between birthplace or ancestry and Jewish identity.[9] Information on Jews identified by the census as Yiddish speakers at home or while growing up is also subject to serious bias because of sharp age differentials in the use of Yiddish.[10] Moreover, the value of this and other approaches based on ancestry will decrease as the country origins of American Jews change and as they become further removed from their immigrant ancestors.

The same concern applies to use of distinctive Jewish names (DJNs) as a way of identifying and estimating Jews in the population.[11] This approach also loses its usefulness as the rate of intermarriage rises, especially as more Jewish women intermarry and take the "non-Jewish" names of their husbands (even if their husbands convert to Judaism).

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[7]Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Jewish Population in the United States 1987: Counting Jewish Populations: Methods and Problems*, Reprint No. 3 (New York, North American Jewish Data Bank and CUNY Graduate Center, 1988); Sidney Goldstein, "A National Jewish Population Study: Why and How," in *A Handle on the Future—The Potential of the 1990 National Survey for American Jewry*, Reprint No. 4 (New York, North American Jewish Data Bank and CUNY Graduate Center, 1988), pp. 1–9; Steven M. Cohen, Jonathan S. Woocher, and Bruce A. Phillips, eds., *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research* (Boulder, Colo., 1984).

[8]Alan M. Fisher, "The National Gallup Polls and American Jewish Demography," AJYB 1983, vol. 83, pp. 111–26.

[9]Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1988).

[10]Sidney Goldstein, "A Further Assessment of the Use of Yiddish in Rhode Island Households," *Rhode Island Jewish Historical Notes* 9, Nov. 1985, pp. 209–19.

[11]Barry A. Kosmin and Stanley Waterman, "The Use and Misuse of Distinctive Jewish Names in Research on Jewish Populations," in *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1985*, ed. U.O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola (Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, 1989), pp. 1–10.

Local Jewish communities have increasingly recognized that effective planning must be based on comprehensive, accurate assessments of the population.[12] A large number of communities have therefore undertaken their own surveys. While these have added greatly to our knowledge, that knowledge remains incomplete. The surveys have varied considerably in scope and quality: They have relied on different questionnaires, varying sampling designs and coverage of the Jewish population, and diverse tabulation plans. The absence of standardized methods and definitions (including who was to be counted as a Jew) made it difficult and sometimes impossible to compare findings across communities, either to obtain a better understanding of a particular community or to obtain insights into the national Jewish community.

Recognizing the problems of coverage and variation in quality among local studies and the need for a national profile, the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF) in 1970/71 undertook the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS-1970/71). The national sampling design relied on a combination of local Jewish federation lists of Jewish households and standard area probability methods to ensure representation of Jewish households not included on lists.[13] Housing units of the combined list and area samples were screened for Jewish occupants. Three criteria were employed to identify Jews: whether any of the occupants had been born Jewish, had a parent who had been born Jewish, or regarded themselves as being Jewish.[14]

In all, a national sample of 7,179 units, each of which had at least one member meeting one of the three criteria, was identified. The resulting weighted estimate of the national Jewish population was 5.4 million Jews. After adjusting for housing units whose religion could not be ascertained and for biases resulting from area-sample cutoffs, Bernard Lazerwitz estimated the total population to range between 5.6 and 6.0 million.[15] Of the persons identified as Jewish by one of the three criteria, 97.3 percent were born Jewish and were still Jewish at the time of the survey; 1.2 percent were born Jewish but no longer considered themselves Jewish; and 1.5 percent were not born Jewish but were reported as Jewish at the time of the survey.[16] In addition, 6.4 percent of all the members of the sampled households

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[12]Lester I. Levin, "Federation and Population Studies," in *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research*, ed. Steven M. Cohen, Jonathan Woocher, and Bruce A. Phillips (Boulder, Colo., 1984), pp. 57–64.

[13]Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB 1973, vol. 74, pp. 264–306.

[14]Bernard Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group: The U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography* 15, Aug. 1978, pp. 389–94.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Fred Massarik, "The Boundary of Jewishness: Some Measures of Jewish Identity in the United States," in *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973*, ed. U.O. Schmelz, P. Glickson, and S. DellaPergola (Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, 1977), pp. 117–39.

consisted of persons neither born Jewish nor currently Jewish. These were largely the non-Jewish spouses of Jewish household members or the children of mixed marriages who were not being raised as Jews. As Fred Massarik concluded, "Interpretations of the Jewish population must therefore give careful attention to the number of persons living in Jewish households and the number of members who specifically meet clear criteria of Jewishness. Failure to do so can lead to quite discrepant estimates of the total Jewish population."[17] This caveat has even greater importance in the 1990s.

NJPS-1970/71 was a milestone in the development of American Jewish demography. Unfortunately, exploitation of its rich data was limited, so that the full value of the survey for understanding the Jewish population was not realized. Nonetheless, the experience both in implementing that survey and trying to utilize the results served the Jewish community well.

In the 1970s, because the national survey was seen as obviating the need for new local surveys, few such surveys were initiated. Since 1980, however, about 50 Jewish communities, including most larger ones, have undertaken surveys. Over the last several decades, some have already done so twice, and a few, like Boston, have done so three times. Still, questions remained about how well these local surveys represented the Jewish population as a whole and, in the case of some surveys, about the quality of coverage.

In the absence of another NJPS in the early 1980s, but with keen recognition of the need for national assessments of the Jewish population, individual groups and scholars have attempted to develop national samples. Studies undertaken for the American Jewish Committee, largely by Steven Cohen, have been in the forefront of such efforts. A number of these earlier surveys[18] employed samples based on distinctive Jewish names derived from lists of persons affiliated with a wide range of Jewish organizations or activities. Whether a sample based on such lists of affiliated or identified Jews was representative of the entire adult Jewish population and especially of those at or near the margins of the community remained questionable, as Steve Cohen himself recognized.[19]

In more recent surveys, a stronger effort has been made to achieve less biased coverage by relying on a different base for developing the sample. A consumer mail panel of 200,000 households developed by a marketing and survey research firm contained 4,700 households which had been identified as containing at least one member reported as currently Jewish. Based on

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[17]Massarik, "Boundary of Jewishness," p. 119.

[18]Steven M. Cohen, "The 1981–82 National Survey of American Jews," AJYB 1983, vol. 83, pp. 89–110; Cohen, *Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis: The 1983 National Survey of American Jews and Jewish Communal Leaders* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1983).

[19]Steven M. Cohen, *Ties and Tensions: The 1986 Survey of American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1987).

the total sample, a demographically balanced subsample (based on region, income, population density, age, and household size) was developed containing over 2,000 Jewish households. The data collected suggest that this sample "succeeded in reaching a slightly larger number of marginally Jewish respondents" than did the earlier samples based on distinctive Jewish names.[20] Still, doubts about the representativeness of such samples were raised both by the self-selective character of participants in the panel and the fact that the sample presumably reflected current religious identification—therefore missing individuals who did not report themselves as currently Jewish by religion.

THE NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION SURVEY OF 1990[21]

Planning for NJPS-1990

This situation presented a major challenge to any effort to undertake a national assessment of the Jewish population. In preparing for a possible new CJF national survey, advantage was taken of the many improvements introduced in sampling and survey procedures since NJPS-1970/71, the experience gained from the large number of local Jewish community surveys completed since then, and the various limited efforts to collect national data. Moreover, the new survey benefited from the much stronger professional credentials of the recent planning and research staffs of local federations, the CJF, and other national agencies, as well as the availability and commitment of a substantial number of Jewish scholars interested and often experienced in surveying and assessing both the general and the Jewish populations. Thus, there was a greater appreciation of the need for data of high scientific quality and a far greater potential for employing the most sophisticated methods to obtain such data and for using them effectively for analytic and planning purposes.

In order to correct problems of comparability among local surveys and to design better sampling methods and a core questionnaire that could be used both locally and eventually in a national survey, in 1984 CJF created the National Technical Advisory Committee on Population Studies (NTAC). In 1986, through the cooperative efforts of CJF and the Graduate

[20]Ibid. See also Steven M. Cohen, *Content or Continuity? Alternative Bases for Commitment* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1991).

[21]This section draws heavily on the paper prepared for the Sidney Hollander Colloquium on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, cosponsored by the Wilstein Institute of the University of Judaism and the Council of Jewish Federations, July 1991.

School and University Center of the City University of New York, the Mandell L. Berman North American Jewish Data Bank (NAJDB) was founded; its goal, to enhance comparability of the data collected locally and nationally and to facilitate analysis of the various data sets.

Operating through the concerted efforts of NTAC and NAJDB, planning for a 1990 National Jewish Population Survey was initiated in the late 1980s. The decision to undertake the survey coincided with worldwide interest in launching a "world census" of Jewry parallel to the 1990 round of censuses being undertaken by national governments. The October 1987 World Conference on Jewish Population, held in Jerusalem, with over 20 countries represented, recommended a stocktaking of world Jewry as the basis for obtaining information for future study and action in the Jewish population field.

The Field Survey

In late 1988, CJF's endowment committee and its board of directors approved undertaking a 1990 national Jewish population study in the United States. Organization of the sample survey was the responsibility of NTAC. In close consultation with federation planners, it designed the core questionnaire. With assistance from a number of national sampling experts, several of whom serve on NTAC, and following consultation with a number of survey companies, it developed a sample design that was intended to ensure the widest possible coverage of the Jewish population, encompassing all types of Jews, ranging from those strongly identifying themselves as Jewish, at one extreme, to those on the margins of the community or even outside it, at the other; it sought to include born Jews who no longer considered themselves Jewish and the non-Jewish spouses/partners and children of Jewish household members, as well as other non-Jewish members of the household.

Following receipt and review of proposals from a number of survey firms, CJF commissioned the ICR Survey Research Group of Media, Pa., to collect data in a three-stage national telephone survey. Since the universe of Jewish households was not known, Stage I involved contacting a random sample of 125,813 American households using computer-assisted telephone interviewing. The sampled households represented all religious groups in continental United States, as well as secular households; the Jewish households were identified among them.

This initial screening was carried on as part of the twice-weekly nationally representative omnibus market-research surveys conducted by ICR. One thousand households were contacted in each of 125 successive rounds over the course of the period April 1989 to May 1990. Each household was

selected using a random-digit-dialing (RDD) methodology; within each cooperating household, to ensure random selection, the adult chosen as respondent was the one with the most recent birthday. The overall procedure allowed for an equal probability of Jews to be selected from every state (except Alaska and Hawaii) and from locations of all sizes, so that a national profile could be obtained. Representation of Alaska and Hawaii was incorporated into the national sample in the third stage of the survey.

In addition to traditional census-type questions on sociodemographic, economic, and household characteristics, the screening survey asked "What is your religion?" Only 2.2 percent of the respondents refused to reply to this question. One by-product of this phase of the study, which was conducted in tandem with CUNY Graduate Center, was a unique profile of religious identification and of denominations in the United States. In fact, the responses provide the largest contemporary data set on American religious adherence. The results of this first stage—the National Survey of Religious Identification— were publicly announced in April 1991 and received wide dissemination in the press.[22]

To ensure the comprehensive coverage desired in NJPS for current and former Jews, additional questions were included in the Stage I screening phase for those who did not respond "Jewish" to the question on current religion. Whereas in the initial screening question respondents only had to answer for themselves, follow-up questions required that respondents provide information both on themselves and on other members of the household. Three follow-up sets of screening questions were successively directed to all respondents who did not identify themselves as Jewish by religion: 1. "Do you or anyone else in the household consider him/herself Jewish?" 2. "Were you or anyone else in the household raised Jewish?" 3. "Do or did you or anyone else in the household have a Jewish parent?" A positive answer to any of these questions qualified the household for initial classification as "Jewish."

This procedure, using multiple points of qualification, more than doubled the unweighted sample of identified "Jewish households." It now added households in which respondents reported themselves as Jewish by criteria other than religion as well as households of mixed composition, which included respondents who had either indicated they had some other religious identification on the religious screening question or had even initially refused to answer. The four screening questions identified 5,146 households containing one or more "qualified" Jews.

Over the course of a year, a panel was thus created to be used in the summer of 1990 as the basis for an intensive assessment of the sociodemo-

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[22]Ari L. Goldman, "Portrait of Religion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises," *New York Times*, Apr. 10, 1991.

graphic, economic, and identificational characteristics of the American Jewish population. To requalify potential respondents and to minimize loss to follow-up between the initial screening and the in-depth survey, 2,240 members of the 5,146 Jewish sample identified in the early months of the screening survey were recontacted in Stage II, the inventory stage. This took place in the months before the final interview stage. During this procedure, a number of potential respondents dropped out of the survey sample due to changes in household composition or disqualification upon further review.

Stage III, the in-depth survey, was conducted during ten weeks in May to July 1990. During this stage, the entire sample of 5,146 "Jewish" households was requalified. In order to meet the original goal of obtaining about 2,500 completed interviews, 2,441 households of those qualified were interviewed, using the extensive questionnaire prepared by NTAC for in-depth assessment of the sociodemographic and economic characteristics of the American Jewish population and of a wide array of attitudinal and behavioral variables related to Jewish identity. Completed interviews were obtained from 2,439 households, encompassing 6,507 individuals; these constitute the final sample for NJPS-1990.

Identifying the Jewish Population

The results of both the screening phase and the in-depth interviews attest to the validity and importance of the view that conceptual and measurement concerns should enter not only into the initial sample selection process but also into the analytical process. The complexity and fluidity of the contemporary American Jewish community are clearly demonstrated by the survey findings, beginning with the qualifying round.

Of the 5,146 households that qualified in Stage I as having at least one Jewish member under one of the four criteria specified earlier, just under half qualified on the basis of religion, just over one-third as containing an ethnic Jew (persons who consider themselves Jews), 5 percent on the basis of some member having been raised Jewish, and another 12 percent on the basis of at least one member reporting a Jewish parent.[23] The results of this self-ascription process demonstrate that any survey that restricts its identification of the Jewish population only to those reporting being Jewish by religion runs the risk of excluding a substantial part of the total population of Jewish religio-ethnic identity.

Moreover, among the 5,146 households that were initially screened as

[23]Sidney Goldstein and Barry A. Kosmin, "Religious and Ethnic Self-Identification in the United States 1989–1990: A Case Study of the Jewish Population," paper presented at the Population Association of America, Washington, D.C., March 1991.

being eligible for the in-depth survey, only 3,665 of the respondents themselves qualified as Jewish under one of the four criteria and only 57 percent of these on the basis of being Jewish by religion. The other 1,481 respondents qualified because members of the household other than the respondent met one of the criteria employed in the screening phase. This situation reflects the large number of households whose members were of mixed religious/ethnic identification or contained persons of Jewish descent who did not profess to be currently Jewish. That so many households were religiously and ethnically mixed is largely due to the sharp increase in mixed marriages in the last several decades.

One might question whether individuals should be counted as part of the Jewish population if they do not regard themselves as currently Jewish, even though born of one or two Jewish parents or raised as Jews, and particularly if they currently report identification with another religion. The answer to this depends, of course, on the religious and sociological perspectives adopted and the use for which the analysis is being undertaken. The great advantage of NJPS-1990 is that it provides the information on these persons and gives scholars and planners the option of including or excluding them, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Assessment of their behavioral characteristics with respect to Jewish practices should provide a more definitive answer as to how they should be classified sociologically and demographically as well as what factors may explain their current status with respect to Jewish identity. Unless it is known how many are in each category, including those on the margins and those who have left, the community cannot design realistic programs to maintain its strength, to retain those in it—especially those on the margins—and to attract back those who have opted out.[24]

Extension and Exploitation of NJPS-1990

Two other features of NJPS-1990 are relevant to this description of the organization of the study and the plans for exploiting the data. The first relates to the efforts NTAC undertook to develop a consortium of communities which would undertake surveys, at their own expense, approximately at the same time as NJPS-1990, and which would employ as much as possible the same basic sample design and core questionnaire. Such an

[24]This survey, like all sample surveys, is subject to sampling error arising from the fact that the results may differ from what would have been obtained if the whole population had been interviewed. Surveys are also subject to errors arising from nonresponse and respondents providing erroneous information; NJPS-1990 is no exception. Readers interested in sampling and nonsampling errors are referred to the Methodological Appendix in *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (Kosmin et al., 1991, pp. 38–39) and to other documents on NJPS-1990 available through the North American Jewish Data Bank.

arrangement was motivated by recognition that, while the size of the national sample can adequately provide reliable insights into the characteristics of the national Jewish population and allow comparisons by region and community type, it is not large enough to permit in-depth assessment of individual communities, with the possible exception of New York. While the idea of a consortium was favorably received, financial and logistic considerations restricted the number of participating communities. That they include New York and Chicago and such smaller communities as Columbus, Seattle, and South Broward County, Florida, should greatly enhance the richness of the insights gained into American Jewry in 1990, both nationally and locally, and also the opportunities for evaluating methodological aspects of the various surveys.

The second major feature of NJPS-1990, and one which sharply distinguishes it from the NJPS 1970/71, is the extensive attention paid in the early stages of the study to the uses to which the data would be put analytically and for planning purposes. A subcommittee of NTAC developed an agenda for disseminating the findings. Beginning with a report at the 1990 CJF General Assembly, and through two major news releases in 1991, the findings were publicized in leading newspapers, on national TV, and on radio. A number of papers have already been presented at professional meetings; more are scheduled. The Sidney Hollander Colloquium in July 1991, cosponsored by the Wilstein Institute of the University of Judaism and the Council of Jewish Federations, focused on the initial findings of the survey and served to encourage utilization of the data by both planners and researchers. A second conference—"A Consultation on Conceptual and Policy Implications of the 1990 CJF National Population Survey"—was sponsored in October 1991 by the Hornstein Program in Jewish Communal Service at Brandeis University.[25] Through CJF Satellite, the findings have been reviewed with local federations. *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*[26] was published and is available to both professionals and the public.

Most significantly, a number of scholars and planners, many of them leaders in their fields, agreed to author individual monographs, with the State University of New York (SUNY) Press undertaking to publish the series, beginning perhaps in late 1992. The monograph topics encompass, among others, the elderly, marriage and the family, population redistribution and migration, women, socioeconomic status, fertility, Jewish identity,

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[25]A key discussion at the consultation, initiated by Steven M. Cohen and Gabriel Berger, revolved about the allocation of the surveyed population into the Jewish identity subcategories and the impact of alternative categorizations on rates of intermarriage and assimilation.

[26]Barry A. Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1991).

intermarriage, philanthropy, Jewish education, apostasy, and voluntarism. While these monographs are being prepared, the authors, as well as others who will have access to the data through a public-use tape, are being encouraged to prepare papers for conferences and articles for journals. Clearly, every effort has been made to ensure that the results of the survey will be widely exploited and disseminated, thereby enhancing their value for scholarly and planning purposes.

Over the past several decades, the *American Jewish Year Book* has occupied a key role in keeping the leadership and the public informed about the demographic situation of American Jewry. In addition to its regular inventory of the size and distribution of Jews among the various localities in the United States and overseas, it has published an impressive number of articles on various demographic features of world and especially American Jewry. Among these articles have been two overviews which attempted, within the limits of available data, to present profiles of the American-Jewish population in 1970 and in 1980.[27] Between the two reports, the results of NJPS-1970/71 had become available, adding to the insights that could be drawn from individual community studies. Now, with the initial findings of NJPS-1990 available, this decennial monitoring of American Jewry's profile and of the ways it has changed in the second half of the 20th century can be undertaken again.

In doing so, as before, the emphasis will be on the major areas of demographic concern—size, composition, distribution, and the processes of marriage (including intermarriage), fertility, and migration. As far as possible, comparisons will be made with the patterns that emerged from the analysis of NJPS-1970/71, in order to gain insights into the extent and direction of change. However, differences in coverage and in the definitions and classifications used in the two surveys sometimes preclude meaningful comparisons. Most important, the 1990 profile will take advantage of the much greater attention given by NJPS-1990 to providing coverage of the full range of American Jewry, including both persons born of one or two Jewish parents but not professing to be currently Jewish and persons not born and not currently Jewish but living with persons qualifying as Jewish under the criteria employed by the survey. By doing so, a more accurate and useful overview of American Jewry can be obtained, with deeper insights into where we have come from, where we are heading, and what implications the demographic situation has for the future of the community.

In undertaking this overview, it must be stressed that the wealth of data available in NJPS-1990 can only be tapped superficially here. Simple cross-

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[27]Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," AJYB 1971, vol. 72, pp. 3–88; Goldstein, "The Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography," AJYB 1981, vol. 81, pp. 3–59.

tabulations are used to profile the population, without controls for other variables affecting the relationships. Smaller analyses, using multivariate techniques, must await preparation of the individual articles and monographs and the in-depth treatment that they can give to particular aspects of the Jewish demographic situation.

THE COMPLEXITY OF JEWISH IDENTITY

The fluid character of the American Jewish community is at the heart of the findings of NJPS. How many Jews there are depends on who is counted as in and who is counted as out of the population. From a policy perspective, this raises questions about how the community can retain those still in the core, how it can bring back those at the margin and those who may have left, and how it can draw in those still in situations where they must choose between being or not being Jewish. Depending on how these questions are answered over the next several decades, the Jewish population has the potential of growing or declining.

On the basis of the weighted sample,[28] NJPS-1990 estimated that 3.2 million households in the United States contained one or more persons who were Jews or former Jews, using the four criteria specified earlier. These 3.2 million households contained 8.1 million persons. The total estimated population is raised to 8.2 million by another 70,000 Jews living in nursing homes and other long-term care institutions (mainly elderly persons), 10,000 living in prisons or homeless, and 20,000 immigrants estimated to have arrived after the survey was initiated.

Just over half (4.2 million) of the 8.1 million individuals in qualified households were born Jews who regarded themselves as Jewish by religion (table 1); this number includes the 100,000 institutionalized and unenumerated persons, for whom detailed data on type of Jewish identity were not obtained). Augmented by the estimated 185,000 who indicated they were Jews by choice, about 70 percent of whom reported having beeen converted, Jews by religion numbered 4.4 million in 1990 and constituted 54 percent of all members of qualified households and almost two-thirds of all persons

[28]After the survey information was collected and processed, each respondent was assigned a weight. When the weights are used in tabulations of the survey data, the results provide estimates of the U.S. population in each category shown in the tabulations. The weighting method ensures that key demographic characteristics of the adult population of the total weighted sample of 125,813 responding households in Stage I matched the most current estimates of these demographic characteristics produced by the Census Bureau. The weighting procedure adjusted for noncooperating households, for those who were not at home when the interviewer telephoned, and for households which did not have telephones or had multiple lines.

of Jewish descent and preference. An additional 1.1 million persons were classified as having been born Jewish but were secular Jews; they did not report their current religion as Jewish nor did they identify themselves with any other religious group. In combination with those claiming to be Jews by religion, these 5.5 million persons compose the "core Jewish population": all those professing to be currently Jewish by religion, ethnic or cultural identity, or birth and not reporting any other religious affiliation. This population is the one which most Jewish communal agencies recognize as their clientele.

Reflecting the broad net which the screening design for NJPS-1990 employed, an additional 1.3 million persons included in the survey are persons of Jewish descent who at the time of the survey reported a religion other than Jewish. They comprise 16 percent of all household members and 19 percent of all those of Jewish descent or religious preference.

Of these, 210,000 are persons who were born or raised Jewish but who currently follow another religion.[29] A majority are offspring of intermarriages, about half of whom were raised as Christians. Comparing this number with the enumeration of Jews by choice suggests a near balance in the exchange between Jewish and non-Jewish groups of those choosing to change religious identification.

Distinct from the converts out of Judaism are those 415,000 adults of Jewish descent who were raised from birth in a religion other than Judaism. They constitute 5 percent of the 8.2 million persons encompassed in the survey and 6 percent of those of Jewish descent or preference. Usually the children of intermarriages, they report an almost equal balance of Jewish fathers and mothers. (It needs to be stressed here that the classification of individuals was based on the information provided by the respondent, not on Jewish legal—halakhic—criteria.) Interestingly, a number of these persons consider themselves Jewish by ethnicity or background, and some follow selected Jewish religious practices. Since they profess another religion, however, they are not treated as core Jews in NJPS-1990.

Exceeding the number of adults of Jewish background but not currently identified as Jews are those 700,000 children under 18 years of age who have a "qualified Jew" as a parent (stepparent in a few cases), but who are being raised in a religion other than Judaism. They constitute almost 9 percent of the 8.2 million persons represented in the survey and 10 percent of all persons of Jewish descent and preference.

Among these children, about 40 percent have a parent who either is a Jew by religion or who is a secular Jew in an interfaith marriage; these children are usually being raised in the religion of the non-Jewish parent. The

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[29]Some have undergone formal conversion, but others have simply switched to another religion. In the text and tables of this report, all such persons are referred to as converts out.

majority of the children in this category are children of converts out of Judaism or of a parent of Jewish descent who was raised from birth as a non-Jew. Their connection to Judaism is through one or more Jewish grandparent(s). Since they have been away from their Jewish roots for two generations, they have had little opportunity for exposure to Judaism. It remains to be determined in future years whether any of this group will come to identify positively as Jews by ethnicity or to convert to Judaism if required to do so to satisfy Jewish law.

In total, the combined population represented by the core population and those of Jewish descent, some of whom regard themselves as ethnic Jews even while professing another religion, numbers 6.8 million persons. That 19 percent of the total are outside the core population attests to the cumulative impact over one or more generations that intermarriage has had on the demographics of the Jewish population. Concurrently, it suggests the heterogeneous character of the population that now constitutes, by one or another criterion, the "Jewish" population of the United States. This heterogeneity is exacerbated further because 1.35 million adult Gentiles were living with those persons identified as "Jewish" by one of the foregoing criteria. These Gentiles were not and never had been identified as Jewish by religion or ethnic origin. Most are the spouses of a "Jewish" man or woman, but some may be persons who share the living quarters as partner or roommate.

The fact that Gentiles constitute 16 percent of the 8.2 million persons encompassed in the survey highlights further the very heterogeneous nature of the Jewish population, particularly if household composition is considered. It also suggests that, to the extent that the Gentile household members, and possibly even their relatives outside the household, are affected by their interaction with the Jewish members of the household, the potential "Jewish audience" in America is far greater than the 5.5 million core population or even the larger group represented by the core Jews and those of Jewish descent. Moreover, such heterogeneity points to the challenges that Jewish communal agencies and religious institutions face in the years ahead in delineating their client population. Who, for example, should be eligible for services rendered by a home for the aged, a community center, or a family service? Who, indeed, should be eligible for burial in a Jewish cemetery? What distinctions, if any, should be drawn between Jewish individuals and Jewish households, between core Jews and Jews by descent, between Jews by either of these criteria and non-Jews living with them? While all would agree that every effort needs to be made to retain those in the core and to strengthen their Jewish identity, what efforts, if any, should be made to attract back into the core those of Jewish descent who now profess another religion? And what missionary efforts should be exerted to make "Jewish households" more homogeneous by attempting to convert to

Judaism the Gentile spouses and partners of those already in the core?

Reflecting the complexity that characterizes individual Jewish identity, the composition of "Jewish households" is also complex. Of the 3.2 million units represented in the survey, only 57 percent were composed entirely of members of the core Jewish population, that is, were entirely Jewish in their current composition. Just over one-quarter (27 percent) were mixed, consisting of at least one person belonging to the core population but including at least one other who was non-Jewish at the time of the survey. As many as 16 percent had no core Jewish household members, having qualified for inclusion in the survey only because one or more members of the household were of Jewish descent even though currently professing another religion. If the number of Jewish households is restricted to those containing at least one core Jew, the total count decreases to 2.7 million units, of which two-thirds are entirely Jewish and one-third are mixed.

NUMBERS, DISTRIBUTION, AND MOBILITY

Changing Numbers, 1970/71 to 1990

At no time in American history has there been a complete enumeration of the nation's Jewish population. Any statistics on the number of Jews in the United States must therefore remain an estimate. Given the complexity of identifying who is Jewish, the estimates vary considerably, depending on the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the criteria used and the success achieved in identifying the various subsets of the population. As the results of NJPS-1990 indicate, depending on which criteria were used, the number of Jews in the United States varies from a low of 5.5 million to a high of 6.8 million, or even up to 8.2 million if we choose to include the Gentile members of "Jewish households." In fact, some analysts of the 1990 data may conclude that there are far fewer than 5.5 million Jews if they apply halakhic criteria. Such variation for any given year, and the use of different criteria in different years, makes any evaluation of changes over time difficult if not dangerous.

NJPS-1970/71 counted persons as Jewish if they had been born Jewish, had a parent who had been born Jewish, or regarded themselves as being Jewish. It estimated the national Jewish population to be 5.4 million, or 2.9 percent of the total American population. A later adjustment of this estimate by Bernard Lazerwitz took account of housing units whose religion could not be ascertained and of biases resulting from area-sample cutoffs in field sampling for economy reasons. The resulting estimates showed the total Jewish population to range between 5.6 and 6.0 million. However,

since no adjustments were ever made for the socioeconomic subcategories of the 1970/71 population, and full evaluation of the 1990 data remains to be completed, it seems advisable to continue to use the 5.4-million original estimate yielded by NJPS-1970/71 in any comparisons undertaken here between the results of that survey and those of the 1990 survey.

Table 2 shows the comparative statistics on population and households for the 1970/71 and the 1990 surveys. It clearly indicates that the extent of change in the 20-year interval varies sharply depending on the criteria used to classify individuals as Jewish. If the broadest set of criteria is used, the Jewish population increased by 40.2 percent, from 5.85 to 8.20 milllion. This is a faster rate of growth than even the total American population, which increased by 22.4 percent in this same interval. However, much of the growth in the "Jewish" population (using the broadest definition) reflects the very large increase in the number of Gentiles living with Jews.

If the comparison is restricted to individuals who are either currently Jewish or of Jewish descent, the increase is much smaller, from 5.48 to 6.84 million or 24.8 percent. Here, too, the indicated growth may be misleading, since almost one in five of the 6.8 million are not currently Jewish. The impressive growth within this category is largely attributable, therefore, to the growing number of persons who are Jewish by descent but currently profess a different religious affiliation.

Restricting the comparison to those currently Jewish, that is, in the core population, the data point to only a slight increase in the Jewish population since 1970, from 5.42 to 5.51 million or 1.8 percent. This is a far slower rate of growth than that of the American population as a whole. Nonetheless, these statistics indicate that the sharp declines in the Jewish population that some scholars anticipated after the 1970/71 survey have not been realized; yet little more than stability has been achieved, probably due to immigration from overseas. However, if Lazerwitz's adjusted data for 1970/71 are more accurate than the lower 1970/71 estimate used here, compared to our 1990 data, the population did decline in the 20-year interval by about 4.6 percent (based on Lazerwitz's medium estimate of 5.78 million Jews).

Reflecting the high rates of intermarriage and the consequent vast increase in the number of households containing a Jew (two Jews marrying each other form one household, whereas two Jews who intermarry form two households), the number of households in 1990 (3.19 million) far exceeded the number identified in the 1970/71 survey (1.95 million). Again, it needs to be stressed that half a million of the households in the 1990 survey did not include any person who was a core Jew.

The net result of the changes in the size and Jewish identity subcategories of the "Jewish population" compared to changes in the size of the population of the nation as a whole is a variable percentage of Jews in the total.

If the broadest definition is used, including Gentiles, then the proportion has risen from 2.9 percent in 1970 to 3.3 percent in 1990, and for some purposes (e.g., political), this may be the relevant statistic. However, if the comparison is restricted to all persons of Jewish descent and preference, it remains unchanged at 2.7 percent. If, further, the comparison is limited to those identified as core Jews, it decreases from 2.7 percent in 1970 to only 2.2 percent 20 years later. The drop would be even sharper if Lazerwitz's adjusted 1970 statistics were used. Clearly, unless the currently non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households are included in the count, Jews have become a smaller percentage of the total population.

Nonetheless, according to estimates emanating from the National Survey of Religious Identification,[10] made on the basis of the first stage (screening phase) of the national survey, which obtained information on the religious composition of the total American population, Jews remain by far the third largest major religious group in the United States. Restricted to the adult population and to those professing a religion, that survey found 86.5 percent of the population to be Christian (including 26.5 percent Catholic and 55.7 percent Protestant; the balance reported "Christian") and 1.8 percent Jewish. The remainder of the adult population was distributed among a number of other groups (e.g., Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus) as well as among agnostics and those reporting no religion. No single religion of the other groups exceeded 0.5 percent of the total adult population. Thus, although constituting a small minority in comparison to the overwhelming Christian majority in America, Jews are clearly the predominant minority religious group in the country.

While total numbers are an important issue, the composition and distribution of the population probably are more relevant factors affecting the dynamics of change in Jewish life in the United States. Thus, we turn next to examination of a range of compositional variables, such as geographic distribution, age, education, and occupation, as well as such components of demographic change as migration, fertility, and intermarriage. The value of NJPS-1990 for such purposes is greatly enhanced by the opportunity to compare the characteristics and demographic behavior of Jews belonging to different identity subcategories of the core population and to compare the core Jews both with those of Jewish descent who in 1990 professed another religion and with the Gentile members of the surveyed households who were born and remain non-Jewish. Such comparisons should allow some insights into how these subcategories of the population differ from one another and suggest what implications observed differences have for the future of the community. Concurrently, they may provide some insights

[10]Goldman, "Portrait of Religion."

into the factors accounting for the location of individuals in particular identity categories.

For purposes of analysis, the core population will be subdivided into three groups: (a) those born Jewish and reported as Jewish by religion; (b) the secular-ethnic Jews—those born Jewish but not reporting themselves as Jewish by religion and not reporting any other religion; (c) Jews by choice—those converted to Judaism and those simply choosing to regard themselves as Jewish. Since the criteria for conversion vary among denominations, this analysis does not try to distinguish between the two subgroups. The currently non-Jewish population also consists of three sub-groups: (a) converts out of Judaism—adults who were born or raised Jewish but who were following another religion at the time of the survey; (b) persons who reported Jewish parentage or descent, but who were raised from birth in another religion (some of these and of the converts out consider themselves Jewish by ethnicity or background); (c) persons who were not and had never been identified as Jewish by religion or ethnic origin.

Regional Distribution

NJPS-1970/71 documented the high mobility levels of American Jews and their increasing dispersion across the United States.[31] Migration, which has played a key role throughout Jewish history, had by 1970 become the major dynamic responsible for the growth or decline of many local Jewish communities and for the changing distribution of the Jewish population among regions of the country and among metropolitan areas.

The high level of education of American Jews and the kinds of occupations which they have increasingly been able to enter, coupled with the growing freedom of choice which Jews have had about where they reside, often result in movement away from parental family and place of origin. This often also means movement out of centers of Jewish concentration.[32] Moreover, the shift away from self-employment to employment for others can result in more frequent movement, because repeated transfers are often associated with high white-collar positions. Such geographic mobility has the potential for weakening individual ties to a particular Jewish community by reducing the opportunites for integration locally and by increasing opportunities for greater interaction with non-Jews, especially as occupational identification and affiliation take on increased importance.

Migration may also have positive effects on the vitality of Jewish life by

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[31]Sidney Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution Among American Jews," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 24, June 1982, pp. 5–23.

[32]Sidney Goldstein, "Jews on the Move: Implications for American Jewry and for Local Communities," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 32, June 1990, pp. 5–30.

bringing additional population to smaller communities or to formerly declining ones, thereby providing the kind of "demographic transfusion" needed to help maintain or to develop basic institutions and facilities essential for a vital Jewish community. It may also do so by bridging the traditional age and affiliation cleavages, thereby providing the social cement needed to hold the community together.[33]

Concurrently, mobility may contribute to the development of a national Jewish society, characterized by greater population dispersion and by greater population exchange among various localities.[34] Both processes require more effective networking among locations in order to ensure continuing opportunities and stimuli for mobile individuals and families to maintain their Jewish identity and their links to the Jewish community, regardless of where they live or how often they move from place to place. Greater dispersion, especially to smaller communities and to more isolated ones, also requires development of methods to ensure that such communities are better able through their own facilities or through links to other, larger communities to service the various needs of both their migrant and nonmigrant populations.[35]

In 1900, two decades after the onset of the massive movement of East European Jews to the United States, 57 percent of American Jewry was concentrated in the Northeast region of the country, reflecting the attractiveness of the major ports of entry and their nearby areas to the new settlers. Only one in five Jews lived in the South or the West; the remaining one-quarter resided in the Midwest. The continued heavy influx of immigrants over the next few decades reinforced the concentration in the Northeast and especially in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. By 1930, 68 percent of all of America's Jews were living in the Northeast region; the proportions in each of the other three regions had declined, with only 12 percent reported in the South and West combined.

With the great reduction in immigration, internal movement became an increasingly important force in redistributing the Jewish population among regions of the country. Succeeding decades witnessed a continuous decline in the percentage living in the Northeast and particularly sharp rises in the proportion living in the West and to a lesser extent in the South. For 1971, the *American Jewish Year Book* reported 63 percent of the population in the Northeast and 25 percent in the Sunbelt states of the South and the West; the Midwest had declined to only 12 percent of the total.[36] NJPS-

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[33]Barry D. Lebowitz, "Migration and the Structure of the Contemporary Jewish Community," *Contemporary Jewry* 2, Fall/Winter 1975, p. 8.

[34]Sidney Goldstein, "American Jews on the Move," *Moment*, Aug. 1991, pp. 24–29ff.

[35]Goldstein, "Jews on the Move."

[36]AJYB 1973. The grouping of states has been changed to ensure comparability with the census assignment of states among regions.

1970/71 found slightly more (64 percent) in the Northeast, and considerably more in the Midwest, about 17 percent, and fewer in the Sunbelt, 19 percent. The difference has never been satisfactorily resolved.[37]

The trend in redistribution documented for 1970–71 has continued (table 3). According to NJPS-1990,[38] considerably fewer Jews were living in the Northeast, only 43.6 percent. Together the South and the West accounted for 45.1 percent, almost equally divided between them. The Midwest continued to contain the smallest percentage of Jews, only 11.3 percent of the total. This overall distribution pattern shows a major realignment of the Jewish population and strengthens the assumption that Jews have participated, perhaps in accentuated form, in the movement out of the Northeast and the Midwest to the South and West that in recent decades has characterized the American population generally.[39] While Jews remain heavily concentrated in the Northeast, the changing regional distribution suggests that Jews feel increasingly accepted in America and are paralleling mainstream America in shifting to the Sunbelt regions of the country.[40] Whether all types of Jews are doing so equally can be assessed by the data on regional distribution by type of Jewish identity.

Differences in regional distribution by type of Jewish identity cannot be ascribed entirely or even mainly to the effects of selective migration. They may well stem from differences in the historical development of various Jewish communities, to variations in socioeconomic and denominational composition, to the size of the local Jewish communities, and to the norms regarding intermarriage and conversion.

The NJPS-1990 sample shows that, in a comparison of core Jews and non-Jews, more of the core Jews are concentrated in the Northeast, which includes the New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania areas of original heavy immigrant settlement. By contrast, relatively more of the non-Jews in "Jewish" households live in each of the other three regions. This finding suggests either that regions outside the Northeast attract a disproportional number of the marginal Jews or that conditions in these regions are more conducive to marginality and the intermarriages that result in Gentile spouses and children being in "Jewish" households.

The sharp locational differences among the subgroups of core Jews confirm these regional variations. Whereas almost half of the Jews by religion

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[37]Fred Massarik, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1973," AJYB 1974–75, vol. 75, pp. 295–304.

[38]These findings differ from the statistics reported in the 1991 *American Jewish Year Book*, whose data are based largely on reports from local federations and on local community studies.

[39]Larry Long, *Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States* (New York, 1988), pp. 137–88.

[40]Cf. William M. Newman and Peter L. Halvorson, "American Jews: Patterns of Geographic Distribution and Change, 1952–1971," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, June 1979, pp. 183–93.

are concentrated in the Northeast, less than one-third of the secular Jews and those who are Jews by choice are located there. Clearly, the Northeast, while no longer the majority area of Jewish residence in the United States, is by far the dominant location of persons identifying themselves as Jewish by religion. Both secular Jews and Jews by choice are relatively more likely to live in each of the other three regions. The differences are particularly sharp for the West. Such variable distribution may have serious implications for the future strength of Jewish identity of those living in the respective regions.

Variations in regional distribution also characterize the non-Jewish members of the sampled households. Those who are converts out of Judaism and those of Jewish descent who grew up in and now practice another religion each have a quite low proportion living in the Northeast, just over one-quarter. This is considerably below the proportion of Jews by religion and even below that of the secular Jews and the Jews by choice. Many more live in the Midwest and the South than do any of the core identity groups. However, while somewhat more live in the West than is true of Jews by religion, the percentage of both secular Jews and Jews by choice in the West exceeds the percent of the converts out of Judaism and of those of Jewish descent but now non-Jews.

Gentile household members, unlike the other non-Jewish members, are relatively more concentrated in the Northeast and less so in the Midwest and South. In fact, their distribution pattern quite closely parallels those of the secular Jews and Jews by choice. Whether this stems from high rates of marriage to secular Jews remains to be determined in the in-depth assessment of intermarriage patterns.

The net result of the differential regional concentration of the various identity subtypes is that the Jewish identificational composition of the different regions also varies. As the data in panel "b" of table 3 show, 61 percent of the sampled population in the Northeast consists of Jews by religion, compared to just under half in the South and only four in ten in the West. The relatively greater concentration of Jews by religion in the South is undoubtedly related to the heavy in-migration of older persons. Significantly, the West contains relatively more secular Jews than do the other regions. Except for the comparatively small percentage of Jews by descent/other religion in the Northeast, the regions seem to differ minimally in the concentrations of non-Jewish household members.

Compared to all other regions, in the Northeast fewer of the sampled household members are secular, Jews by choice, converts out of Judaism, and born to Jewish parents but practicing another religion. The Northeast clearly continues to be the major "bastion" of Judaism in the United States, even as its position is diluted through the redistribution of population to

other regions of the country. Given such redistribution, it is also clear that the mix of Jewish identities varies considerably from region to region and that losses to the core Jewish population through intermarriage, conversion out, and children not raised as Jews are more common among those living outside the Northeast. Such a pattern has particular implications for the future of the national community if redistribution continues to be toward the Sunbelt areas.

Metropolitan/Nonmetropolitan Residence

Historically, Jews in the United States have been overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas. In 1957 about nine out of every ten Jews age 14 and over lived in urbanized areas of 250,000 or more persons, in contrast to only 37 percent of the total American population. Almost all of the remaining Jews resided in smaller urban places; only 4 percent of the total lived in rural areas, compared to 36 percent of Americans as a whole.[41]

Greater dispersal was already evident in an analysis of changes in geographic distribution undertaken by Newman and Halvorson covering the period 1952–1971.[42] Based on data reported in the *American Jewish Year Book*, their study found that the highest growth in Jewish population occurred in counties other than those of traditional Jewish residence, many of them in areas new to Jewish settlement. By contrast, areas of high Jewish concentration in 1952 displayed moderate or low growth. The observed changes pointed to both higher rates of dispersion and continued growth associated with the processes of urbanization and metropolitanization.

This pattern of redistribution was corroborated in an analysis completed by Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner,[43] which compared the distribution of Jewish population among the 30 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence in 1936 and 1986. In 1936, 90 percent of the country's Jewish population was found in the 17 largest metropolitan areas; by 1986, the top 30 metropolitan areas had to be considered in order to encompass so high a proportion of American Jewry. As Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner conclude, ". . . there are more Jewish population centers than in the past, but with fewer Jews in each center."[44]

In 1936, only one of the 30 largest Jewish communities was farther south than Washington, D.C., or St. Louis, and that was Houston, with its 16,000

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[41]U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States, March 1957," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 79, 1958.

[42]Newman and Halvorson, "American Jews."

[43]Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1986," AJYB 1987, vol. 87, pp. 164–76.

[44]Ibid.

Jews. By 1986, the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale metropolitan area had the third largest Jewish population in the United States, with 367,000 persons, and six other southern metropolitan areas were among the leading 30, including two more in Florida with a combined population of over 100,000 Jews. Similar developments occurred in the West. Only three of the leading communities in 1936 were west of the Rockies, and none of these exceeded 100,000 Jews. By 1986, there were six, and Los Angeles, with its 604,000 persons, ranked as the second largest Jewish community in the United States. Meanwhile, metropolitan communities in the East and Midwest experienced declines. The New York metropolitan area's reported Jewish population decreased from 2.6 million to 2.2 million in the 50-year interval, and Chicago's went from 378,000 to only 254,000. Declines also characterized Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. While some of these changes may be an artifact of the way the basic statistics were collected and/or reported, the overall pattern suggests major basic changes in patterns of Jewish population growth and distribution among metropolitan areas. The new geography has serious implications for integration and assimilation and for other areas of social, economic, political, and even religious concern.

Of particular interest is the extent to which Jews have participated in movement to smaller locations. Such dispersion, especially when it involves movement to communities with few Jewish inhabitants, has particular relevance for the strength of individual ties to the Jewish community. It has the potential of weakening opportunities both to interact with other Jews and to have easy access to Jewish facilities, agencies, and institutions. Much more research is needed on how the "Jewish environment," as indicated by density of Jewish population and facilities, affects individual Jewish identity and the vitality of the community.

Some insights into the impact of metropolitan/nonmetropolitan residence[45] can be obtained from NJPS-1990. In 1990, Jews continued to be concentrated in metropolitan areas: three-quarters of all core Jews enumerated in NJPS-1990 were living in metropolitan areas (table 4), virtually identical with the 77 percent of the total American population in 1988. Yet, as many as one-quarter of all Jews were living in nonmetropolitan areas, that is, not only outside the central cities of the 283 metropolitan areas of the United States but also beyond their suburban areas. About two-thirds of the nonmetropolitan core population lived in areas of 150,000 persons and over, but the balance were in smaller places. In all, therefore, almost 8 percent of American Jews resided in nonmetropolitan areas of less than

[45]Metropolitan area residents are those who live in a county that lies within a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropolitan areas are persons living in counties that are not in metropolitan areas; the population size refers to the number of residents of the given counties.

150,000 total population. This finding justifies the concerted efforts made by NJPS-1990 to include representation of areas with sparse Jewish populations in the national sample. Such areas were not covered in NJPS-1970/71, which may help to explain some of the differences in the findings between the two surveys, especially as this relates to Jewish identity and behavior.

The residential pattern of the core Jews varies considerably by type of Jewish identity. Jews by religion were much more concentrated in metropolitan areas than either secular Jews or Jews by choice, 79 percent compared to 65 and 59 percent, respectively. Whether nonmetropolitan location leads to greater secularism and outmarriage or whether secular and intermarried persons choose to live in nonmetropolitan areas and smaller communities needs to be studied in greater depth; that they are disproportionally located in such places is clear. Whereas only one in five of the Jews by religion lived in nonmetropolitan areas, one-third of the secular Jews and four in ten of the Jews by choice did so; moreover, a substantial proportion of the latter two groups lived in nonmetropolitan areas of less than 150,000 persons.

The relation between metropolitan/nonmetropolitan residence and Jewish identity is also suggested by the residential patterns of the non-Jewish members of the sampled households. For the total group, only 60 percent were located in metropolitan areas, compared to three-quarters of the core Jews. This percentage varied minimally for the three subcategories of non-Jews, and more closely resembled that of secular Jews and Jews by choice than it did Jews by religion. That approximately four out of every ten of the non-Jews in the sampled households lived in nonmetropolitan areas, and as many as 15–18 percent in areas of less than 150,000 population lends weight to the thesis that identity is correlated with residence, either as effect or cause. It suggests for community planners that efforts to reach those more marginal to the community must give concerted attention to smaller communities of the country.

Migration Patterns

Migration is a key factor in helping to explain the national redistribution of the Jewish population. It is also the salient factor in the changing distribution between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. NJPS-1970/71 documented the extensive mobility of American Jewry.[46] At that time, 17 percent of the Jewish population aged 20 and over were living in a different city or metropolitan area than that in which they had resided in 1965. As many as 9 percent had moved to a different state in the five-year interval,

[46]Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution."

and an additional 6 percent had moved elsewhere within their state of residence. While the system of classifying persons as residentially stable or mobile differed some in 1990 compared to 1970, the information collected in NJPS-1990 suggests that the high level of migration observed for 1965–70 also characterized the period 1985–90 (table 5). About one-fourth of the Jews in the core population moved beyond their local area in the five years 1985–90. Almost 11 percent moved between states, and another 11 percent changed areas of residence within their state. Overall, both the proportion migrating intrastate and those moving a greater distance seem to have increased some over 1965–70.

The mobility levels of American Jews very closely parallel those of the total white American population; for the latter, 20 percent migrated beyond their local area between 1980 and 1985, the most recent period for which national five-year data are available. Nine percent had moved between states, and 9 percent had made intrastate moves beyond the local area. The virtually identical levels of mobility suggest that the underlying economic and social forces that account for a very mobile American population operate among Jews as well. This is not surprising, given the educational and occupational composition of the Jewish group. Evidently, the stimulus that these provide for movement outweighs any countervailing impact that ties to family and community may have for Jews.

The cumulative effect of such extensive mobility is evidenced in the proportion of Jewish adults who had moved during their lifetime (table 6). Less than one in five were living in the same city/town in which they were born. By contrast, one-quarter of all adults had moved elsewhere in their state, and almost one-half were living in a different state in 1990 from their state of birth. Those who were foreign-born constituted the remaining 10 percent of the adult population. Using this lifetime index of mobility, Jews are considerably more mobile than the general population, among whom only 30 percent had changed state of residence, and 6 percent had moved from another country. That 57 percent of all Jews were living outside their country or state of birth attests to the key role which migration occupies as a dynamic of change for American Jewry.

That it does so for both Jews by religion and secular Jews is suggested by the comparative data on migration for these groups. The comparison will be limited here to the recent migrants, i.e., to those who had moved in the five years before the survey (table 5). Ten percent of Jews by religion had made an interstate move between 1985 and 1990, and another 10 percent moved intrastate beyond their local area. Jews by choice were more mobile, and secular Jews were the most mobile of all, probably reflecting both their somewhat younger age composition and a greater willingness to leave places of concentrated Jewish settlement.

Age affects the propensity to move, since migration is closely linked to events in the life cycle. Thus, whereas 72 percent of Jews aged 18–24 resided in the same city/town in 1990 as in 1985, this was true of only 54 percent of the 25–34 age group (table 7); graduate studies, marriage, and beginning a career all help explain the heightened mobility. That as many as 22 percent of the latter were interstate migrants attests to the dramatic role of migration in this stage of the life cycle. (Similar patterns were observed for 1970.)[47] Thereafter, increasing age is associated with greater stability: A rising proportion lived in the same house in 1985 and 1990, reaching a high of 83 percent of those 65 years and over, compared to a low of only 21 percent of those aged 25–34; a corresponding reduction was noted in the percent who reported interstate migration. Nonetheless, a majority of those aged 35–44 and over one-quarter of those 45–64 years changed residences during the five-year interval, many between states or outside their local area within state; mobility is certainly not restricted to the younger segments of the population. Moreover, a considerable part of the mobility of middle-aged and older persons seems, from data not presented here, to be repeat movement.

The NJPS-1990 data also allow comparison of the five-year mobility patterns of the core Jewish adults and the currently non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households (table 5). Such a comparison indicates that the core Jews as a whole are somewhat less mobile than the total non-Jews. More of the non-Jews had changed residence locally and through moves to other parts of their state as well as outside the state, suggesting that ties to family and community may be somewhat weaker than among Jews. Examination of the subgroups within the non-Jewish group indicates, however, that greater mobility is mainly characteristic of the Gentile members of the households and, to a lesser extent, those born of Jewish parents but not raised Jewish. The converts out of Judaism displayed greater stability. Fuller explanation of these differences must await in-depth analysis, taking account of variation among groups in socioeconomic composition, in age patterns, and in strength of social ties.

That migration is not restricted to the adult population is evident in the statistics showing the percentage of persons under age 18 who were living in a state other than the one in which they were born (not shown in table). Among all the children classified as core Jews, 21 percent were interstate migrants by the time of the survey. The level of migration is considerably higher for children classified as Jewish by religion than for those categorized as secular Jews. Almost one-quarter of the former, compared to only 16 percent of the secular children, had moved interstate. The high degree of

[47] Ibid.

mobility among Jewish youth points to the necessity of assessing more fully the implications that such movement has on their integration into the Jewish community, particularly into systems of Jewish education.

Among the 700,000 children in the sampled households classified as currently non-Jewish, interstate migration occurred more frequently than among the Jewish children; 29 percent had made such moves, compared to only 21 percent of the Jewish children. The higher migration level of the non-Jewish children contrasts with the pattern of the parental generation, suggesting that core Jewish families with children may be less mobile than their non-Jewish counterparts in the sampled households. Specific reasons for this need in-depth evaluation.

The Impact of Mobility on Regional Distribution

NJPS-1990 provides information on the origin and destination of the interstate migrants, thereby permitting evaluation of their regional redistribution patterns across the country (table 8).

The highest migration rates characterized those core Jews born in the Northeast and Midwest; 30 percent of the former and 42 percent of the latter were living in a different region in 1990 than that in which they were born. By contrast, only 23 percent of those born in the South and even fewer, 13 percent, of those born in the West had changed region of residence.

The direction of the shift among those who moved is clearly to the Sunbelt. About half of the 838,500 leaving the Northeast moved to the South, and another third migrated to the West. Of the 335,900 leaving the Midwest, almost one-third went to the South, and just over half headed to the West. Of the much smaller numbers leaving the South and the West, almost half shifted to the Northeast; the second largest stream was the interchange between the South and the West. The direction of the overall shift is most evident in the streams for the Northeast and Midwest: Whereas 60 percent of all interregional migrants originated in the Northeast and another 24 percent in the Midwest, by 1990 only 12 percent of the interregional migrants had moved to the Northeast and 8 percent to the Midwest. By contrast, only 10 and 7 percent of all interregional migrants were born in the South and the West, respectively, but 44 and 36 percent resided in these regions by 1990. On balance, this redistribution resulted in a net loss of almost 677,000 Jews to the Northeast and 219,000 to the Midwest. By contrast, the South gained 485,000, and the West netted 411,000. Clearly, migration has produced a massive redistribution of Jews among the major regions of the United States.

The movement of the non-Jewish members of the surveyed households closely parallels that of the Jews, with a net shift from the Northeast and

the Midwest to the South and the West. The former two regions experienced a lifetime loss of 115,000 and 113,000 persons, respectively, while the South gained 84,000 and the West 143,000. With the small exception of the interchange between the Northeast and the Midwest (Jews shifted from the Northeast to the Midwest, whereas for non-Jewish household members the exchange was reversed), the overall direction of interregional migration patterns of Jewish and non-Jewish household members was similar. However, the shift of the Jewish members to the South and West was more marked, reflecting the fact that relatively fewer of the non-Jews originated in the Northeast and comparatively more moved there and to the Midwest from other regions of the country.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Age Composition

Jews in the United States have long been characterized by a relatively older population. Reflecting the combined effects of lower fertility and the growing concentration of the large numbers of immigrants from the early 1900s among the aged, the core Jewish population continues to be older than the white population of the United States (the difference is even greater if nonwhites are included). In 1990, the median age of the Jewish core was 37.3 years, almost four years higher than the 33.6 median of the total whites (table 9). Since 1970, both the Jewish and the total population have aged, with both groups adding about four years to their median ages.

The 1990 differences in age composition suggested by the medians are reflected in the proportions in different age segments. For example, 19 percent of the Jewish group is under age 15, compared to 21 percent of all whites. These proportions are well below the 23 and 28 percent, respectively, recorded in 1970 and reflect both lower Jewish fertility and the reduction in general fertility. By contrast, relatively more Jews are aged; even excluding the 80,000 Jews living in institutions, most of whom are above age 65, 17.2 percent of the core Jewish population was age 65 and over, compared to only 13.3 percent of the white population. This difference extends even to the old aged; almost 8 percent of the Jews were age 75 and over, compared to 5.5 percent of the whites.

The differences are not as great in the middle ages, suggesting that the relative burden of supporting the dependent population, the young and the aged combined, is quite similar for Jews and for the population as a whole. However, compared to all whites, the dependency of the aged is greater for the Jews and that of the children and youth is less, although for both groups,

those under age 25 still considerably outnumber the aged.

The age composition within the Jewish population also varies among the different identity subcategories. The median age of those who are born Jews and currently Jews by religion was 39.3 years, compared to a median of only 29.9 years for those classified as secular Jews. This difference is clearly reflected in the much larger proportion of secular Jews under age 25 and in the much higher percentage of aged among the Jews by religion. Even within the middle age range, 25–64 years, Jews by religion are more skewed toward the higher ages. These cross-sectional data suggest a shift toward secular identification with Judaism among younger generations, but, as these persons age, they may well shift from viewing themselves as secular to regarding themselves as Jews by religion.

Jews by choice have the highest median age, 41.1 years, for obvious reasons. Few children make a decision to change their religion or have this decision made for them. Conversion is largely an adult phenomenon, with the religion of the children being largely determined by their parents. Just over half of Jews by choice are found in the narrow age range of 25–44 years, reflecting the upsurge in recent decades in marriages of Jews to persons not born Jewish.

Finally, NJPS-1990 allows comparison of the age composition of the Jewish members of the surveyed households with those who were not Jewish at the time of the survey. Such a comparison shows that the non-Jewish members are younger than either the Jewish members or the total U.S. white population. Their median age of 31.7 is almost six years below that of the Jews and two years below all whites in the nation. This difference, like that of the Jews by choice, is probably a function of the recent high rate of intermarriage and the fact that a large proportion of the children of mixed marriages are not being raised as Jews. The particularly high proportion of children in the Jewish descent/other religion category is a case in point. The differences are even sharper if the comparison is made with those classified as Jewish by religion. In fact, the age composition of the non-Jewish members of households quite closely resembles that of the secular Jews. This suggests that the same social factors that lead more younger Jews to identify themselves as secular may also underlie the greater number of younger non-Jews, who are either descended from Jews but are not themselves Jewish or are Gentile members of the household.

The variations in the comparative age structures of the Jewish population by type of identity are important considerations for institutions and agencies in planning current programs and future directions. At the same time, these age patterns call for more research attention to whether these cross-sectional differentials are indicative of future trends; longitudinal studies are very much in order.

Gender Differentials

The gender composition of the Jewish population reflects the combined effects of a variety of demographic and social forces. In general, males outnumber females at birth, but thereafter mortality tends to be more heavily selective of males. As a result, more women than men reach the older ages. Other factors also affect sex composition, however. For Jews, sex-selective rates of intermarriage, conversion into and out of Judaism, and immigration could affect the gender composition of the different subcategories. The omission of the institutionalized population from these statistics on gender composition is also likely to significantly affect the sex ratios of the aged, since the population in nursing homes and institutions for the aged tends to be heavily female; the aged still living in households may consist disproportionally of married couples and therefore be more balanced in gender composition than the aged as a whole.

For the total core Jewish population, a near balance exists in gender composition with 98.8 males for every 100 females; this is only slightly above the 95.8 ratio for the total white population (table 10). The higher ratio for the Jews is largely attributable to the omission from the Jewish group of the institutionalized population.

Within the Jewish group, gender composition varies among the different identity categories. The sex ratio is just over 100 for both the Jews by religion and the secular Jews, but far below a balanced composition for the Jews by choice. The latter suggests that intermarriages resulting in conversion of the non-Jewish spouse more often involved a Jewish-born male whose wife chose Judaism than a Jewish-born female whose husband made such a choice. Women may also be more likely to choose Judaism for reasons unrelated to marriage.

The total non-Jews in "Jewish" households have a somewhat lower sex ratio than the Jews, and are quite similar to the total U.S. white population. While this group, too, would be affected by the omission of the institutionalized population, the effect would not be as great as for the Jews since considerably fewer of the non-Jews are in the aged group. The more important factor affecting the sex composition of the non-Jews is the sex-selective patterns of intermarriage and conversion out of Judaism. Among those who have converted out of Judaism, the sex ratio is heavily skewed toward women. Among the larger number of others of Jewish descent who were born or raised as non-Jews, the overall sex ratio is quite balanced, reflecting the large percentage of children. For those aged 25 and over, however, the sex ratio is also unusually low, possibly reflecting the greater tendency of women to acknowledge their Jewish descent. Whether this relates in any way to halakhic considerations needs further research. Such an explanation is further suggested by the high sex ratio of those reported as Gentile

members of the households: 103.1 males per 100 females. But this higher ratio may also reflect a lesser tendency, especially in earlier years, of men to become Jews by choice upon marriage to a Jew.

Generation Status

The changing generation status of the American-Jewish population has great importance for the future of American Jewry.[48] In the last half century, third and higher generation Jews have had to face the American scene without massive reinforcement from immigrant flows from overseas. Although this situation has been modified by the influx of Israelis and Soviet Jews, their relatively small numbers do not seem to have significantly altered either the overall demographic composition of American Jewry or its socioreligious profile. Confronted with the growing freedom that Jews have come to experience in virtually all spheres of American life, the greater distance at which more Jews now find themselves from their immigrant origins takes on added significance.

Already in 1970, the growing Americanization of the Jewish population was evident. NJPS-1970/71 found only 23 percent of household heads in the Jewish population to be foreign-born, and one out of every five was already third generation.[49] Succeeding community surveys showed declining proportions of foreign-born and rising percentages of third generation. For example, the Boston studies of 1965, 1975, and 1985 reported the foreign-born to be 22, 12, and 8 percent, respectively, of the total population. By contrast, those with American-born parents rose from 20 to 49 to 61 percent over the three surveys.[50]

By NJPS-1990, the percentage of foreign-born in the core Jewish population had declined to 9 percent. The relation to age is clear, directly reflecting the changing volume of Jewish immigration to the United States; 17 percent of the population aged 65 and over were foreign-born, declining to only 4 percent of those under age 18. In all, 55 percent of all foreign-born persons are 45 years old and over.

Indicative of the changing generation status of the population is the number of U.S.-born grandparents (table 11, panel *a*), which can range

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[48]Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968).

[49]Massarik and Chenkin, "U.S. National Jewish Population Survey."

[50]Morris Axelrod, Floyd J. Fowler, and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning* (Boston, Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1967); Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1977); and Sherry Israel, *Boston's Jewish Community: The 1985 CJP Demographic Study* (Boston, Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1987).

between none and four for any single individual. Only 2 percent of those 65 years old and over had all four grandparents U.S.-born, but four out of ten of those aged 18–24 years did so. Whereas 94 percent of the aged reported none of their grandparents born in the United States, this was true of only 23 percent of the youngest adult group. Judged by generation status, the Jewish community in the United States is clearly becoming an increasingly American-Jewish community.

To what extent is generation status associated with Jewish identity? The NJPS-1990 data point to a clear relation. Among core Jews, including children, 10 percent of the Jews by religion were foreign-born, compared to 7 percent of the secular Jews and slightly fewer of the Jews by choice (not shown in table). Much of the difference between the Jews by religion and the secular Jews stems from the larger proportion of older persons among the Jews by religion, but even in younger groups, more of the Jews by religion were foreign-born. More detailed examination shows Jews by religion had the highest proportion with no American-born grandparents (70 percent) and the lowest with all four grandparents born in the United States (9 percent). By contrast, only 38 percent of the secular Jews had no American-born grandparents, and 28 percent had all of their grandparents American-born. Not surprisingly, more Jews by choice had all their grandparents born in the United States, and fewer had no American-born grandparents. Incorporation of Jews by choice into the core Jewish population has the effect, therefore, of increasing the average generation status of the core Jewish population. That the non-Jewish members of the sampled "Jewish" households have a much higher proportion with American-born grandparents, 46 percent compared to 14 percent of the core Jews, is not unexpected.

Of special interest are the Jews who have converted out of Judaism. Overall, their generation-status profile most closely resembles that of the secular Jews; almost one-third reported all four of their grandparents as American-born, and only 30 percent had no grandparents born in the United States. Consistent with such a pattern as well as with expectations, even higher percentages of those of Jewish descent who were not born or raised Jewish reported having all four grandparents American-born, and few had no American-born grandparents.

The changing generation status of the Jewish population can best be summarized by their average number of American-born grandparents (table 11, panel *b*). For all Jews in the core population, this amounts to exactly 1.00. It varies, however, from a low of only 0.75 for those who are Jewish by religion to a high of 2.44 for those who are Jews by choice; secular Jews are intermediate. Moreover, within each identity group, the average number of American-born grandparents is inversely related to age. The average for young adult Jews by religion, for example, is over twice as high as for the

aged. Those who converted out of Judaism most closely resembled the secular Jews, except for a considerably higher number of American-born grandparents among aged converts. Not surprisingly, the other currently non-Jewish members in the sampled households had higher averages than did the Jewish subgroups. Interestingly, however, the differences were minimal among identity groups for those aged 18–24, pointing to greater similarity among younger cohorts as the foreign-born and their children die.

While much fuller research is needed to assess the impact of generation status on Jewish identity, these data suggest that the greater distance from ethnic ties and experiences that served as integrating forces for earlier generations has altered the socioreligious profile of American Jewry. Rising Americanization, judged by generation status, seems to be associated with both higher levels of secularism and higher rates of conversion to another faith, probably largely in association with intermarriage. Generational change is inevitable and involves a complex process leading to the abandonment of traditional forms and the development of new forms of identity and expression which are seen by many as more congruent with the broader American way of life. Whether these changes have resulted by 1990 in the weakening or strengthening of American Jewry remains to be tested.

Educational Achievement

Reflecting the great emphasis placed on education, both as an intrinsic value and as a means for mobility, the Jews of America have compiled an extraordinary record of educational achievement. By midcentury, the children and grandchildren of the immigrants from Eastern Europe were averaging about 12 years of schooling, two years higher than the average of the white population.[51] Moreover, over twice as many Jews as whites in the population had completed college.[52]

NJPS-1970/71 indicated that these differentials had continued. Just over half of all Jews age 25 and older had some college education, in contrast to only 22 percent of all whites age 25 and over. Moreover, only 16 percent of the Jews, compared to 46 percent of the whites, had less than 12 years of schooling. Particularly sharp differences characterized the proportion that had some graduate education—18 percent of the Jews, compared to only 5 percent of white adults. While Jewish women, like those in the general population, had, on average, less education than men, the levels of educational achievement for both Jewish men and women were well above

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[51]Ben Seligman and Aaron Antonovsky, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," in *The Jews*, ed. Marshall Sklare (Glencoe, Ill., 1958).

[52]Sidney Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials Among Religious Groups in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 74, May 1969, pp. 612–31.

those of their counterparts in the general population.

In the 1970s it seemed likely that educational levels might remain at the very high plateau already achieved or even dip slightly, as young Jews integrated more into the larger society. Jews, it was thought, might then pattern their educational behavior more on the model of the general population. What do the data from NJPS-1990 indicate?

For the core Jewish population 25 years old and over, a college education had become increasingly common (table 12A). Almost three-quarters had at least some college, and as many as one-quarter had some graduate education. Overall, therefore, educational achievement of the adult Jewish population rose substantially between 1970/71 and 1990. The general U.S. white population also experienced an impressive improvement in its educational level, but sharp differentials persisted between them and the Jews. In 1990, almost twice as high a percentage of Jews had some college education as whites, and the percentage with graduate training was three times greater.

Some of this increase for both groups reflects the changing composition of the population aged 25 and over. As the older persons with less schooling die, and as the more educated younger population ages, the average for all ages will rise. A fairer comparison of changes between 1970/71 and 1990 and of differences between groups would be with both age and gender controlled. For such purposes, the focus here will be on the 30–39 age group (table 12B and table 13). Such a focus is useful because most of these persons are young enough to be affected by recent educational patterns, and most of them are likely to have completed their education.

In 1970/71, 83 percent of the males had some college education; 70 percent had graduated college; 45 percent had done some graduate studies. For the total white male population, the comparable levels were only 34, 20, and 11 percent. By 1990, 87 percent of the Jewish males aged 30–39 years had some college education, 69 percent had graduated college, and 37 percent had had some graduate studies. These data show no rise in levels of education among Jewish males. Sharp differences persist, however, between the Jewish males aged 30–39 and this age cohort in the white population. Only slightly more than half (52 percent) of white males aged 30–39 received some college education and less than a third (31 percent) graduated college. Only 13 percent did any graduate studies. Similar patterns characterize Jewish and white females. Clearly, educational achievement remains a very strong value in the Jewish community, even though young people in the last two decades have not achieved higher levels of education than their immediate predecessors.

Of particular interest is whether levels of education vary by type of Jewish identity. The data from NJPS-1990 strongly suggest this to be the case. It

may well help to explain why the levels of education have not risen more for the younger Jewish population as a whole.

Among all adults in the three Jewish core groups, similar proportions obtained a college or graduate education. These comparisons are distorted, however, by the different age compositions of the three groups. If the comparison is restricted to those aged 30–39, a different picture emerges. Many more of the secular Jews had less than a college education, and a much higher percent of the Jews by religion had completed college than was true of the Jews by choice or of the secular Jews. Similarly, the secular Jews had the lowest percentage reporting graduate studies. These very different educational patterns suggest that the value placed on education generally associated with Jews occurs most frequently among those professing to be Jews by religion and next most frequently among those who have chosen to be Jews. Have the secular Jews assimilated the less positive attitude toward higher education that seems to characterize the American population in general? Does this help to explain why fewer younger Jews have pursued graduate studies?

Differentials extend to the non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households. Thus, among all the currently non-Jewish household members aged 30–39, almost one-third had less than a college education compared to only 14 percent of the Jewish members. Moreover, only 43 percent of the non-Jewish members had completed college and about one in five had pursued graduate studies, in contrast to 66 and 33 percent, respectively, of the Jewish members. For all three of the non-Jewish groups, the percentage who completed college was well below the levels of college completion of all three of the core Jewish groups. Moreover, the percentage of all three categories of Jews who had undertaken graduate studies was well above that of the three non-Jewish groups.

The differences among the various subcategories of core Jews and of non-Jews suggest that the intensity of Jewish identity is related to levels of education; the stronger the intensity, the higher the level of achievement. Evidently, the values and norms associated with being Jewish or becoming Jewish, especially regarding oneself as Jewish by religion, have a significant impact on the amount of education obtained. Full demonstration of this relation requires an in-depth analysis that gives attention to a number of additional variables and also uses information on the type and intensity of religious identity before and at the time that education was being pursued.

Labor-Force Status and Occupation

The labor-force participation of men and women closely reflects the life-cycle stage, being intimately tied to whether individuals are pursuing

education, beginning a career, marrying and raising a family, or retiring. Consistent with patterns in the general population, the proportion of men in the core Jewish population in 1990 actively participating in the labor force rose, as education was completed, from a low of 40 percent of those aged 18–24 to a peak of 94 percent in the prime working ages 35–44. At first gradually and then precipitously, the percent in the labor force declined to 26 percent of those aged 65 and over. Compared to the levels found by the 1957 census survey,[53] the data suggest a considerably lower level of labor-force participation by Jews in recent years, especially in the younger and older ages. In 1957,[54] as many as 54 percent of men aged 18–24 were working, reflecting lower rates of college enrollment, while 46 percent of those aged 65 and over were in the labor force, reflecting a lesser tendency to retire. The latter difference even extends to the 45–64 age group, 96 percent of whom were in the labor force in 1957 compared to only 81 percent in 1990. Only in the peak ages, 35–44, is there close similarity, with well over 90 percent working in both 1957 and 1990.

The overall pattern of age differentials for women closely parallels that of men, with labor-force participation rising in 1990 from 43 percent of those 18–24 to a peak of 76 percent at ages 25–34, and then declining to only two-thirds of those aged 45–64 and 10 percent of the aged. However, the peak occurs ten years earlier, and the levels of participation are lower than those of men at all ages but the youngest. The latter reflects a somewhat lesser tendency of women to be enrolled as students (49 percent compared to 57 percent of the men).

Most significant, however, is the substantial proportion of women aged 25–44 and 45–64 in the labor force, about three-fourths of the former and two-thirds of the older group. These levels represent dramatic increases. In 1957, for example, only about 30 percent of Jewish women aged 25–44 were employed, reflecting the greater likelihood that they were engaged in home management. That labor-force participation in 1957 rose to 38 percent of those aged 45–64 resulted from the tendency of some women to enter the labor force once children were older; even this level is far below the 66 percent of women aged 45–64 in the labor force in 1990. As for men, fewer young women were labor-force participants in 1990 than in 1957, 43 percent compared to 57 percent; unlike men, however, there was minimum change

[53]U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population."

[54]Since the 1970 data on labor force refer to heads of household, they are not fully comparable to the 1990 data that encompass all adult household members. To assess change, therefore, the 1957 Census survey data are used, even though the coverage of Jews differs from 1990; the 1957 data refer to persons reported as Jewish by religion. However, since Jews by religion constitute a very high proportion of the 1990 core Jewish population, and the labor-force rates of the total core and of the Jews by religion are quite similar, the differences between 1957 and 1990 in coverage are not serious.

in the proportion of employed older women, 10 percent in 1990 compared to just over 8 percent in 1957. Whether this pattern will change as women aged 25–64 (who have had more labor-force experience than earlier cohorts) age needs to be monitored in future research. It is clear that, for the age range 25–64, Jewish women's participation in the labor force has become a common pattern, with significant implications for family, fertility, income, and participation in the organized activities of the community.

The high occupational achievement of Jews, paralleling their distinctive educational record, has long been documented.[55] Community studies in every decade since the 1950s, as well as NJPS-1970/71, have shown Jews to be heavily concentrated in the upper ranks of the occupational hierarchy. Moreover, comparative data over the last four decades point to a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in white-collar work; and within the white-collar category, a shift has occurred toward more professionals and fewer managers.[56] These shifts in occupational composition likely reflect the continued operation of forces identified earlier by Simon Kuznets[57] as affecting the Jewish occupational structure: decreased self-employment as more Jews entered professional, technical, and executive positions in firms and large corporations; a decline in the share of industrial blue-collar jobs; and a lesser concentration in trade, especially small proprietorships, in contrast to many of their parents and grandparents. The non-Jewish population has also moved up the occupational hierarchy in response to changing opportunities and labor-force needs. The question then for 1990 is whether Jews persist in their occupational distinctiveness and, if so, whether the differential between Jews and non-Jews has narrowed or widened.

Differentials clearly persist (table 14). In 1990, 80.1 percent of all core Jewish employed males held white-collar positions, well above the 47.6 percent for the total white population of the United States.[58] Within the white-collar group, the differential for professionals was even sharper, with 39.0 percent of all Jewish males so employed compared to only 15.8 percent of all employed whites. The percentage employed as managers was quite similar for the two groups, but the proportion in sales and clerical work was higher for the Jewish men.

Despite these large current differences within the white-collar group, the

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[55]Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970"; Goldstein, "The Jews in the United States," pp. 3–59.

[56]Barry R. Chiswick, "The Economic Status of American Jews: Analysis of the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," paper presented at Conference on Policy Implications of the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, Los Angeles, July 1991.

[57]Simon Kuznets, *Economic Structure of U.S. Jewry: Recent Trends* (Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, 1972).

[58]U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, vol. 38, Jan. 1991.

comparative data from 1970 point to continued narrowing of differences between males in the Jewish and the total white population. While the level of white-collar employment for Jewish men has declined from the 87-percent level reported in NJPS-1970/71, that of whites generally has risen. The data indicate that more Jewish males are now engaged as operatives and service workers, suggesting that for the first time in recent history, American Jews are increasingly turning to manual labor for their livelihood. This finding confirms the speculation offered in 1981 that, motivated by different values and attracted by new life-styles and income opportunities, especially during times of economic uncertainty, more Jews may turn to making a living through manual labor. Bienstock[59] may have been right when he suggested that Jews might turn in increasing numbers to opportunities in new areas where demands for services were likely to grow. As a result, the occupational structure of Jewish males in 1990 more closely resembles that of the whites than it did in 1970. The index of dissimilarity[60] declined substantially from a high of 56.9 in 1970 to 32.6 in 1990.

That some of the narrowing may be due to the changing Jewish identificational composition is suggested by the comparative data on occupational composition by identity type. Whereas 82.3 percent of the male Jews by religion are in white-collar work, only 72.4 percent of both the secular Jewish men and those males who are Jews by choice are so employed. Most of the difference is concentrated in the lower proportion of the latter two groups in sales and clerical work, although secular males also tend to have fewer managers. Furthermore, more of those not Jewish by religion are concentrated in the manual-laborer groups. If the secular Jews and the Jews by choice constitute a growing proportion of the total core population, their different pattern of occupational choice could well account for the narrowing differential between the Jewish core group and the general white population. We shall have to await the results of the more in-depth evaluation of the occupational data for fuller insights into the factors explaining this change.

Jewish women have also been characterized by much higher levels in white-collar work than all white females; and, as for men, the differentials have narrowed. In 1990, the proportion of Jewish women in white-collar work was similar to that in 1970—90 percent—but for white women generally, it had risen from 65 to 72 percent. Unlike their male counterparts, Jewish women were not characterized by a rising percent of manual workers in the two decades since NJPS-1970/71.

Within the white-collar group, the differences between Jewish women

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[59]Herbert Bienstock, quoted in *New York Times*, June 25, 1972.

[60]The index shows the percent of cases that would have to be redistributed in order for the two groups to have identical distributions.

and all white women held only for professionals, with over twice as many Jewish women in the group. Between 1970 and 1990, the proportion of Jewish women working as managers remained constant, but the percentage of professionals rose significantly, from 24 to 36 percent, with a corresponding drop in clerical and sales workers. These changes are consistent with the rising level of education among women.

Among the Jewish women, Jews by religion closely resembled the secular Jews and the Jews by choice in the total percentage who were in white-collar occupations; the percentage varied only between 87 and 91 percent, being highest for the Jews by religion. Although the percentage of professional women was highest for Jews by choice, much of this difference is attributable to age composition. Once age is controlled, Jews by choice have the lowest proportion of white-collar persons, including professionals, and far fewer in sales and clerical work; with age controlled, secular Jews have more in professional work than do Jews by religion. By contrast, more of the Jews by choice are in managerial positions. For all three groups, most of the small number engaged in manual work are employed as service workers. As for men, these data for women suggest that somewhat more of the secular Jews and Jews by choice than Jews by religion are in the lower ranks of the occupational hierarchy. This differential sharpens when age is controlled.

Comparisons can also be made between the Jewish members of the sampled households and the non-Jewish members. If dichotomized in terms of white-collar and blue-collar workers, the non-Jewish members tend to fall between the Jews and the total American white population. Among males, 56 percent are white-collar, in contrast to 80 percent of the core Jews and 48 percent of all whites; among females, 74 percent of the non-Jewish members are white-collar, in contrast to 90 percent of the core Jewish group and 72 percent of the white population. Age does not seem to change these patterns. Clearly, the underlying factors that account for occupational composition seem to operate in an intermediate fashion for the non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households. Multivariate assessment should indicate what these specific variables are and whether they relate to general sociodemographic conditions or to factors more closely tied to Jewish identity.

Marriage Patterns

Marriage and the family have been basic institutions for Judaism, playing a key role in providing for the future, first through reproduction and then by serving as the major agents of socialization and the transmission of values, attitudes, goals, and aspirations. Given the high value that Judaism has traditionally placed on marriage and the family and the changes occurring in these institutions in American society as a whole, a major question

is whether Jews have changed their marriage patterns. If so, how, and what implications does this have for the maintenance of the demographic and social vitality of the Jewish population in the future?

The 1957 census survey[61] provided one of the first opportunities to compare Jewish marital composition with that of the general population. That comparison indicated that Jews were more apt to marry at some time in their life, to marry at a somewhat later age, and to have more stable marriages.

NJPS 1970/71 found three-quarters of all men and 85 percent of all women aged 25–29 had been married; this compared to 81 and 89 percent, respectively, of men and women in this age group in the U.S. white population. Above age 35, over 95 percent of all Jewish men and 98 percent of all Jewish women had been married,[62] attesting to a strong adherence to traditional values concerning marriage.

NJPS-1990 indicates some change in the patterns suggested by these earlier surveys (table 15). By 1990, the current marital status of the Jewish population almost matched that of the general U.S. white population. Just over 26 percent of all Jewish adult males had never married, compared to 24 percent of the total adult white population; slightly more of the total whites were married and divorced than were Jews. These overall similarities are misleading, however, because of pronounced differentials among younger age groups. In the 18–24 age group, for example, only 4 percent of the Jewish men had been married, compared to 17 percent of men in the general population; by ages 25–34, just half of all Jews but two-thirds of all whites had been married. Even as late as ages 35–44, substantial differences persisted. Only by age 45 and over were the differences minimal, with approximately 92 percent or more of the men in both groups having been married.

The key question is whether these cross-sectional data indicate the likely levels of marriage of the younger cohorts. Comparison with the 1957 census statistics and the NJPS-1970/71 data shows a basic change. For example, whereas only 29 percent of Jewish men in 1957 and 17 percent of those in 1970/71 were still single at ages 25–34, this was true of half of all Jewish men in this age range in 1990. At ages 35–44, 17 percent were still single in 1990 compared to only 5 percent in 1957 and 4 percent in 1970/71. Only at age 45 and over were the levels quite similar, with 5 percent or fewer still single. The sharper differential between the younger and older groups in 1990 compared to 1957 and 1970/71 suggests that the percent married by the time they reach middle and old age may in the future be less for the currently younger segments of the Jewish population than was true earlier.

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[61]U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population."

[62]Schmelz and DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in American Jewish Demography*.

By 1990, like women in the general population, Jewish women were marrying at older ages than was true in 1957 and 1970/71. For example, among all Jewish women aged 25–34, in 1957, 91 percent had married and in 1970/71, 90 percent had done so, but by 1990 this was true for only half. Even at ages 35–44, a differential persisted, with 89 percent of all Jewish women having married, compared to 94 percent in 1957 and 98 percent in 1970/71. Moreover, by 1990 the decline in proportions marrying by age 45 was considerably sharper for the Jewish than for the white women. For those aged 45 and over, however, minimal change had occurred between 1957 and 1990, either for Jewish women or for white women generally; in both periods, over 90 percent were married.

As for men, the difference in patterns for the younger and older women raises questions about whether the cross-sectional patterns can point to future levels of marriage for those under age 45 in 1990. Whether changes in marriage behavior associated with higher rates of cohabitation will reduce the percentage who eventually marry, or whether other factors, such as AIDS, will lead to rising marriage rates will need monitoring over the next decade. To the extent that marriage in 1990 had been delayed for a substantial proportion of younger men and women, the impact of such delays on fertility as well as on intermarriage heightens the significance of this change in marital behavior.

Is type of Jewish identity differentially associated with marriage patterns? For men, the data point to somewhat more younger Jews by religion remaining single longer than secular Jews and especially Jews by choice. Among those aged 25–34, 51 percent were never married compared to 47 percent of the secular Jews and only 19 percent of the Jews by choice. By ages 35–44, the differences were minimal. The higher proportion of Jews by religion who pursue graduate education may explain the lower proportion who marry before age 35. For women, more of those aged 18–24 who were Jews by religion were never married than were secular Jewish women or Jews by choice. For those between ages 25 and 44 years, the percentages never married among Jews by religion and secular Jews were similar and higher than among Jews by choice. Although the differences apply to a narrower segment of young Jewish women than of men, the same explanations may hold, particularly since fewer women than men receive higher education, and women marry on the average about 2–3 years earlier than men.

AVERAGE AGE AT MARRIAGE

For those who do marry, there is no strong evidence of significant changes in age at marriage among the different age cohorts (table 16). For

males in the core Jewish population, the average age at first marriage was 26.0 years and varied irregularly within a narrow range for the age groups between 25–34 and 65 and over. The 20.6-year average for those under age 25 is distorted because such a high percentage of this age cohort is still single. Since more of those single in the younger age groups may still marry later, the average age at marriage among these cohorts is likely to rise, but only time will tell how many marry and at what ages.

The average age of marriage of core Jewish women is almost three years lower than that of men. The difference tends to be narrower, however, among younger cohorts, but varies irregularly by age. The absence of a clear pattern of change in average age at marriage suggests that the percentage of persons marrying, rather than the age at which they marry, may be the more important change in marriage behavior among the Jewish population.

MARITAL STABILITY

The central role that the family has played in Jewish life has given rise to growing concern about the extent to which Jews share in the growing general tendency of broken marriages. Information on current marital status is not a good indicator since divorce can be followed by remarriage; data on current marital status do not therefore indicate the extent of divorce. Information on number of marriages and type of marital dissolution for those married more than once must also be considered.

Some insight into the extent of marital dissolution among Jews can be obtained by examining the number of marriages of the adults represented in NJPS-1990. In obtaining such an enumeration, the survey also ascertained the reason for the marital dissolution of the first marriage and of the last marriage in all cases of multiple marriage. Since few persons had married more than twice, the divorce record is complete for virtually all ever-married persons.

Among all ever-married men in the core Jewish population, 83.5 percent had been married only once at the time of the survey; 14 percent had been married twice; and 2.5 percent had been married three or more times (table 17). Marital stability was slightly higher for women, with 87.2 percent married once, only 11.2 percent married twice, and fewer than 2 percent having had three or more marriages. Overall, therefore, these data point to a relatively high rate of marital stability among Jews, particularly since some of the broken marriages were attributable to death of spouse and temporary separations rather than divorce. However, the data by age point to changing patterns and relations.

The percentage of men married more than once increases from none of those under age 25 to a high of 22 percent of those aged 45–64 years. Of

those aged 65 and over, somewhat fewer had multiple marriages, but more had been married three or more times (5.4 percent) than any other group. For women the pattern was somewhat different, with the percent married more than once rising from none of those under age 25 to 18 percent of those aged 35–44 years; it then declined to only 10 percent of the oldest group. The higher level in the middle ages may reflect changing divorce patterns.

Of those married only once, NJPS-1990 found that 5.5 percent of all men and 10.4 percent of all women were divorced at the time of the survey. That the level is twice as high for women as for men points to the much higher remarriage rate of divorced men. For this subset of the ever-married population, the age data indicate a particularly high divorce rate for the small number of men who were married before age 25 (27 percent of all those who had married only once) and for women between ages 35 and 54 (about 15 percent). For the men this suggests a high risk of marital break-up of young marriages; for the women it again points to a stronger tendency to remain divorced for some time after a marriage dissolves.

Since a number of those whose first marriages ended in divorce have remarried, a more accurate basis for assessing the stability of first marriages is to examine the first-marriage divorce rate among all ever-married persons. Such assessment shows that among all ever-married men in the core population, 16.4 percent ended their first marriage in divorce. For women the comparable percentage was 18.2 percent. Of the men who remarried after their first divorce, 10.5 percent experienced a second divorce; 11.9 percent of the remarried women had also been divorced again by the time of the survey. Taking account of both first and last divorce among all ever-married persons, the evidence indicates 18 divorces for every 100 ever-married men and 19 for every 100 ever-married women. While comparative data are not available for earlier points in time, this finding suggests that divorce has become relatively common among American Jews.

Of particular interest is whether the rate of divorce varies by Jewish identity. Hypothetically, given the strong value placed on marriage and the family, divorce should occur less frequently among persons who report being Jews by religion than among those reported as secular Jews. The data (not shown in table) support such an expectation. Among the ever-married men, those classified as Jewish by religion reported 13.6 percent of their first marriages broken by divorce. The rate was almost twice as high among secular Jews (24.5 percent), and the differences generally applied across most age groups. A large difference also characterized women, among whom 16.3 percent of the Jews by religion and 27.2 percent of the secular Jews had experienced a divorce in their first marriage. Clearly, being secular is associated with greater risk of marital break-up.

The relation of marital dissolution to status as a Jew by choice differs by

gender (not shown in table 15). For men, it is associated with an unusually high divorce rate. Among almost four out of every ten male Jews by choice, the first marriage ended in divorce, although the data available for this overview do not indicate if the divorced marriage involved a Jewish or non-Jewish spouse. For women the rate was only 18.4, quite similar to that of Jews by religion and well below that of secular Jews. The reasons for these gender differences among the Jews by choice need to be explored in later analyses.

If the analysis focuses on cumulative divorces in first and last marriage (for those married more than once), the same pattern of differentials by identity noted for first marriage persists. Being a Jew by religion has a positive correlation with stability as does, for women, being a Jew by choice. Secular Jews are more prone to divorce, and the greatest risks characterize male Jews by choice. These data suggest that, to the extent that changes in the identity composition of the Jewish population are associated with changing marital stability, any trend toward higher levels of secularism and intermarriage by Jewish women are likely to be associated with higher levels of marital instability.

Fertility Differentials

American Jews have been characterized by lower fertility than non-Jews, and some data sets have even pointed to below-replacement levels of Jewish reproduction.[63] This situation, coupled with the reduced immigration in the second half of the 20th century and the increasing rates of intermarriage, has given rise to concern about whether, in fact, the Jewish population in the United States will continue to grow. The debate continues and seems likely to become accentuated, in view of the evidence from NJPS-1990 showing very high rates of mixed marriage, low rates of conversion, and a high proportion of children of mixed marriages not being raised as Jews (see discussion below).

NJPS-1990 provides the opportunity to assess fertility changes in the 20 years since the 1970/71 national survey. Using that survey, DellaPergola found that since the beginning of the century, Jewish fertility was consistently lower than among total whites. He reported that "Jewish fertility levels basically followed over time the general fluctuations of the total whites, but patterns of response to period societal change were relatively earlier as appropriate to a more perfectly contracepting population."[64] Moreover, the younger cohorts of women tended toward increasingly lower

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[63]Sergio DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Identity," *Demography* 17, Aug. 1980, pp. 261–73.

[64]Ibid., p. 270.

fertility, even though young ever-married women indicated an expectation of slightly more than two children. DellaPergola speculated that these expectations seemed unrealistically high, given other patterns observed. The evidence from NJPS-1990 seems to validate his doubts.

Comparison of the Jewish fertility reported in 1990 with that of all white women in childbearing years in 1988 shows Jewish fertility to be substantially below that of the general population (table 18). For example, Jewish women aged 25–29 averaged only 0.5 children, whereas white women in this age group had already had one child. By ages 40–44, Jewish women averaged 1.6 children, considerably below the 2.1 average of all white women in that age group. These differentials suggest that the motives for small families among Jews reflect a complex combination of factors involving both conditions unique to the Jews and those shared with the larger population.

The 1970/71 data showed an average completed fertility of 2.4 children for all Jewish women aged 45–49.[65] In 1990, the comparable age group had averaged only 1.9 children. This was not only 20 percent below the Jewish average for those aged 45–49 20 years earlier, but also 19 percent below the average for all white women aged 45–49 in 1988, and 10 percent below the 2.1 level needed for replacement. Clearly, Jewish fertility has declined, resulting in below-replacement fertility for those at the end of childbearing. This contrasts with the above-replacement levels achieved by Jewish women in the age groups between 50 and 65, who were in their peak childbearing years during the baby-boom period.

To date, Jewish women currently aged 35–44 have also had fewer than 2.1 children. Again, their averages are below the 2.3 levels achieved by women in this age range in 1970/71. Moreover, based on their expected completed family size, the women in the 1990 survey will remain at below-replacement levels. This suggests a marked change in fertility behavior over the past 20 years.

Even among women below age 35, except for those aged 20–24 who were just beginning childbearing, the fertility levels reported in 1990 were about half those in 1970/71 for comparable age groups. Nonetheless, as in 1970/71, in 1990 women under age 35 indicated that they expected to have more than two children. If realized, this would represent a significant reversal in fertility behavior. Like DellaPergola, however, we can question how realistic these expectations are. Ever-married women aged 20–24 in 1970/71 expected to average 2.5 children by the end of childbearing. Twenty years later, ever-married women in this same age cohort (not necessarily represented by the same women since some had died and some may have left the core Jewish group) had had only 1.7 children. For the 25–29 age group in

[65] DellaPergola, "Patterns."

1970/71, the 2.0 actual completed births by the end of the next 20 years also fell below the expected average of 2.2 indicated in 1970/71. Only for the women above 35, most of whom were well along in their fertility by 1970/71, did completed fertility come close to resembling expectations. While it is possible that the younger 1990 cohorts will be more realistic in their expectations than were the 1970/71 women, especially if patterns of late childbearing change, the experience of cohorts included in the 1970 study provides no sound basis for believing this will be the case.

If the age group 45–49 is used as marking the end of childbearing, comparison among the subgroups of core Jews shows considerable variation in the average number of children ever born. Whereas Jews by religion averaged 1.9 children, secular Jewish women averaged 1.7; Jews by choice constituted the only group to exceed replacement with their 2.3 average. For the next youngest group, however, most of whom had also completed childbearing, minimal difference characterized the Jews by religion and the secular Jews; each averaged about 1.6 children ever born. Again, the Jews by choice had higher fertility, averaging 1.9 children. For all three groups, fertility was below replacement levels at this late point in the reproductive cycle.

Within this overall pattern, the higher fertility of Jews by choice is notable. Their average number of children was higher than that of Jews by religion and of secular Jews at every age below 50, except the very youngest. This suggests that couples involving one spouse who converted to Judaism do not restrict the number of children below the average of all Jews. Why Jews by choice should generally have higher fertility than born Jews remains to be explored. It may be related to the differences in socioeconomic and cultural background that may also help to explain the higher fertility of the white population.

Moreover, the fertility of the Jews by choice at ages 40–44 and 45–49 is about 10 percent higher than that of converts out of Judaism, who averaged 1.8 and 2.0 children, respectively. However, for younger age groups, the number of children born by the time of the survey was higher for the converts out of Judaism. At all ages, the fertility of the converts out exceeded that of the Jews by religion and the secular Jews. How much of this higher level reflects differences in timing of childbearing rather than number of children born by the end of reproduction and how much is attributable to background factors similar to those characterizing the non-Jewish white population which the convert has presumably joined remains to be ascertained.

Except for those women within ten years of the end of the childbearing period, whose below-replacement fertility levels are consistent with expectations for completed fertility, women generally expected to have more than

two children. However, in only a few age/identity categories did the expected averages exceed replacement level. These data on expectations, therefore, provide no strong evidence of a major upswing in Jewish fertility. Among all Jewish women under age 45 at the time of the survey, the average completed fertility would be only 1.9 children even if expectations were fully realized, and this would vary between the narrow range of 1.8 and 2.1 for the three categories of core Jews, with secular Jews having the lowest average and Jews by choice the highest. With an average just above 2.1, converts out of Judaism expect only slightly more children than those choosing Judaism.

The overall prospects for Jewish fertility, based on the results of NJPS-1990, therefore apppear to differ minimally from those based on NJPS-1970/71 and intervening surveys. For the immediate future and most likely for the longer run as well, birth levels among Jews seem likely to operate at below-replacement levels or at best to hover at about replacement. Coupled with the higher than average death rates that are associated with an aging population, natural increase is likely to be low or even negative. If intermarriage continues high, with low levels of conversion into Judaism and high percentages of children in mixed marriages being reared as non-Jews, there seems little prospect that the total core Jewish population of the United States will rise above the 5.5 million estimated on the basis of NJPS-1990. If anything, in the absence of strong reversals in fertility and/or intermarriage or large upsurges in immigration, the chances are more likely that the core population will decline toward 5.0 million and possibly even below it in the early decades of the 21st century. All this remains speculative, and different scenarios can be developed based on the assumptions one is willing to adopt.

Intermarriage

Interest in the levels and impact of intermarriage of Jews has a long history. Initially, it was viewed not so much as a potential threat to the demographic maintenance of American Jewry but as an index of the loss of Jewish identification and the weakening of the social and religious cohesiveness of the community. Increasingly, however, concern has focused on the effect of intermarriage on the future size of the Jewish population, especially at a time when fertility is at or even below replacement levels. This concern became particularly acute after the popularization of the concept of the "vanishing American Jew" in the 1960s, based on evidence from community studies of increasing rates of intermarriage with greater distance from immigrant origins.[66]

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[66]Erich Rosenthal, "Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States," AJYB 1963, vol. 64, pp. 3–53.

The 1957 Bureau of the Census sample survey provided the first national set of estimates of Jewish intermarriage.[67] It found that 3.8 percent of married persons reporting themselves as Jewish were married to non-Jews, and that at least 7.2 percent of all marriages in which one partner was Jewish were mixed marriages. Both these statistics are probably low since no information was collected on the earlier religion of marriage partners; couples with one converted spouse were not separately identified, so that it was not possible to ascertain the rate of conversion either into or out of Judaism.

NJPS-1970/71 provided the first nationwide set of comprehensive data on Jewish intermarriage patterns since it also ascertained the religious identity of the marriage partners before marriage.[68] Of all Jewish persons married at the time of the survey, 8.1 percent were married to a person not born Jewish. Although this level was higher than the 1957 finding, in itself it was not considered unusually high. What shocked the community was the reported rise in the level of intermarriage from less than 2 percent of those individuals who had married before 1925, to about 6 percent of those marrying between 1940 and 1960, to 12 percent of the 1960–64 marriage cohort, to a high of 29 percent of all Jews marrying in the five years preceding the survey. While such a finding was not inconsistent with earlier evidence, the magnitude of the rate, the fact that it reflected a national pattern, and projections that the rate would rise still higher aroused the community to new concerns about its demographic survival.[69]

The impact of intermarriage on demographic growth may largely be determined by the extent of conversion to Judaism of the non-Jewish partner and by the extent to which the children of interfaith marriages are raised as Jews. NJPS-1970/71 found that in 23 percent of the intermarriages in which the husband was originally Jewish, the wife converted; among those couples in which the wife was originally Jewish, only 4.0 percent of the husbands converted. Of the non-Jewish partners in intermarriages, a very substantial percentage identified themselves as Jews even though they had not undergone official conversion to Judaism, i.e., they were functioning as Jews by choice. This was true of 46 percent of the non-Jewish wives and 44 percent of the non-Jewish husbands. Moreover, the study found that 63 percent of the children of Jewish fathers and 98 percent of those of Jewish mothers were being raised as Jews.[70]

The combined findings with respect to conversion, self-identity of the non-Jewish spouse, and children being raised as Jews (even if not always

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[67]Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials Among Religious Groups."

[68]Massarik and Chenkin, "U.S. National Jewish Population Survey"; Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."

[69]Elihu Bergman, "The American Jewish Population Erosion," *Midstream*, Oct. 1977, p. 9.

[70]Massarik and Chenkin, "U.S. National Jewish Population Survey."

halakhically Jewish) meliorated the concerns raised by the high rates of intermarriage. Yet, it was also recognized that the study may have underestimated the levels of intermarriage and overestimated the gains to Judaism through conversion and identification because of inadequate representation of areas containing very low levels of Jewish concentration and of those Jews who had converted out of Judaism. The more encompassing design of NJPS-1990 was intended to correct the defects of NJPS-1970/71 in coverage of more marginal Jews and those who had converted out of Judaism. To the extent that it succeeded, the data obtained on intermarriage should be more accurate than were those for 1970/71.

NJPS-1990 estimated that 2.6 million adults were born Jewish and were married at the time of the survey.[71] Of this number, 69 percent were married to someone also born Jewish and 4 percent were married to a person not born Jewish who had chosen to be Jewish either through conversion or through self-identification. Of the Jews by choice, about 70 percent had converted. The remainder of the born Jews were married to Gentiles, including the 6 percent of born Jews who converted to another religion. Compared to the findings of NJPS-1970/71, therefore, these data point to a very substantial rise in the level of intermarriage, from 8 percent in 1970/71 to 31 percent of all born Jews.

That this higher level reflects a continuation of the trend suggested by the cohort data of the 1970/71 study is evidenced in the statistics by marriage cohort.[72] Whereas 89 percent of born Jews who married prior to 1965 married another born Jew, only 69 percent of those marrying between 1965 and 1974 did so. This percentage, in turn, declined to only 49 percent for the group marrying between 1975 and 1984, and in the five years preceding the survey, 1985–1990, it reached a low of 43 percent. Of the intermarriages, some involved conversions to Judaism or a choice on the part of the non-Jewish spouses to regard themselves as Jewish even if not formally converted. If all such Jews by choice are counted as Jewish, the percent of Jews marrying other Jews rises to 91 percent among those marrying before 1965, and to 48 percent of those marrying in the most recent period, 1985–1990. The high rate of mixed marriages in 1985–1990 means that for every new

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[71]Intermarriage can be defined in different ways, depending on whether the Jewish identity of the marriage partners is ascertained according to religion at time of birth, at time of courtship, at time of marriage, or at time of the survey. Depending on the definition used, the rate of intermarriage will vary. Consistent with NJPS-1990's goal of encompassing current as well as former Jews, intermarriage is measured in terms of the religious identification of the current marriage partner of anyone who was born Jewish and is now married, irrespective of current Jewish identity.

[72]Egon Mayer, "Jewishness Among the Intermarried: A Record of Lost Continuity or Lost Opportunity?" Paper presented at the Sidney Hollander Colloquium on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, July 1991.

couple consisting of two Jewish partners there were approximately two new couples in which only one of the partners was Jewish. The magnitude of the change that has occurred in the extent of mixed marriages is indicated by the fact that among those marrying before 1965, five times as many Jewish marriages were homogamous as mixed.

The extent of change in intermarriage patterns is further illustrated by the changing levels of conversion to, or choice of Judaism by, the non-Jewish partner. Among those spouses not born Jewish in the pre-1965 marriage cohort, one out of every five chose to be Jewish. In each succeeding cohort, the NJPS-1990 data indicate that the percentage declined, reaching a low of only 9 percent in the 1985–1990 cohort. Of course, these percentages may change in future years as spouses respond to family and community pressures, as they learn more about the religion of the other spouse, and particularly as parents face decisions about the religious training and identification of their children.

One of the major concerns about the demographic implications of high rates of mixed marriages is the Jewish identity of the children of such marriages. The households identified as mixed-married in NJPS-1990, that is, households in which children live with a core Jewish and a non-Jewish parent, contained 664,000 children under 18 years of age. Of these children, only 25 percent were being raised as Jews at the time of the survey; 45 percent were being raised in another religion;[73] and 30 percent were being raised without any religion. Unless a large majority of the latter opt to be identified as Jews when they reach adulthood, most children of mixed marriages will be lost to Judaism; they will be Jews by descent only, either through the maternal or paternal line. These potential losses constitute a major challenge to the Jewish community. Seen in the context of the high rate of mixed marriage that has come to characterize the community, the failure to attract more of these children into the Jewish fold could contribute to declines in the number of Jews in the future. That virtually all of the children of Jews by choice married to born Jews were being raised as Jews points to the importance of increasing the rate at which the non-Jewish partner to a marriage chooses to become Jewish and of strengthening the opportunities that the mixed-married and their children have to develop stronger ties to the Jewish community.[74]

The changing levels of intermarriage and conversion (both formal and informal) reflect a complex set of changes in the American social structure and the position of Jews in this structure, as well as in the attitudes of Jews and non-Jews about intermarriage generally and mixed marriages in particular. The greater freedom in choosing where to be educated, in type and

[73]These included children reported being raised as both Jewish and something else.
[74]Cf. Mayer, "Jewishness Among the Intermarried."

place of employment, in location of residence, and in choice of friends have all contributed to greater freedom in choice of spouse. Associated with such freedom has been the greater freedom extended to both partners to decide whether, upon marriage, to make the couple religiously homogamous or to maintain individual religious identity as well as to decide in what, if any, religion to raise children.

Accompanying the structural changes that have been conducive to more mixed marriages and less conversion have been the sharp changes in attitude among the Jewish population about the acceptance of intermarriage. NJPS-1970/71 asked respondents whether "it is all right for Jews to marry non-Jews." Half maintained that it was not, and most of these disagreed strongly. The question was asked differently in 1990: "Hypothetically, if your child were considering marrying a non-Jewish person, would you: strongly support, support, accept or be neutral, oppose or strongly oppose the marriage?" Among the respondents classified as Jews by religion, only 22 percent reported that they would oppose the marriage, and far fewer of those who were secular Jews, only 4 percent, reported opposition. Indeed, one-third of the Jews by religion and 45 percent of the secular respondents said they would support such a marriage, and about half of each group said they would accept it.

Clearly, a large proportion of the Jewish population has reconciled itself to the possible or actual marriage of their children to non-Jews even though they might prefer Jewish children-in-law. Given this set of attitudes and the growing opportunities for mixed marriages to occur, there seems little likelihood that the trend revealed by both NJPS-1970/71 and NJPS-1990 will reverse itself. At best, it may reach a high level plateau. This means, as Egon Mayer has stressed, that reactive, defensive, preventive measures are not likely to achieve much in the decades ahead.[75] Rather, what he refers to as proactive, culturally, and even politically assertive measures seem more in order, measures which would lead to the strengthening of the weak ties that many intermarried still retain.

JEWISH PRACTICES AND ATTACHMENTS

Denominational Identification

Religious denomination constitutes a major dimension along which the American Jewish community subdivides itself. Denominational divisions are particularly pertinent because of the different attitudes and practices

[75] Ibid., p. 33.

about such issues as intermarriage and conversion, patrilineal descent, and divorce, all of which affect who is to be considered a Jew. Stimulated in part by Rabbi Irving Greenberg's provocative essay questioning whether there will be one Jewish people by the year 2000,[76] a heated debate has ensued on the demographic and religious implications these different practices have for social interaction among Jews, for their survival as one people, and even for survival demographically at a level at which Jews can remain a key segment in the larger American community.

The discussion of the complexity of defining and measuring what constitutes the Jewish population of the United States in this essay touches on these concerns only superficially. Introduction of halakhic issues would add profoundly to the complexity and would alter considerably the categories of Jewish identity used by NJPS-1990. While full discussion of the issues must await other occasions, their significance is clearly relevant to examination of the current denominational composition of the Jewish population and of changes in such identity.

For all respondents, NJPS-1990 asked: "Referring to Jewish religious denominations, do you consider yourself to be Conservative, Orthodox, Reform, Reconstructionist, or something else?" The wide range of responses, in addition to the four specific denominations, reflects the religious heterogeneity of the respondents, including those professing no religion and those reporting themselves as non-Jewish even though born to Jewish parents. A number of secular Jews and even some of the currently non-Jewish respondents indicated that they considered themselves to be identified with one of the major denominations. Whether they were responding in terms of family identity, sympathy with a particular outlook, or on some other basis cannot be ascertained. The fact that they did so testifies to the difficulty and complexity of ascertaining both who is a Jew and what types of Jews there are. The information collected from the respondents and referring to the respondents only has been weighted to reflect the denominational affiliation of all adults. The results may differ some from the actual denominational composition of the total adult population, based on giving individual members in each household the opportunity to answer for themselves.

For the entire adult core Jewish population, the largest single denomination was Reform, with 38 percent of the total (table 19). It was followed closely by Conservative, with 35 percent. Orthodox constituted 6 percent of total adults and Reconstructionist just over 1 percent. Those who indicated a nondenominational category, such as secular, just Jewish, and traditional, made up 10 percent of the total; a residue group of miscellaneous small categories accounted for almost 9 percent.

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[76]Irving Greenberg, "Will There Be One Jewish People by the Year 2000?" *CLAL Perspectives* (New York, National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership, 1986), pp. 1–8.

Not surprisingly, compared to the secular Jews, more of the Jews by religion were in the major denominational groups. Whereas 91 percent of the Jews by religion reported a denominational affiliation, only 25 percent of the secular Jews did so; one-fifth of the latter were in the "just Jewish"/secular category and another 52 percent said they were something else. Jews by choice, on the other hand, more closely resembled the Jews by religion in denominational composition. More of them were Reform; fewer were Conservative, and about the same proportion were Orthodox. That a total of 92 percent of Jews by choice identified denominationally, even though a considerable proportion did not go through formal conversion, suggests the significance of their having made the choice to identify as Jews.

Among those born Jewish and still Jewish by religion, denominational affiliation varies across age groups (table 20). The aged group contains the highest percent of Orthodox and the lowest percent Reform, reflecting its heavier immigrant composition. Twelve percent of all older persons, compared to only 5 percent of those between ages 25 and 64, are Orthodox. By contrast, the percent who are Reform rose from 31 percent of the aged to half of those aged 25–44, and the percentage Conservative declined with lower age to only 33 percent of those aged 25–44. A major realignment in denominational affiliation has occurred with distance from the older, more heavily immigrant or second-generation cohorts. Yet, the data for those aged 18–24 at the time of the survey suggest, as have those for some community studies,[7] that the pattern may be altering again. Among the youngest cohort, almost twice as many were Orthodox (10 percent) as among those aged 25–64, and more were Conservative than at ages 25–44. By contrast, Reform accounted for only 35 percent of the youngest cohort, a level not too far above that of the aged and well below that of the 25–44 age group. Among the 18–24 group, 10 percent identified themselves as "just Jewish"/secular. This percentage is the highest of any age group, possibly pointing to an underlying movement away from denominational identification, even among persons professing to be Jewish by religion. But this group may change once its members marry and settle in a career and a community. Whether the change in denominational identification among the young reflects a basic reversal among the Jews by religion or whether it reflects a shift of the younger Reform raised/educated Jews from the Jews by religion category into the secular category, leaving relatively more of the Jews by religion in the Conservative and Orthodox groups, needs to be researched in depth. In doing so, particular attention needs to be given to the role of Jewish education, both type and amount.

To assess changes in denominational identification, respondents were

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[7]Calvin Goldscheider and Sidney Goldstein, *The Jewish Community of Rhode Island: A Social and Demographic Survey* (Providence, Jewish Federation of Rhode Island, 1988).

asked a parallel question about the denomination in which they were raised. Comparison of this information with that on current identification allows evaluation of changes over the course of the lifetime of the individual respondents. The data point to substantial shifts in the denominational identity of American Jewry.

For the core population, Conservative Judaism constitutes the denomination in which the largest proportion of Jews were raised, one-third (table 21). An additional 26 percent were raised as Reform Jews, and almost as many (23 percent) as Orthodox. Not even 1 percent grew up in the Reconstructionist movement. Just over four out of every five core Jews thus reported being raised in a specific denomination.

Comparison of the data on current denomination with that in which individuals were raised shows that, on balance, the proportion Conservative has hardly changed, remaining close to one-third, although specific individuals so identified may have changed denominations. On the other hand, the percentage of Orthodox declined from 23 percent to only 6 percent, and the proportion of Reform increased from 26 to 38 percent. Reconstructionists rose to 1.3 percent of all core Jews. In total, the percentage of core Jews reporting a denomination declined only slightly, from 83 percent based on denomination raised to 81 percent based on current denomination, suggesting the persistence of denominational identification among Jews despite some tendency toward greater secularism. Seven percent reported being raised as "just-Jewish"/secular and 10 percent reported such an identity at the time of the survey. For both reference periods, about 9 percent classified themselves as something else, but for most of the Jews by choice this was non-Jewish at the time they were growing up.

The dynamics of change in denominational identity can be better measured by comparing the denomination in which born Jewish and currently Jewish individuals were raised and their denomination at the time of the survey (table 22). These data point to much greater movement into the Conservative and Reform groups than into the Orthodox. Whereas 89 percent of all Orthodox respondents reported they were raised Orthodox, only 60 percent of the Conservative adults and 58 percent of the Reform reported their "origins" as being in the same denomination. Of the 11 percent of the Orthodox who were not raised as Orthodox, almost half shifted from Conservative; almost all the others had been secular/"just Jewish." Three-fourths of the 40 percent of Conservatives who were drawn from other denominations came from an Orthodox background; and most of the others were raised Reform. The situation was different for the 41 percent moving into Reform; of all adult Reform Jews, one-fourth came from the Conservative movement and about one in ten had been raised Orthodox. Clearly, most of the considerable shifting among denominations

involved transitions to the denomination most nearly similar to the one in which the individual was raised. A majority of both the Reconstructionist and the "just Jewish" groups were not raised with these identities; most were drawn from the other major denominations, especially the Conservative group.

The absolute effect in numbers of the exchanges among denominations between early socialization and the time of the survey, plus the gains resulting from the addition of Jews by choice, is crudely indicated by the size of the denominations at these two points (not in table). Since adults of varied ages are included, the changes do not cover a specific number of years. On balance, over the lifetime of the respondents, the greatest numerical changes characterized the Orthodox and Reform. The former declined by about 731,000 adherents, or 73 percent, from the one million adults reported raised as Orthodox. The Reform grew by about 533,000 persons, or 46 percent, from the 1.17 million who were raised Reform. Conservative remained virtually stationary, increasing by only about 40,000, or 3 percent, from the 1.53 million who reported themselves as having been raised as Conservative Jews. The small Reconstructionist movement experienced the largest relative growth, just over 200 percent, but this increase involved only about 46,000 adults.

The number not identified with any of the four specific denominations also grew, by 112,000 persons, or 15 percent. While this finding points to some increase in secularization of the core population, the change is not particularly sharp. It is augmented, however, by those who have left Judaism entirely and by the large numbers of Jews by descent who were not raised and are not currently Jewish. On balance, therefore, these data suggest that those still classifiying themselves as Jewish have been shifting away from Orthodoxy toward Reform and secular Jewish identity.

Ritual Practices and Organizational Involvement

The heterogeneity of the population surveyed by NJPS-1990 raises questions about whether the subgroups differ in how they manifest their Jewish or former Jewish identities. Does converting out of Judaism mean cessation of all observance of Jewish ritual practices and other manifestations of Jewish identity or does some retention occur, particularly of practices that provide links to one's Jewish family? For those choosing to be Jewish, how closely do their Jewish observances resemble those of persons raised Jewish, and how much do they continue to observe the practices associated with former religious identification? Do secular Jews differ from those who reported themselves as Jewish by religion? Do secular Jews forego all ritual practice?

The data available from the large number of questions included in NJPS-1990 on ritual practice, organization memberships, philanthropy, ties to Israel, and attitudes toward a range of topics lend themselves to providing some answers to such questions. To do so thoroughly requires an in-depth assessment that is beyond the scope of this overview report. Because only a superficial evaluation, limited to a few behavioral indicators, can be undertaken here, the reader should be aware that some of the conclusions may change when fuller controls for age, denomination, family history, and other key background variables can be introduced into the analysis. The comparisons are suggestive of underlying differences and whet the appetite for fuller understanding of the reasons for the observed patterns and their implications for the future of Jewish life in the United States.

RITUAL PRACTICES

Attention turns first to selected ritual practices (table 23). Most pertain to the household as a whole, though a few questions related specifically to individual behavior are also examined. In our discussion, ritual practices are analyzed along two dimensions: in terms of the respondent's Jewish identity and other characteristics and in terms of household composition (entirely Jewish, mixed Jewish-Gentile, no core Jews). It should be noted that even though, to simplify presentation, the discussion may refer to the practices as if they were performed by the individual, the data for a given household do not necessarily reflect the behavior of the individual responding for that household.

Observance of the Sabbath is at the very heart of Judaism and lighting Sabbath candles is an important aspect of that observance. Of all respondents in the core Jewish group, 62 percent reported that candles were never lit in their households on Friday evening; only 17 percent reported lighting Sabbath candles always or usually. Not surprisingly, almost nine out of ten respondents who were either formerly Jewish or of Jewish descent never lit candles Friday evening; 11 percent did so sometimes, and 2 percent even reported regular lighting of candles. This may involve behavior by someone else in the household who is currently Jewish or may be a vestige of earlier behavior that is done without religious connotation.

Within the core Jewish group, sharp differences exist by type of identity (table 24). Whereas almost one in five of those reporting themselves as Jewish by religion reported Sabbath candles being lit in their household always or usually, and another 23 percent reported sometimes lighting candles, only 11 percent of the secular Jews fell in these two categories; almost nine in ten of the secular Jews indicated that candles were never lit in their households, virtually identical to the non-Jewish respondents. By

contrast, but surprising by its magnitude, 57 percent of the Jews by religion reported never lighting candles. While adhering more closely than the secular Jews to this key element of ritual, still, a majority of Jews by religion do not practice it.

The level of adherence is reported as highest among the Jews by choice. Almost one-third reported Sabbath candle lighting always or usually, and only 32 percent reported never doing so. Evidently, candle lighting has particular symbolic value in households that include a Jew by choice. The significance of this for outreach programs designed to achieve higher levels of religious homogamy in intermarried households needs to be recognized. Fuller understanding of the reasons that lead to such a differential might also prove useful in enhancing ritual practices among other segments of the Jewish population.

Consistent with the differences observed among respondents with different types of Jewish identity, sharp differences characterize household types. One in five of the entirely Jewish households lit Sabbath candles always or usually compared to just under 5 percent of the mixed households and only 1 percent of those with no core Jews as members As important, just over half of the entirely Jewish households reported never doing so. Less surprising, just over 80 percent of the mixed and almost nine out of ten of the non-core households reported no such observance.

The observance of *kashrut* (dietary laws) was also assessed. Since buying kosher meat and other kosher products has become widespread, even among non-Jews, purchase of kosher meat no longer serves as a good index of *kashrut* observance. Keeping separate dishes within the household is a more sensitive index. That it is no longer a common practice is evidenced by the fact that eight of every ten households in the core Jewish population were reported as not using separate dishes for meat and milk products. Only 13 percent did so always/usually. These statistics differed only slightly from those reported by the non-Jewish respondents, among whom 83 percent never used separate dishes, compared to 9 percent who did so always/usually.[78]

Again, the data for the subtypes within the core population point to differences. Fifteen percent of the Jews by religion reported using separate dishes, compared to only 4 percent of the secular Jews. While it is not surprising that 92 percent of the secular Jews did not practice *kashrut*, that 80 percent of the Jews by religion failed to do so points to the high degree of attenuation of this religious tradition. As with candle lighting, Jews by choice reported the highest rate of *kashrut* practice in their households. One in five such households used separate dishes always/usually, and only 59

[78]Some non-Jews misunderstood this question to refer to everyday dishes and those used for special occasions.

percent reported never doing so, a high percentage but well below that of the Jews by religion.

A vast majority of households, including entirely Jewish ones, reported never or only sometimes using separate sets of dishes in observance of *kashrut*. Almost four out of every five entirely Jewish units and about 90 percent of the mixed households were in these nonuse categories. Clearly, this aspect of religious behavior is now practiced by only a small minority of Jewish households, undoubtedly largely concentrated among those regarding themselves as Orthodox.[79]

Observing Passover through attendance at a seder has been one of the most common practices reported in community surveys, reflecting both its religious significance and its role in reinforcing family and community linkages. In contrast to Sabbath candle lighting and observance of *kashrut*, NJPS-1990 reveals a fairly strong continuation of seder attendance. It is, however, not nearly as universal as some community studies have reported. Almost 62 percent of the respondents in the core population reported that their households always/usually attended a seder, and another 19 percent did so sometimes. Yet, one in five indicated they never did so, suggesting that a substantial number of Jews forego this family/religious event. Most persons who are no longer Jewish but are of Jewish descent never attend a seder, but that 10 percent reported doing so always/usually and another 14 percent as sometimes suggests that family ties may lead to continued involvement in observance of Passover through seder participation on the part of these non-Jews.

Within the core group, attendance at a seder is highest for Jews by religion, almost three-fourths of whom reported always or usually participating and another 18 percent doing so sometimes. They were followed closely by Jews by choice. However, only a minority of secular Jews attended a seder at least sometimes (44 percent). Evidently, most secular Jews see little value in even observing the humanistic/cultural aspects of the Passover holiday as manifested in the seder.

Seder attendance, like Sabbath candle lighting and *kashrut*, varies by household composition. Whereas 69 percent of the entirely Jewish households were reported as having someone in the household always or usually attending a seder, only 40 percent of the mixed households and far fewer, 8 percent, of the noncore households did so. By contrast, only 14 percent of the entirely Jewish households were reported as having no one attending a seder, compared to almost four in ten of the mixed households and almost eight in ten of those having no core Jews as members.

Hanukkah, like seder attendance, has been noted as one of the mainstays

[79]Cf. Goldscheider and Goldstein, *Jewish Community of Rhode Island*.

of Jewish religious practice in the United States today, even though the popular importance attached to it is far out of proportion to its significance religiously, being strongly determined by its location in the secular calendar close to Christmas. Over three times as many respondents (60 percent) reported that Hanukkah candles were always/usually lit in their households as reported lighting Sabbath candles. Like attendance at a seder, observance of Hanukkah serves as an important symbol of Jewish identity. Nonetheless, a not insignificant part of the survey population does not light Hanukkah candles. Among the non-Jewish respondents, the extent of observance of Hanukkah closely resembled that of seder attendance and probably for the same reasons.

Among the core population, the observance of Hanukkah by Jews in the various identity-type categories also closely resembles the patterns already discussed for seder attendance. A large majority (70 percent) of Jews by religion always/usually lit Hanukkah candles, and only 17 percent never did so. These were followed closely by the Jews by choice. Only 16 percent of the households of secular respondents always/usually lit candles, and two-thirds never did so. Evidently, the competition of Christmas is not a major stimulus for manifesting one's Jewishness through Hanukkah candle lighting.

Like attendance at seders, lighting of Hanukkah candles is a popular practice in entirely Jewish households; just under two-thirds reported doing so always or usually. By contrast, only four in ten mixed households did so this frequently. Among households with no core Jews in them, lighting Hanukkah candles occurred regularly among only 8 percent.

Because of the increasingly religiously mixed composition of Jewish households, interest has grown in the extent to which non-Jewish practices have been introduced. Full evaluation of this requires far more in-depth analysis than is possible here. Attention to whether the surveyed households had a Christmas tree provides some initial insights.

The evidence is that this non-Jewish practice has penetrated Jewish households to a considerable degree. While 62 percent of the respondents in the core population reported never having a Christmas tree in their household, 28 percent indicated that they did so always/usually, and another 10 percent said sometimes. Whether they regarded the tree as a religious or as a seasonal symbol was not ascertained. That over one-third of the core households sometimes or always/usually had a Christmas tree is largely explained by the fact that about one-third of the households containing at least one core Jew also included at least one person who was not a core Jew, i.e., someone professing another religion. Given such a composition, the high proportion of households having a Christmas tree is more comprehensible. Not surprisingly, nine out of every ten respondents

in the currently non-Jewish group reported having a Christmas tree sometimes, usually, or always.

Some households in each of the Jewish identity categories had a Christmas tree, although the frequency varies. Far fewer of the Jews by religion than of the secular Jews reported having a tree always or usually, and the Jews by choice more closely resembled the Jews by religion. The high proportion of secular Jews having a tree may reflect a high rate of mixed marriage among them. That almost half of the Jews by choice had a Christmas tree suggests that a number continue to observe Christmas in this way even while professing Judaism. This may relate to maintenance of family ties in the same way that a proportion of the Jews who have converted to another religion continue to light Hanukkah candles and to attend a seder. Whether those Jews by choice who have converted to Judaism differ from those who are Jews by choice without conversion with respect to having a tree remains to be determined.

Another perspective for viewing the practice of having a Christmas tree is in terms of household composition. As many as 10 percent of those households composed entirely of Jews reported always or usually having a Christmas tree; two-thirds of the mixed households did so as did about 80 percent of those with no core Jews as members. Given the comparatively high percentage of mixed households that regularly observe Hanukkah, this suggests that many concurrently observe both Hanukkah and Christmas. The data support such an assumption; of the four in ten mixed households that always or usually light Hanukkah candles, two-thirds also always or usually have a Christmas tree. This means that almost 30 percent of all mixed households always or usually have both a Christmas tree and light Hanukkah candles. This finding suggests that mixed religious composition quite often also involves mixed religious practices.

Next to be considered is an individual trait, fasting on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Of the core Jews, 48 percent reported that they personally did so, and 48 percent did not. The remainder could not for health reasons. The high percentage who did not fast reflects the comparatively low level of traditional behavior within the Jewish community. Among the currently non-Jewish population, 12 percent reported fasting, again suggesting that, like candle lighting and *kashrut*, a small number continue to observe the practices with which they became familiar while being raised in a Jewish environment. Alternatively, it may reflect deference to other members of the household who are Jewish.

Consistent with patterns already noted, fasting was far more common among Jews by religion and Jews by choice than among secular Jews. The secular Jews and the currently non-Jewish respondents were virtually identical in proportion fasting. Clearly, this is a practice very largely restricted

to persons identifying themselves as Jewish by religion or choice, although it is not even observed by all the members of these identity groups.

PHILANTHROPY

Still another expression of Jewish identity is represented by charitable donations to Jewish causes. For philanthropy, as for synagogue/temple membership, behavior varied by household composition. Whereas almost two-thirds of the entirely Jewish households contributed to Jewish causes in 1989, only 28 percent of the mixed households and far fewer of the households with no core Jews did so. Interestingly, contributing to Jewish causes on the part of entirely Jewish households ranks high, along with seder attendance and Hanukkah candle lighting, suggesting that philanthropy persists as one of the key channels through which Jewish households express their Jewishness. For mixed households, Jewish philanthropy also ranks higher than such traditional ritual practices as Sabbath candle lighting, but it characterizes only a minority of such households and ranks lower than seder attendance and Hanukkah candle lighting in frequency. We can thus expect that, other things being equal, a growing proportion of mixed households will reduce the aggregate amount of giving to Jewish causes. Contributions to secular charities are much more uniform across all types of households. Two-thirds of both the entirely Jewish and the mixed composition households reported such contributions, as did just over half of the noncore units. This uniformity in secular philanthropy reenforces the significance of the differentials observed for contributions to Jewish causes.

ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

Identity can also express itself through participation in the organized life of the larger community, such as synagogues/temples and Jewish organizations. Respondents were asked whether they or any members of their household belonged to a synagogue or temple. Only one-third of those in the Jewish core population reported such membership. Among those respondents outside the core, only 3 percent did. Within the core group, membership was highest (56 percent) among households in which the respondent was a Jew by choice and virtually nonexistent among secular Jews. Just over one-third of the households represented by a Jew by religion belonged to a synagogue. Not surprisingly, over three times as many households composed entirely of Jews held synagogue membership as did mixed households. Data not shown here indicate that affiliated households are larger than average, suggesting a life-cycle pattern of membership wherein households with children of school age are more likely to be affiliated in order

to enable their children to enroll in programs of Jewish education.[80] Such a relation evidently does not characterize a high proportion of the mixed households. How to attract their Jewish members and especially their children remains a major challenge for the community.

Membership in Jewish organizations other than a synagogue/temple is another way to express one's Jewish identity. Yet 72 percent of the respondents in the core population indicated that they were not members of any Jewish organization, and only 13 percent belonged to two or more groups. Membership in Jewish organizations was even lower among noncore respondents; only 5 percent belonged, and most of these held membership in only one group. Once again, Jews by religion and Jews by choice closely resembled each other. Although about two-thirds of both groups did not belong to any Jewish organization, somewhat more of the Jews by choice were active, reiterating earlier findings that being a Jew by choice is associated with more intense manifestation of Jewishness. In sharp contrast, secular Jews had very low affiliation rates, with only 8 percent belonging to a group.

ISRAEL VISITS

The final indicator examined here is the number of times the respondent had visited Israel. One quarter of the core respondents had been to Israel, 15 percent once and 12 percent twice. Far fewer of the noncore respondents, only 6 percent, had visited Israel. Identifying as a Jew by religion is associated with a higher rate of visiting Israel (31 percent) than is being a secular Jew or a Jew by choice (11 percent each). Aside from differences in degree of identification with Israel, the higher rate among Jews by religion may be partially explained by the popularity of organized trips to Israel for teens, in which they would have been most eligible to participate as members of synagogue/temple youth groups. This is the single index of Jewishness in which the Jews by choice more closely resemble the secular Jews than the Jews by religion and one of the few on which they have the lowest "score," although their ranking is closely shared with the secular Jews.

Overall, what do these indicators tell us about Jewish practices and affiliation in America? First, it must be stressed again that the comparisons undertaken here are superficial, not having taken account of a host of background variables that could affect the outcomes. Such analyses will have to await fuller exploitation of the rich data available in NJPS-1990. Within these limitations, the data seem to point to several conclusions. The

[80]Kosmin et al., *Highlights*, p. 37.

overall level of Jewish identity as manifested in ritual practice, organization membership, and ties to Israel is comparatively low for the core population and much lower still for those of Jewish descent who do not profess to be currently Jewish. It is considerably higher for entirely Jewish households than for households of mixed composition. To the extent that the latter may be a growing group because of increasing numbers of mixed marriages and the very large reservoir of children of such marriages who are not being raised as Jews, levels of nonobservance and nonmembership may rise in the future.

If observance and involvement are important mechanisms for maintaining the strength of individual identity and integration with the larger community, then, even for many core Jews, the reinforcement and the links are weak. It may well be that other mechanisms for maintaining identity and integration are replacing the traditional ones.[81] Some of these, such as social affinity through work and friendship with other Jews, can and will be measured through NJPS-1990 data. Whether they are sufficient to serve as substitutes for traditional practices and more formal involvement with the community remains to be tested.

CONCLUSION

At the heart of the findings of NJPS-1990 is the fluid character of the American Jewish community. The broad net intentionally built into the design of NJPS in its effort to identify all types of Jews in America has shown that we are constituted of different Jewish populations for different purposes, that we need to think of ourselves not so much in total numbers but in terms of who and what we are and whom the community is serving.

We consist of a central core made up of persons identifying themselves as either Jews by religion or as secular Jews, many of whom live in entirely Jewish households. Yet even within this core group wide differences exist in socioeconomic characteristics and Jewish practices. In addition, a substantial number of Jews are married to non-Jews. Still others, because of earlier family histories of intermarriage, qualify as Jewish only by descent, either having been born to a Jewish parent but not raised Jewish or having chosen to adopt another religion as a corollary of intermarriage. Forming the outer ring are Gentiles, who, though never Jewish through parentage or socialization, are members of households composed partially of current or former Jews and in this way may be affected by their exposure to Jewish values and practices and by worldwide events that have relevance for the

[81] Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change*.

Jewish community. In short, there is no one Jewish population in America today. From both a demographic and a planning perspective, how many we are and who we are depends on who we count as in or out, and this depends, in turn, on what our goals are—to identify the basic core, to reach out to those on the margins, to make concerted efforts to attract those still confronting choices as to who they should be.

The differences observed in both socioeconomic composition and behavioral indicators among the different categories of Jews identified by NJPS-1990 seem to justify the distinctions made by the classification system adopted for the analysis. Jews by religion are more traditional and involved in their community; Jews by choice more closely resemble those who are Jews by religion; the secularists operate closer to the margins of traditional behavior. In fact, for most indicators, Jews by choice tend to be the most observant and the most involved. In view of the high rates of intermarriage, this finding suggests that "conversion" of the non-Jewish partner should enhance the Jewish component of family life and possibly even raise the overall level of observance in the community.

Major challenges face the community as a result of the high rates of intermarriage, the persistence of low fertility, the greater dispersal of the population, comparatively high rates of marital instability, the evidence of growing secularism, the loss of the more traditional members through aging and death, and growing Americanization. Yet, there are also signals of potential for continued strength as American Jews continue their efforts to find a meaningful balance between being American and being Jewish.

The demographic base of the Jewish population seems to have reached a plateau and may well decline in future years. Only if the mixed-married and especially their children, as well as the substantial number who are secular, can be retained or brought back into the core and their ties to Judaism and the Jewish people strengthened can our numbers grow. As I have argued before,[82] the potential for continued vitality remains. Stability of numbers, or even declining numbers, need not constitute a fundamental threat to the maintenance of a strong Jewish community and to high levels of identity, although the impact of size is clearly more relevant on the local than national level because of the need for sufficient Jewish population density to allow a vital Jewish communal life. What is most important both nationally and locally is that the community be willing to develop new institutional forms designed to mitigate the negative effects of population decline and dispersal and the growing numbers of mixed households. These must provide increasing opportunities for Jewish self-identification and for greater participation of individuals in organized Jewish life, regardless of

[82]Goldstein, "Jews in the United States."

whether they live in large or small communities or whether they are in entirely Jewish or in mixed households. Jews will surely become increasingly American in the years ahead. The question is whether the Jewish community will enhance the opportunities and means for them to remain Jewish and possibly facilitate a more intensive identification with their Jewishness.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY

Jewish Identity	Number	Percent of Core Jewish Population	Distribution of Total Pop. in Qualified Households
Jews by Religion[a]	4,210,000	76.3	51.4
Secular Jews	1,120,000	20.3	13.7
Jews by Choice	185,000	3.4	2.3
Core Jewish Population	5,515,000	100.0	
Converts Out	210,000		2.6
Jewish Descent/ Other Religion	415,000		5.0
Children under 18 being raised in other religion	700,000		8.5
Gentiles	1,350,000		16.5
Total population	8,190,000		100.0

[a]Includes 100,000 institutionalized and unenumerated persons.

Note: In this and all subsequent tables the following definitions are used: The Core Jewish Population consists of (1) persons born Jewish and identified as being Jewish by religion (Jews by Religion); (2) persons born Jewish reporting no current religious identity (Secular Jews); and (3) those born non-Jews but identified as Jewish by religion—whether converted or not (Jews by Choice). Non-Jewish Household Members include (1) persons born/raised Jewish reporting adherence to another religion (Converts Out); (2) persons with Jewish parent(s) brought up in and reporting other religious identity (Jewish Descent/Other Religion); (3) those born in and reporting another religion (Gentiles); and (4) children under age 18 who have a "qualified Jew" as a parent, i.e., one currently Jewish or of Jewish descent, but who are being raised in a non-Jewish religion.

TABLE 2. THE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970 AND 1990

Population	1970	1990	Percent Change
Total population in Jewish households	5,850,000[a]	8,200,000[b]	+40.2
Total Jews: currently Jewish and Jewish background	5,480,000	6,840,000[c]	+24.8
Total core Jews: currently Jewish religion/identification	5,420,000	5,515,000	+1.8
Number of households with one or more Jews	1,950,000	3,186,000	+63.4
U.S. resident population	203,211,000	248,710,000	+22.4
U.S. households	63,449,000	91,947,000	+44.9
Jews as a percent of U.S. population			
Total population in Jewish HH	2.9	3.3	
Total Jews	2.7	2.7	
Total core Jews	2.7	2.2	
Average household size			
Total households with Jews	3.0	2.6	
Entirely core Jewish households	NA	2.2	
Mixed households	NA	3.2	
Households with no core Jews	NA	2.7	
Total U.S. households	3.1	2.7	

[a]Includes 50,000 institutionalized population.
[b]Includes 100,000 institutionalized and unenumerated population.
[c]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent who are currently not being raised as Jews.

TABLE 3. REGION OF RESIDENCE OF POPULATION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

a. Percent Distribution by Region

Region	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population
Northeast	47.8	30.4	30.4	43.6	21.1
Midwest	10.8	12.7	13.5	11.3	26.1
South	21.7	20.4	27.9	21.6	32.8
West	19.7	36.6	28.2	23.5	20.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	4.10	1.12	0.18	5.40	199.7

Region	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[a]	Gentiles	Total
Northeast	25.2	28.4	36.6	32.3
Midwest	22.6	14.7	13.8	14.9
South	31.0	29.8	23.8	26.9
West	21.2	27.1	25.8	26.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.21	1.12	1.35	2.68

TABLE 3.—*(Continued)*

b. Percent Distribution by Jewish Identity

Region	Core Jewish Population			Non-Jewish Household Members			Total Percent	Total Number (in mill.)
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[a]	Gentiles		
Northeast	60.8	10.6	1.7	1.7	9.8	15.4	100.0	3.22
Midwest	43.9	14.1	2.5	4.8	16.3	18.5	100.0	1.01
South	47.1	12.7	2.7	3.5	17.6	17.0	100.0	1.89
West	41.1	20.8	2.6	2.3	15.5	17.7	100.0	1.96
Total	50.7	13.9	2.3	2.7	13.8	16.7	100.0	8.08

[a]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

Note: On this and subsequent tables, percentages or numbers may not always add to totals, due to rounding.

TABLE 4. METROPOLITAN/NONMETROPOLITAN RESIDENCE[a] OF POPULATION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

a. Distribution by Metro/Nonmetro Residence

	Core Jewish Population			
Residence	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
Metropolitan	79.1	65.0	58.6	75.4
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	15.2	22.2	26.2	17.0
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	3.5	8.8	10.1	4.9
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	2.2	4.0	5.1	2.7
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	Non-Jewish Household Members			
Residence	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[b]	Gentiles	Total
Metropolitan	58.2	55.7	64.8	60.4
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	26.1	26.9	21.3	24.0
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	5.6	9.5	8.0	8.5
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	10.1	7.9	5.9	7.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4.—*(Continued)*

b. Distribution by Jewish Identity

Residence	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Number (in millions)[a]
Metropolitan	79.1	18.3	2.6	100.0	3.76
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	67.2	27.7	5.1	100.0	0.85
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	54.6	38.4	7.0	100.0	0.24
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	62.0	31.7	6.3	100.0	0.13
Total	75.4	21.3	3.3	100.0	4.99

Residence	All Household Members: Current Religion Jewish	Secular Jews	Jews by Choice	Non-Jewish Members	Total	Number (in millions)
Metropolitan	56.1	13.0	1.8	29.1	100.0	5.31
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	39.0	16.0	3.0	42.0	100.0	1.46
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	28.8	20.2	3.7	47.3	100.0	0.46
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	26.4	13.5	2.7	57.4	100.0	0.31
Total	49.8	14.0	2.2	33.9	100.0	7.55

[a]Metropolitan area residents are those who live in a county that lies within a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropolitan areas are persons living in counties that are not in metropolitan areas; the population size refers to the number of residents of the given counties.
[b]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

TABLE 5. FIVE-YEAR MIGRATION STATUS OF ADULTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Migration Status	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total Jews	U.S. White Pop. Mobility 1980–85[a]
Same house	60.5	44.0	52.5	57.1	58.7
Diff. house/ same local area	19.2	24.0	21.2	20.1	21.4
Intrastate	9.4	18.2	13.1	11.2	9.3
Interstate	10.0	12.4	10.8	10.5	8.7
International	0.9	1.4	2.5	1.1	1.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	3.16	0.76	0.17	4.09	171.37

Migration Status	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total Non-Jews
Same house	61.1	48.3	46.2	48.3
Diff. house/ same local area	22.2	27.8	24.2	24.8
Intrastate	11.4	9.9	15.1	13.6
Interstate	4.6	13.5	13.2	12.3
International	0.7	0.5	1.3	1.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.20	0.41	1.28	1.89

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1987.

TABLE 6. LIFETIME MIGRATION STATUS OF ADULTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Migration Status	Core Jewish Population			
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total Jews
Same house	2.0	2.6	2.3	2.1
Diff. house/ same local area	18.3	14.0	10.7	17.2
Intrastate	24.8	22.2	22.7	24.2
Interstate	44.0	51.8	58.4	46.1
International	10.9	9.4	6.0	10.4
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	3.18	0.77	0.17	4.12

Migration Status	Non-Jewish Household Members			
	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total Non-Jews
Same house	0.5	3.3	2.9	2.7
Diff. house/ same local area	19.7	10.6	13.8	13.7
Intrastate	30.1	32.8	29.5	30.2
Interstate	41.7	44.9	44.3	44.2
International	8.0	8.4	9.5	9.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.20	0.41	1.29	1.90

TABLE 7. FIVE-YEAR MIGRATION STATUS OF CORE JEWISH ADULTS, BY AGE (PERCENT)

Migration Status	Age Group				
	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–64	65 & Over
Same house	54.3	21.0	48.6	73.1	82.7
Diff. house/ same local area	17.3	33.0	26.9	14.3	9.1
Intrastate	16.5	21.3	12.8	5.7	3.9
Interstate	11.5	22.1	10.4	6.2	4.1
International	0.3	2.6	1.4	0.7	0.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.42	0.84	0.92	1.02	0.90

TABLE 8. REGION OF 1990 RESIDENCE, BY REGION OF BIRTH AND INTERREGIONAL LIFETIME MIGRATION, U.S.-BORN POPULATION, CORE JEWS AND NON-JEWISH HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

Region of Birth	Region of Residence				Total	Distribution by Region of Birth
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West		
			Core Jewish Population			
			Percent Distribution of Total Population			
Northeast	69.7	2.9	17.2	10.2	100.0	
Midwest	6.9	57.6	13.3	22.2	100.0	
South	11.5	4.0	76.8	7.7	100.0	
West	5.9	1.8	5.4	86.9	100.0	
			Percent Distribution of Outmigrants			
Northeast	—	9.7	56.7	33.6	100.0	59.9
Midwest	16.2	—	31.4	52.4	100.0	24.0
South	49.5	17.2	—	33.3	100.0	9.6
West	45.3	13.6	41.1	—	100.0	6.5
Total	11.6	8.4	44.2	35.8		100.0

TABLE 8.—*(Continued)*

Region of Birth	Region of Residence				Total	Distribution by Region of Birth
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West		
			Interregional Lifetime Migration			
Total inmigration	+161,930	+116,970	+618,330	+501,860		
Total outmigration	−838,500	−335,860	−133,570	−91,160		
Net migration	−676,570	−218,890	+484,760	+410,700		
Northeast	—	+27,040	+409,310	+240,220		
Midwest	−27,040	—	+82,440	+163,490		
South	−409,310	−82,440	—	+6,990		
West	−240,220	−163,490	−6,990	—		
			Non-Jewish Household Members			
			Percent Distribution of Total Population			
Northeast	76.1	3.7	15.2	5.0	100.0	
Midwest	7.3	57.2	15.5	19.9	100.0	
South	7.6	8.8	71.7	12.0	100.0	
West	4.1	3.0	6.8	86.1	100.0	
			Percent Distribution of Outmigrants			
Northeast	—	15.3	63.7	21.0	100.0	32.7
Midwest	17.1	—	36.4	46.5	100.0	32.2
South	26.7	31.1	—	42.2	100.0	24.7
West	29.6	21.5	48.9	—	100.0	10.4
Total	15.2	14.9	37.6	32.3		100.0

TABLE 8.—*(Continued)*

Region of Birth	Region of Residence				Total	Distribution by Region of Birth
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West		
			Interregional Lifetime Migration			
Total inmigration	+99,070	+97,630	+245,840	+211,010		
Total outmigration	−213,970	−210,220	−161,660	−67,700		
Net migration	−114,900	−112,590	+84,180	+143,310		
Northeast	—	−3,150	+93,160	+24,890		
Midwest	+3,150	—	+26,110	+83,330		
South	−93,160	−26,110	—	+35,090		
West	−24,890	−83,330	−35,090	—		

TABLE 9. AGE COMPOSITION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Current Age	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population
0–14	18.3	23.9	4.5	19.0	20.7
15–24	9.5	16.3	7.3	10.9	14.2
25–34	15.0	19.9	18.0	16.1	17.6
35–44	16.8	17.0	33.1	17.4	14.9
45–64	20.0	16.2	26.9	19.5	19.3
65 & over	20.4	6.6	10.2	17.2	13.3
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median age	39.3	29.9	41.1	37.3	33.6

Current Age	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[a]	Gentiles	Total
0–14	—	55.7	—	23.2
15–24	8.6	11.5	16.1	13.6
25–34	19.3	9.6	28.3	19.8
35–44	28.8	11.0	26.2	20.1
45–64	31.8	7.4	21.6	16.5
65 & over	11.7	4.7	7.8	6.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median age	42.7	13.5	37.1	31.7

[a]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

TABLE 10. SEX RATIOS[a], BY AGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY

Age Group	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population
0–14	113.3	87.1	118.8	106.2	105.4
15–24	105.7	95.5	40.9	100.4	102.8
25–44	99.4	113.4	41.3	98.1	101.0
45–64	99.5	96.2	32.1	94.3	93.8
65 & over	91.0	140.0	342.6	96.5	68.9
Total	100.6	102.2	52.6	98.8	95.8

Age Group	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[c]	Gentiles	Total
0–14	[b]	112.7	—	112.7
15–24	176.8	110.4	84.6	96.4
25–44	68.6	81.4	100.6	92.7
45–64	39.3	60.4	114.6	87.3
65 & over	60.7	48.2	140.0	91.8
Total	62.2	96.6	103.1	96.5

[a]Number of males per 100 females.
[b]All females.
[c]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

TABLE 11. GENERATION STATUS: PERCENT OF GRANDPARENTS BORN IN U.S., BY AGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY, AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF U.S.-BORN GRANDPARENTS

a. Percent U.S.-Born Grandparents

Age Group	Core Jewish Population							
	By Religion		Secular		By Choice		Total	
	None	All	None	All	None	All	None	All
18–24	27.1	33.7	12.7	51.0	—	59.6	22.5	39.1
25–44	53.5	12.8	25.3	31.6	18.8	38.6	45.6	18.2
45–64	85.0	3.7	62.0	17.0	27.9	48.2	78.4	8.1
65 & over	95.8	1.1	88.7	4.2	41.7	33.4	94.3	2.0
All ages	70.0	9.3	38.3	28.4	22.6	42.3	12.5	14.1

Age Group	Non-Jewish Household Members							
	Converts Out		Jewish Descent/ Other Religion		Gentiles		Total	
	None	All	None	All	None	All	None	All
18–24	27.4	62.8	7.5	44.5	17.4	57.3	16.3	55.3
25–44	22.4	34.2	21.4	45.9	28.5	51.4	26.2	48.3
45–64	35.1	17.7	21.3	37.4	48.9	37.8	40.7	34.8
65 & over	51.7	33.4	20.3	62.0	55.4	40.0	44.2	45.6
All ages	30.0	32.4	19.6	45.8	33.0	48.7	29.5	46.2

TABLE 11.—(*Continued*)

b. Average Number of U.S.-Born Grandparents

Age Group	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
18–24	2.16	2.87	3.52	2.39
25–44	1.12	2.08	2.37	1.39
45–64	0.34	1.05	2.44	0.56
65 & over	0.89	0.31	2.08	0.14
All ages	0.75	1.78	2.44	1.00

Age Group	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
18–24	2.71	2.93	2.83	2.84
25–44	2.09	2.49	2.46	2.43
45–64	1.66	2.28	1.80	1.89
65 & over	1.63	2.75	1.72	2.02
All ages	1.98	2.52	2.33	2.33

TABLE 12A. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, BY JEWISH IDENTITY, ALL ADULTS AGE 25 AND OVER (PERCENT)

	Core Jewish Population				
Education	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population[a]
High school or less	28.5	25.1	21.9	27.7	62.2
Some college	18.7	21.5	20.3	19.3	17.3
College completed	26.8	25.0	29.6	26.7	11.8
Graduate studies	25.9	28.4	28.2	26.4	8.7
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	2.67	0.56	0.13	3.36	129.17

	Non-Jewish Household Members			
Education	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
High school or less	42.7	48.8	44.5	45.2
Some college	29.6	22.2	17.6	20.0
College completed	15.3	15.1	23.8	20.9
Graduate studies	12.4	13.9	14.1	13.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.17	0.32	1.00	1.46

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 1988, table 2.

TABLE 12B. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, BY JEWISH IDENTITY, ALL ADULTS AGES 30–39 (PERCENT)

Education	Core Jewish Population				Total U.S. White Population[a]
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	
High school or less	12.6	19.9	10.2	14.0	50.8
Some college	16.7	29.3	29.4	20.0	21.8
College completed	34.5	26.1	32.3	32.7	16.2
Graduate studies	36.2	24.7	28.0	33.4	11.2
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.59	0.16	0.05	0.81	33.60

Education	Non-Jewish Household Members			
	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
High school or less	27.6	33.7	32.3	32.1
Some college	33.6	30.3	22.3	25.3
College completed	20.3	21.8	26.7	24.9
Graduate studies	18.4	14.2	18.7	17.7
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.06	0.10	0.33	0.49

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 1988, table 2.

TABLE 13. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, BY JEWISH IDENTITY, MEN AND WOMEN AGES 30–39 (PERCENT)

	Core Jewish Population				Non-Jewish Household Members				
Education	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Religion	Gentiles	Total	Total U.S. White Pop.[a]
					Males				
High school or less	12.4	16.6	10.6	13.2	18.4	36.9	38.2	35.9	47.9
Some college	14.5	26.2	32.2	17.8	22.6	23.1	20.5	21.2	21.5
College completed	33.2	26.5	32.0	31.7	44.8	23.0	27.3	28.3	17.5
Graduate studies	39.9	30.7	25.2	37.3	14.2	17.0	14.0	14.6	13.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in thousands)	296	83	18	397	24	43	161	228	16,841
					Females				
High school or less	12.8	23.3	10.0	14.7	34.5	31.5	26.9	28.9	53.8
Some college	18.9	32.4	27.7	22.2	41.7	35.5	24.0	28.7	22.0
College completed	35.8	25.8	32.6	33.6	2.3	20.9	26.1	22.0	14.9
Graduate studies	32.5	18.5	29.7	29.5	21.5	12.1	23.0	20.4	9.3
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in thousands)	297	80	31	408	32	59	173	264	16,760

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 1988, table 2.

TABLE 14. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY AND SEX, POPULATION AGE 18 AND OLDER (PERCENT)

Occupation	Core Jewish Population				U.S. White Population[a]
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	
			Males		
Professionals	38.8	40.1	36.7	39.0	15.8
Managers	17.8	11.8	20.2	16.7	14.3
Clerical/sales	25.7	20.5	15.5	24.4	17.5
Crafts	7.6	11.7	11.1	8.5	19.8
Operatives	5.3	9.8	11.6	6.4	19.6
Service	4.7	6.1	4.9	5.0	8.9
Agriculture	—	—	—	—	4.2
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	1.47	0.37	0.05	1.89	55.78
			Females		
Professionals	34.7	39.8	43.6	36.1	15.2
Managers	13.4	9.6	18.0	13.0	16.0
Clerical/sales	42.9	37.5	27.5	41.1	41.3
Crafts	1.7	2.0	1.3	1.8	2.2
Operatives	1.4	4.1	1.1	1.8	7.8
Service	5.8	7.1	8.5	6.2	16.5
Agriculture	—	—	—	—	0.9
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	1.51	0.36	0.11	1.98	45.73

TABLE 14.—*(Continued)*

Occupation	Non-Jewish Household Members			
	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total Non-Jews
		Males		
Professionals	20.2	31.9	27.3	27.5
Managers	9.5	10.4	13.2	12.3
Clerical/sales	12.5	20.5	15.6	16.2
Crafts	22.2	20.8	15.8	17.3
Operatives	18.1	9.7	16.4	15.3
Service	14.3	6.7	10.9	10.4
Agriculture	3.1	—	0.9	1.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.08	0.16	0.62	0.85
		Females		
Professionals	21.2	22.7	31.7	28.2
Managers	17.0	11.7	12.2	12.7
Clerical/sales	37.2	35.8	30.7	32.8
Crafts	2.8	1.3	5.1	3.9
Operatives	10.2	15.3	4.4	7.7
Service	11.6	13.3	16.0	14.8
Agriculture	—	—	—	—
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.12	0.23	0.59	0.93

[a]*Source:* U.S. Department of Labor, Jan. 1991, table 823.

TABLE 15. MARITAL STATUS OF THE ADULT CORE JEWISH POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX; AND PERCENT NEVER MARRIED BY JEWISH IDENTITY

Age	Marital Status: Never Married	Married	Divorced/ Separated	Widowed	Total	U.S. White Pop. Percent Never Married[a]
			Core Jewish Males			
18–24	96.2	2.8	1.0	—	100.0	83.0
25–34	49.5	46.5	4.0	—	100.0	33.7
35–44	17.4	72.5	9.2	0.9	100.0	11.7
45–64	7.4	80.8	9.4	2.4	100.0	5.3
65 & over	3.1	82.1	3.4	11.3	100.0	4.0
All ages	26.4	64.2	6.1	3.3	100.0	24.1
U.S. white	24.1	66.2	7.2	2.6	100.0	
			Core Jewish Females			
18–24	85.4	11.7	2.9	—	100.0	68.2
25–34	31.2	60.9	7.2	0.8	100.0	20.4
35–44	11.4	74.3	13.8	0.5	100.0	7.2
45–64	4.5	72.9	14.9	7.7	100.0	4.0
65 & over	1.6	56.7	4.0	37.7	100.0	4.9
All ages	19.6	63.7	9.6	7.1	100.0	16.9
U.S. White	16.9	61.9	9.0	12.2	100.0	

Age	Percent Never Married: Core Jewish Males By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Core Jewish Females By Religion	Secular	By Choice
18–24	97.3	93.6	100.0	89.9	74.4	42.0
25–34	51.0	47.0	19.4	31.4	32.8	22.1
35–44	17.6	16.8	17.4	11.4	11.5	11.1
45–64	7.3	8.9	—	4.5	6.6	—
65 & over	3.2	3.8	—	1.7	—	—
All ages	24.8	34.4	13.7	17.9	27.4	15.4

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, May 1991, table 1.

TABLE 16. AVERAGE AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE BY CURRENT AGE, SEX, AND JEWISH IDENTITY, POPULATION AGE 18 AND OVER

	Core Jewish Population			
Age	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
		Males		
18–24	19.7	21.4	—	20.6
25–34	25.6	24.3	24.9	25.2
35–44	26.3	25.3	24.5	26.0
45–64	25.9	25.4	26.4	25.8
65 & over	27.0	25.5	25.0	26.8
All ages	26.3	25.0	25.2	26.0
		Females		
18–24	20.5	20.3	—	20.4
25–34	23.0	23.1	23.6	23.1
35–44	24.4	23.7	23.2	24.2
45–64	21.9	21.8	24.3	22.0
65 & over	24.3	22.4	25.0	24.2
All ages	23.4	22.6	23.8	23.3

TABLE 16.—*(Continued)*

Age	Non-Jewish Household Members			
	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
		Males		
18–24	21.0	21.1	20.9	20.9
25–34	22.5	22.5	24.2	23.8
35–44	26.7	25.0	26.9	26.4
45–64	25.4	23.7	25.4	25.1
65 & over	25.4	24.7	31.0	28.6
All ages	25.0	24.0	25.9	25.4
		Females		
18–24	17.8	19.6	18.6	18.8
25–34	20.6	21.5	23.8	22.9
35–44	21.8	22.6	24.1	23.4
45–64	19.8	20.7	23.6	21.9
65 & over	21.3	21.4	21.3	21.3
All ages	20.6	21.5	23.4	22.5

TABLE 17. NUMBER OF MARRIAGES, BY AGE, SEX, AND JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Age	Number of Marriages			Total Percent	Number of Marriages			Total Percent
	1	2	3+		1	2	3+	
	Males				Females			
	Total Core Jewish Population							
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	97.6	2.4	—	100.0	92.6	6.5	0.9	100.0
35–44	81.5	16.4	2.1	100.0	82.5	14.8	2.7	100.0
45–64	78.5	20.1	1.4	100.0	84.3	13.9	1.7	100.0
65 & over	83.0	11.6	5.4	100.0	90.1	8.9	1.0	100.0
Total	83.5	14.0	2.5	100.0	87.2	11.2	1.6	100.0
	Jews by Religion							
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	98.0	2.0	—	100.0	92.1	6.5	1.4	100.0
35–44	85.8	13.7	0.5	100.0	85.6	12.4	2.0	100.0
45–64	83.0	15.2	1.8	100.0	84.5	13.8	1.7	100.0
65 & over	83.9	10.9	5.2	100.0	89.5	9.6	1.0	100.0
Total	86.0	11.7	2.4	100.0	87.7	10.8	1.5	100.0
	Secular Jews							
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	96.6	3.4	—	100.0	92.8	7.2	—	100.0
35–44	68.7	24.6	6.7	100.0	69.2	26.5	4.5	100.0
45–64	63.2	36.8	—	100.0	82.1	15.2	2.6	100.0
65 & over	84.3	6.7	9.0	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
Total	76.3	20.0	3.6	100.0	84.6	13.5	1.9	100.0

TABLE 17.—*(Continued)*

Age	Number of Marriages			Total Percent	Number of Marriages			Total Percent
	1	2	3+		1	2	3+	
	Males				Females			
	Jews by Choice							
18–24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
25–34	100.0	—	—	100.0	96.2	3.8	—	100.0
35–44	80.5	17.3	2.2	100.0	31.3	11.9	5.7	100.0
45–64	30.9	69.1	—	100.0	87.5	12.5	—	100.0
65 & over	54.8	45.2	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
Total	61.8	37.4	0.8	100.0	88.3	9.8	1.9	100.0
	Total Non-Jewish Household Members							
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	89.9	10.1	—	100.0	88.6	11.0	0.3	100.0
35–44	76.4	17.2	6.4	100.0	76.4	19.2	4.5	100.0
45–64	75.5	19.4	5.1	100.0	72.4	21.3	6.3	100.0
65 & over	84.1	10.1	5.8	100.0	63.5	32.9	3.5	100.0
Total	81.6	14.4	4.1	100.0	79.1	17.5	3.5	100.0

TABLE 18. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN PER WOMAN, BY AGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY

	Core Jewish Population				
Age	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Women[a]
15–19	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
20–24	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4
25–29	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.5	1.0
30–34	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.1	1.5
35–39	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.9
40–44	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.6	2.1
45–49	1.9	1.7	2.3	1.9	2.3
50–54	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.8
55–59	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.6	3.0
60–64	2.2	2.1	1.4	2.2	2.9
65 & over	2.0	1.8	2.8	2.0	2.4
Total	1.6	1.2	1.7	1.5	

	Non-Jewish Household Members			
Age	Was Jewish	Jewish Descent/ Other Religion	Gentiles	Total
15–19	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
20–24	1.2	0.3	0.2	0.3
25–29	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.8
30–34	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.3
35–39	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.6
40–44	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.7
45–49	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.3
50–54	2.2	3.3	2.4	2.5
55–59	3.0	5.0	2.5	2.8
60–64	2.1	2.8	3.9	3.2
65 & over	2.4	2.6	3.1	2.7
Total	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.6

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, May 1989, table 1; U.S. Bureau of the Census, March 1984, table 270.

TABLE 19. CURRENT DENOMINATION OF CORE JEWISH ADULT RESPONDENTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Current Denomination	Jewish Identity			
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
Orthodox	7.0	0.8	7.9	6.1
Conservative	39.6	13.0	32.4	35.1
Reform	42.7	11.3	51.3	38.0
Reconstructionist	1.5	0.9	0.6	1.3
Just Jewish	8.0	21.7	5.7	10.1
Something else	1.1	52.4	2.1	9.4
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 20. CURRENT DENOMINATION OF ADULT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE JEWS BY RELIGION, BY AGE (PERCENT)

Current Denomination	Age			
	18–24	25–44	45–64	65 & over
Orthodox	9.7	5.2	4.8	11.8
Conservative	43.1	32.6	42.4	48.6
Reform	34.8	50.6	42.6	31.2
Reconstructionist	1.1	1.6	2.7	0.2
Just Jewish	10.3	8.0	7.2	7.8
Something else	1.0	2.0	0.3	0.5
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 21. DENOMINATION RAISED OF CORE JEWISH ADULT RESPONDENTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Denomination Raised	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
Orthodox	26.6	6.9	2.5	22.5
Conservative	38.0	21.7	7.8	34.3
Reform	28.4	21.5	1.4	26.3
Reconstructionist	0.4	0.1	—	0.3
Just Jewish	5.6	16.2	7.5	7.4
Something else	0.7	33.6	80.8	9.3
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 22. CURRENT DENOMINATION OF RESPONDENTS WHO WERE BORN JEWS, BY DENOMINATION RAISED (PERCENT)

Denomination Raised	Current Denomination				
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Reconstructionist	Just Jewish
Orthodox	89.1	32.4	11.7	17.1	15.5
Conservative	4.8	60.1	25.9	44.4	18.4
Reform	0.4	4.2	58.6	13.9	14.5
Reconstructionist	—	—	0.3	17.2	—
Just Jewish	5.0	1.5	2.4	5.5	46.7
Non-Jewish	0.7	1.7	1.0	1.9	5.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 23. JEWISH RITUAL PRACTICES AND ATTACHMENTS OF ADULT RESPONDENTS, CORE JEWS AND NON-JEWS (PERCENT)

Practices	Always/ Usually	Sometimes	Never	Total Percent
		Core Jews		
Sabbath candles	16.9	20.9	62.2	100.0
Attend seder	61.7	18.5	19.8	100.0
Separate dishes	13.0	4.8	81.4	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	59.7	14.4	25.9	100.0
Christmas tree	27.6	10.1	62.3	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				48.5
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				28.2
Percent who have been to Israel				26.2
Percent who are synagogue members				32.9
		Non-Jews		
Sabbath candles	1.6	10.7	87.7	100.0
Attend seder	10.3	13.9	75.8	100.0
Separate dishes	9.8	7.5	82.7	100.0
Hanukkah candles	9.4	10.7	79.9	100.0
Christmas tree	81.8	8.1	10.1	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				11.6
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				5.1
Percent who have been to Israel				5.5
Percent who are synagogue members				3.2

[a]Includes 0.8 percent who are vegetarians.

TABLE 24. JEWISH RITUAL PRACTICES AND ATTACHMENTS OF CORE JEWISH ADULT RESPONDENTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Practices	Always/ Usually	Sometimes	Never	Total Percent
		Jews by Religion		
Sabbath candles	19.4	23.3	57.3	100.0
Attend seder	71.4	17.6	11.0	100.0
Separate dishes	14.7	4.4	80.1	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	70.2	13.2	16.6	100.0
Christmas tree	20.7	7.2	72.1	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				57.8
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				32.8
Percent who have been to Israel				30.8
Percent who are synagogue members				38.5
		Secular Jews		
Sabbath candles	3.1	8.4	88.5	100.0
Attend seder	22.1	21.5	56.4	100.0
Separate dishes	4.3	3.2	91.5	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	15.9	17.9	66.1	100.0
Christmas tree	55.9	19.5	24.6	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				10.3
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				7.8
Percent who have been to Israel				10.9
Percent who are synagogue members				5.6
		Jews by Choice		
Sabbath candles	32.9	35.2	31.8	100.0
Attend seder	63.9	20.7	15.4	100.0
Separate dishes	19.4	20.1	59.4	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	64.5	21.3	14.1	100.0
Christmas tree	27.3	21.6	51.1	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				71.5
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				38.1
Percent who have been to Israel				11.4
Percent who are synagogue members				55.5

[a]Includes small percentage who are vegetarians.

Jewish Population in the United States, 1991

THE "CORE" JEWISH POPULATION OF the United States was estimated to be 5.5 million in 1990. This figure is based on the findings of the Council of Jewish Federations' 1990 National Jewish Population Survey[1] and represents a modest growth from the 5.4 million reported in the 1970/71 National Jewish Population Study, the last previous effort of such magnitude.

The NJPS-1990 total is about 5 percent less than the 5.8 million total figure for 1991 derived by the alternate method used to estimate the size of the American Jewish community, i.e., adding together all local community counts. The difference, small though it is, between the national and aggregated-local figures is probably explained by the lag in data gathering and reporting on the local level, as well as definitional problems. As more local communities conduct studies over the next few years, declines and increases that have already occurred will be documented. The updated statistics will show national and regional patterns more in line with NJPS findings. Based upon trends revealed in NJPS data, declines can be expected to be reported in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and most of the Midwestern states. Higher community totals are anticipated for Colorado, Arizona, and the Pacific Northwest.

The NJPS used a scientifically selected sample to project a total number for the United States, but could not provide accurate information on the state and local levels. Therefore, as in past years, in this article we have based local, state, and regional population figures on the usual estimating procedures.

While the Jewish federations are the chief reporting bodies, their service areas vary in size and may represent several towns, one county, or an aggregate of several counties. In some cases we have subdivided federation areas to reflect the more natural geographic boundaries. Some estimates, from areas without federations, have been provided by local rabbis and other informed Jewish community leaders. In still other cases, the figures that have been updated are from past estimates provided by United Jewish Appeal field representatives. Finally, for smaller communities where no recent estimates are available, figures are based on extrapolation from older data. The estimates are for the resident Jewish population, including those in private households and in institutional settings. Non-Jewish family members have been excluded from the total.

The state and regional totals shown in Appendix tables 1 and 2 are derived by

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[1]See "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," by Sidney Goldstein, elsewhere in this volume, and Barry A. Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1991).

summing the individual estimates shown in table 3 and then making three adjustments. First, communities of less than 100 are added. Second, duplicated counts within states are eliminated. Third, communities whose population resides in two or more states (e.g., Kansas City and Washington, D.C.) are distributed accordingly.

Because population estimating is not an exact science, the reader should be aware that in cases where a figure differs from last year's, the increase or decrease did not come about suddenly but occurred over a period of time and has just now been substantiated. Similarly, the results of a completed local demographic study often change the previously reported Jewish population figure. This should be understood as either an updated calculation of gradual demographic change or a correction of a faulty older estimate.

In determining Jewish population, communities count both affiliated and nonaffiliated residents who are "core" Jews as defined in NJPS.[2] In most cases, counts are made by households, with that number multiplied by the average number of self-defined Jewish persons per household. Similarly to NJPS, most communities also include those born and raised as Jews but who at present consider themselves as having no religion. As stated above, non-Jews living in Jewish households, primarily the non-Jewish spouses and non-Jewish children, are not included in the 1991 estimates presented in the appendix below.

Local Population Changes

The community reporting the largest numeric decline was that of the New York City area[3]—in absolute numbers a drop of about 220,000 since the last estimate was provided. The percentage losses in Jewish population were greatest in the middle-aged suburban regions of Nassau County, Westchester County, and the borough of Queens. It is believed that an aging population in these areas that frequently relocates to Florida is not being replaced in large enough numbers by young persons. Conversely, a Jewish population increase of nearly 15 percent over the past decade took place in Manhattan. These changes were revealed in a recently completed demographic study, further details of which will be provided in next year's article.

Just outside of the immediate New York City area lies Rockland County, the community reporting the largest numerical increase in Jewish population. This suburban county, which was included in the 1991 New York population study, increased its total number by more than 23,000 since the last estimate was provided.

Rapid Jewish population growth also occurred in southeast Florida, where the areas of Hollywood and Boca Raton-Delray Beach grew by at least 5,000. While increases in the former were substantiated in a recently completed population study,

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[2]Born Jews who report adherence to Judaism, Jews by choice, and born Jews without a current religion ("secular" Jews).

[3]The five boroughs of New York City plus Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties.

the latter is a projected estimate indicative of continued growth. The increase in the Ft. Lauderdale figure is largely based on a reevaluation of its federation list and the methodology used to determine the full-year as against part-year residents. Finally, Miami-Dade County's losses continue to reflect ongoing demographic change, the primary features of which are an aging population, an increase in the numbers of non-Jewish immigrants settling in Jewish areas, and a preference by Jewish newcomers to Florida to locate further up the coast in Broward and Palm Beach counties.

Other declines in excess of 2,000 were reported in Bridgeport and Hartford, Connecticut. As the latter now includes the Meriden area in its total, the actual number for the Hartford area remains the same. Other more moderate declines occurred primarily in Northeastern and Midwestern communities: Champaign-Urbana, Illinois; Gary, Terre-Haute, and Marion, Indiana; Leominister, Massachusetts; Flint, Michigan; Vineland, New Jersey; Kingston and Auburn, New York; and Altoona, Hazelton, and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Communities outside these regions that declined included Louisville, Kentucky; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Charleston, South Carolina; Greenville, Mississippi; Chattanooga and Memphis, Tennessee; and Montgomery, Alabama. The Memphis losses were due to the elimination of non-Jews in Jewish households from the community count.

As indicated by the southeast Florida Jewish population increases, growth communities were mainly in the South and West: Portland, Oregon; Atlanta, Georgia; Santa Barbara and Ventura County, California; Denver, Colorado; Dallas, Texas; Brevard County and Sarasota, Florida; Durham-Chapel Hill and Raleigh, North Carolina; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Other parts of the country showing increases included Wichita, Kansas; South Bend, Indiana; Cape Cod, Massachusetts; Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Columbus, Ohio. The new figures for both Dallas and Columbus are reported in their newly completed Jewish population studies. Some of the declines in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Connecticut reflect the elimination of duplicated counts between communities. In California, the reduction in the Orange County figure is based upon a reevaluation of its federation lists, while the increases in the San Francisco Bay Area reflect the addition of persons born Jewish with no current religion. Inclusion of this group is in keeping with the NJPS definition of the core Jewish population.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Percent of Total
Alabama	9,000	4,041,000	0.2
Alaska	2,400	550,000	0.4
Arizona	72,000	3,665,000	2.0
Arkansas	1,800	2,351,000	0.1
California	923,000	29,760,000	3.1
Colorado	51,000	3,294,000	1.5
Connecticut	106,000	3,287,000	3.2
Delaware	9,500	666,000	1.4
District of Columbia	25,500	607,000	4.2
Florida	593,000	12,938,000	4.6
Georgia	74,000	6,478,000	1.1
Hawaii	7,000	1,108,000	0.6
Idaho	500	1,007,000	(z)
Illinois	257,000	11,431,000	2.2
Indiana	18,000	5,544,000	0.3
Iowa	6,000	2,777,000	0.2
Kansas	14,000	2,478,000	0.6
Kentucky	11,500	3,685,000	0.3
Louisiana	15,500	4,220,000	0.4
Maine	8,500	1,228,000	0.7
Maryland	211,000	4,781,000	4.4
Massachusetts	275,000	6,016,000	4.6
Michigan	107,000	9,295,000	1.2
Minnesota	30,500	4,375,000	0.7
Mississippi	1,700	2,573,000	0.1
Missouri	61,500	5,117,000	1.2
Montana	500	799,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,500	1,578,000	0.5
Nevada	20,500	1,202,000	1.7
New Hampshire	7,000	1,109,000	0.6
New Jersey	426,000	7,730,000	5.5
New Mexico	6,000	1,515,000	0.4
New York	1,644,000	17,990,000	9.1

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Percent of Total
North Carolina	16,500	6,629,000	0.2
North Dakota	700	639,000	0.1
Ohio	131,000	10,847,000	1.2
Oklahoma	5,500	3,146,000	0.2
Oregon	15,500	2,842,000	0.5
Pennsylvania	330,000	11,882,000	2.8
Rhode Island	16,000	1,003,000	1.6
South Carolina	8,000	3,487,000	0.2
South Dakota	350	696,000	0.1
Tennessee	17,500	4,877,000	0.4
Texas	109,000	16,987,000	0.6
Utah	3,000	1,723,000	0.2
Vermont	4,500	563,000	0.8
Virginia	67,500	6,187,000	1.1
Washington	33,000	4,867,000	0.7
West Virginia	2,500	1,793,000	0.1
Wisconsin	34,500	4,892,000	0.7
Wyoming	500	454,000	(z)
U.S. TOTAL	**5,798,000	248,710,000	2.3

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
*Resident population, April 1, 1990. (*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports,* series P-25, no. 1044.)
**Exclusive of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands which previously reported Jewish populations of 1,500 and 350, respectively.
(z) Figure is less than 0.1 and rounds to 0.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1991

Region	Total Population	Percent Distribution	Jewish Population	Percent Distribution
Northeast	50,809,000	20.4	2,817,000	48.6
New England	13,207,000	5.3	417,000	7.2
Middle Atlantic	37,602,000	15.1	2,400,000	41.4
Midwest	59,669,000	24.0	669,000	11.5
East North Central	42,009,000	16.9	548,000	9.5
West North Central	17,660,000	7.1	121,000	2.1
South	85,446,000	34.4	1,180,000	20.3
South Atlantic	43,567,000	17.5	1,008,000	17.4
East South Central	15,176,000	6.1	40,000	0.7
West South Central	26,703,000	10.7	132,000	2.3
West	52,786,000	21.2	1,133,000	19.5
Mountain	13,659,000	5.5	153,000	2.6
Pacific	39,127,000	15.7	980,000	16.9
TOTALS	248,710,000	100.0	5,798,000	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1991 (ESTIMATED)

State and City	Jewish Population
ALABAMA	
*Birmingham	5,100
Decatur (incl. in Florence total)	
*Dothan	150
Florence	150
Huntsville	750
**Mobile	1,100
**Montgomery	1,100
Selma	100
Sheffield (incl. in Florence total)	
Tuscaloosa	300
Tuscumbia (incl. in Florence total)	
ALASKA	
**Anchorage	2,000
***Fairbanks	210
Juneau	100
Ketchikan (incl. in Juneau total)	
ARIZONA	
Cochise County	250
*Flagstaff	250
Lake Havesu City	100
*Phoenix	50,000
Prescott	150
*Tucson	20,000
Yuma	100
ARKANSAS	
Fayetteville	120
Hot Springs	200
**Little Rock	1,300
CALIFORNIA	
Antelope Valley	700
Bakersfield-Kern County	1,400
Berkeley-Contra Costa County (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	
*Chico	500
Corona (incl. in Riverside total)	
***El Centro	125
*Eureka	500
Fairfield	800
Fontana (incl. in San Bernardino total)	
*Fresno	2,000
Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
Long Beach (also incl. in Los Angeles total)[N]	13,500
Los Angeles Metro Area	501,000
Merced	170
*Modesto	450
Monterey Peninsula	1,500
Murietta Hot Springs	400
*Napa	450
Oakland-Alameda County (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	
Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)	
Orange County	80,000
Palmdale (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
Palm Springs[N]	9,850
Palo Alto-South Peninsula (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	
Pasadena (also incl. in L.A. Metro Area total)	2,000
Petaluma (listed under Sonoma County-S.F. Bay Area)	
Pomona Valley[N]	6,750
*Redding	145
Riverside	1,620
Sacramento[N]	12,500
Salinas	500
San Bernardino area	2,800
*San Diego	70,000
San Francisco Bay Area[N]	210,000
San Francisco	49,500
N. Peninsula	24,500
S. Peninsula	21,000
San Jose	33,000
Alameda County	32,500
Contra Costa County	22,000
Marin County	18,500
Sonoma County	9,000
*San Jose (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	

[N]See Notes below. *Includes entire county. **Includes all of 2 counties. ***Figure not updated.

State and City	Jewish Population
*San Luis Obispo	1,500
*Santa Barbara	5,000
*Santa Cruz	1,200
Santa Maria	300
Santa Monica (also incl. in Los Angeles total)	8,000
Santa Rosa (listed under Sonoma County-S.F. Bay Area)	
Sonoma County (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	
*Stockton	1,600
Sun City	200
Tulare & Kings counties	500
***Vallejo	400
*Ventura County	9,000
COLORADO	
Aspen	250
Boulder (incl. in Denver total)	
Colorado Springs	1,500
Denver[N]	46,000
Evergreen	100
*Ft. Collins	1,000
*Grand Junction	250
Greely (incl. in Ft. Collins total)	
Loveland (incl. in Ft. Collins total)	
Pueblo	250
Telluride	100
Vail	100
CONNECTICUT	
Bridgeport[N]	13,500
Bristol (incl. in Hartford total)	
Cheshire (incl. in Meriden total)	
Colchester	575
Danbury[N]	3,500
Danielson	100
Darien (incl. in Stamford total)	
Greenwich	3,900
Hartford[N]	26,000
Hebron (incl. in Colchester total)	
Lebanon (incl. in Colchester total)	
Lower Middlesex County[N]	1,475
Manchester (incl. in Hartford total)	
Meriden[N]	3,000
Middletown	1,300
New Britain (incl. in Hartford total)	
New Haven[N]	28,000
New London[N]	4,000
New Milford	400
Newtown (incl. in Danbury total)	
Norwalk[N]	9,500
Norwich (also incl. in New London total)	1,800
Putnam	100
Rockville (incl. in Hartford total)	
Shelton (incl. in Valley area)	
Southington (incl. in Meriden total)	
Stamford/New Canaan	11,100
Storrs (incl. in Willimantic total)	
Torrington	560
Valley area[N]	550
Wallingford (also incl. in Meriden total)	500
Waterbury[N]	2,700
Westport (incl. in Norwalk total)	
Willimantic area	700
DELAWARE	
Dover[N]	650
Wilmington (incl. rest of state)	9,500
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
Greater Washington	165,000
FLORIDA	
Boca Raton-Delray Beach (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Brevard County	3,750
*Crystal River	100
**Daytona Beach	2,500
Fort Lauderdale (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Fort Myers (incl. in Lee County)	
Fort Pierce	500
Gainesville	1,200
Hollywood (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Jacksonville	7,300
Key West	170
*Lakeland	800
Lee County	4,000
*Miami-Dade County (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Naples	750
***Ocala	100
Orlando[N]	18,000
Palm Beach County (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Pasco County	1,000
**Pensacola	775
*Port Charlotte-Punta Gorda	400

State and City	Jewish Population
*St. Petersburg-Clearwater	9,500
**Sarasota	10,000
Southeast Florida	515,000
Dade County	189,000
Hollywood[N]	66,000
Ft. Lauderdale[N]	140,000
Boca Raton-Delray Beach	60,000
Palm Beach County (excl. Boca Raton-Delray Beach)	60,000
Stuart-Port St. Lucie	3,000
Tallahassee	1,500
*Tampa	12,500
Venice (incl. in Sarasota total)	
*Vero Beach	300
Winter Haven (incl. in Lakeland total)	
GEORGIA	
Albany	350
Athens	300
Atlanta Metro Area	67,000
Augusta[N]	1,400
Brunswick	100
**Columbus	1,000
**Dalton	230
Fitzgerald-Cordele	125
Macon	900
*Savannah	2,750
**Valdosta	110
HAWAII	
Hilo	280
Honolulu (includes all of Oahu)	6,400
Kuaii	100
Maui	210
IDAHO	
**Boise	220
Lewiston	100
Moscow (incl. in Lewiston total)	
ILLINOIS	
Aurora area	500
Bloomington-Normal	170
Carbondale (also incl. in S. Ill. total)	100
*Champaign-Urbana	1,300
Chicago Metro Area[N]	248,000
**Danville	100
*Decatur	200
*DeKalb	200
East St. Louis (incl. in S. Ill.)	
Elgin[N]	600
Freeport (incl. in Rockford total)	
*Joliet	850
Kankakee	200
*Peoria	950
Quad Cities[N]	1,250
**Quincy	125
Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
Rockford[N]	1,000
Southern Illinois[N]	815
*Springfield	1,000
Waukegan	500
INDIANA	
Bloomington	1,000
Elkart (incl. in South Bend total)	
Evansville	520
**Ft. Wayne	1,085
**Gary-Northwest Indiana	2,200
**Indianapolis	10,000
**Lafayette	500
*Michigan City	280
Muncie	160
South Bend[N]	1,900
*Terre Haute	250
IOWA	
Ames (also incl. in Des Moines total)	200
Cedar Rapids	430
Council Bluffs (also incl. in Omaha, Neb. total)	150
Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
*Des Moines	2,800
*Iowa City	1,200
**Sioux City	600
*Waterloo	170
KANSAS	
Kansas City (incl. in Kansas City, Mo.)	
Lawrence	175
Manhattan	100
*Topeka	500
Wichita[N]	1,300
KENTUCKY	
Covington/Newport (incl. in Cincinnati, Ohio total)	
Lexington[N]	2,000
*Louisville	8,700
Paducah (incl. in S. Ill.)	
LOUISIANA	
Alexandria	250
Baton Rouge[N]	1,200

State and City	Jewish Population
Lafayette (incl. in S. Central La.)	
Lake Charles	300
Monroe	525
**New Orleans	12,000
*Shreveport	960
South Central La.[N]	250
MAINE	
Augusta	500
Bangor	1,250
Biddeford-Saco (incl. in S. Maine)	
Brunswick-Bath (incl. in S. Maine)	
Lewiston-Auburn	500
Portland	3,900
Rockland	110
Southern Maine (incl. Portland)[N]	5,500
Waterville	300
MARYLAND	
*Annapolis	2,000
**Baltimore	94,500
Cumberland	265
***Easton Park area[N]	100
*Frederick	600
*Hagerstown	300
*Harford County	1,000
Howard County	7,200
Montgomery and Prince Georges counties	104,500
Ocean City	100
**Salisbury	400
Silver Spring (incl. in Montgomery County)	
MASSACHUSETTS	
Amherst	750
Andover[N]	3,000
Athol area (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Attleboro	200
Beverly (incl. in Lynn total)	
Boston Metro Region[N]	228,000
Brockton[N]	8,000
Brookline (also incl. in Boston total)	26,000
Cape Cod-Barnstable County	3,000
Clinton (incl. in Worcester County)	
Fall River	1,780
Falmouth (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Fitchburg (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Framingham (incl. in Boston total)	
Gardner (incl. in Athol total)	
Gloucester (also incl. in Lynn total)	450
Great Barrington (incl. in Pittsfield total)	
*Greenfield	900
Haverhill	1,500
Holyoke	550
*Hyannis (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Lawrence (incl. in Andover total)	
Leominster (also incl. in Worcester County total)	400
Lowell area	2,000
Lynn-North Shore area[N]	25,000
*Martha's Vineyard	260
New Bedford[N]	3,000
Newburyport	280
Newton (also incl. in Boston total)	34,000
North Adams (incl. in N. Berkshire County)	
North Berkshire County	750
Northampton	700
Peabody (incl. in Lynn total)	
Pittsfield-Berkshire County	3,100
Plymouth	500
Provincetown (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Salem (incl. in Lynn total)	
Southbridge (also incl. in Worcester County total)	105
Springfield[N]	11,000
Taunton area	1,200
Webster (also incl. in Worcester County total)	125
Worcester area[N]	10,100
*Worcester County	13,700
MICHIGAN	
*Ann Arbor	5,000
Battle Creek	140
Bay City	280
Benton Harbor	450
**Detroit Metro Area	94,000
*Flint	1,725
*Grand Rapids	1,500
**Jackson	300
*Kalamazoo	1,000
*Lansing	2,100

State and City	Jewish Population
*Marquette County	150
Midland	150
Mt. Clemens (incl. in Detroit total)	
Mt. Pleasant[N]	150
*Muskegon	220
*Saginaw	200
MINNESOTA	
**Duluth	500
*Minneapolis	22,000
Rochester	400
**St. Paul	7,500
Winona (incl. in LaCrosse, Wis. total)	
MISSISSIPPI	
Biloxi-Gulfport	150
**Greenville	270
**Hattiesburg	120
**Jackson	700
MISSOURI	
Columbia	350
Hannibal (incl. in Quincy, Ill. total)	
Kansas City Metro Area	19,100
*St. Joseph	265
**St. Louis	53,500
Springfield	285
MONTANA	
*Billings	200
Butte	110
Helena (incl. in Butte total)	
NEBRASKA	
Grand Island-Hastings (incl. in Lincoln total)	
Lincoln	1,000
Omaha[N]	6,500
NEVADA	
Carson City (incl. in Reno total)	
*Las Vegas	19,000
**Reno	1,400
NEW HAMPSHIRE	
Bethlehem	100
Claremont	150
Concord	450
Dover area	600
Exeter (incl. in Portsmouth total)	
Franconia (incl. in Bethlehem total)	
Hanover-Lebanon	360
*Keene	150
**Laconia	270
Littleton (incl. in Bethlehem total)	
Manchester area	2,500
Nashua area	1,000
Portsmouth area	950
Rochester (incl. in Dover total)	
Salem (also incl. in Andover, Mass. total)	150
NEW JERSEY	
Asbury Park (incl. in Monmouth County)	
*Atlantic City (incl. Atlantic County)	15,800
Bayonne (listed under Hudson County)	
Bergen County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	85,000
***Bridgeton	325
Bridgewater (incl. in Somerset County)	
Camden (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Cherry Hill[N]	28,000
Edison (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Elizabeth (incl. in Union County)	
Englewood (incl. in Bergen County)	
Essex County[N] (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	76,200
North Essex	15,600
East Essex	10,800
South Essex	20,300
Livingston	12,600
West Orange-Orange	16,900
Flemington	900
Freehold (incl. in Monmouth County)	
Gloucester (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Hoboken (listed under Hudson County)	
Hudson County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	13,950
Bayonne	2,500
Jersey City	5,700
Hoboken	750
North Hudson County[N]	5,000
Jersey City (listed under Hudson County)	
Lakewood (incl. in Ocean County)	
Livingston (incl. in Essex County)	
Middlesex County[N] (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	58,000
Millville	135

State and City	Jewish Population
Monmouth County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	33,600
Morris County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	33,500
Morristown (incl. in Morris County)	
Mt. Holly (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Newark (incl. in Essex County)	
New Brunswick (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Northeastern N.J.[N]	367,000
Ocean County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	9,500
Passaic-Clifton (also incl. in Passaic County total)	8,000
Passaic County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	18,700
Paterson (incl. in Passaic County)	
Perth Amboy (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Phillipsburg (incl. in Easton, Pa. total)	
Plainfield (incl. in Union County)	
Princeton	3,000
Salem	100
Somerset County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	7,900
Somerville (incl. in Somerset County)	
Sussex County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	4,100
Toms River (incl. in Ocean County)	
Trenton[N]	6,000
Union County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	30,000
Vineland[N]	2,200
Warren County	400
Wayne (incl. in Passaic County)	
Wildwood	425
Willingboro (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
NEW MEXICO	
*Albuquerque	4,000
Las Cruces	525
Los Alamos	250
Santa Fe	900
NEW YORK	
*Albany	12,000
Amenia (incl. in Poughkeepsie)	
Amsterdam	450
*Auburn	115
Beacon (incl. in Poughkeepsie)	
*Binghamton (incl. all Broome County)	3,000
Brewster (incl. in Putnam County)	
*Buffalo	18,125
Canandaigua (incl. in Geneva total)	
Catskill	200
Corning (incl. in Elmira total)	
*Cortland	200
Dunkirk	100
Ellenville	1,600
Elmira[N]	1,100
Fleischmanns	115
Fredonia (incl. in Dunkirk total)	
Geneva	300
Glens Falls[N]	800
*Gloversville	380
*Herkimer	180
Highland Falls (incl in Orange County)	
Hudson	470
*Ithaca	1,250
Kingston[N]	4,300
Lake George (incl. in Glens Falls total)	
Liberty (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	2,100
Middletown (incl. in Orange County)	
Monroe (incl. in Orange County)	
Monticello (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	2,400
Newark (incl. in Geneva total)	
Newburgh (incl. in Orange County)	
New Paltz (incl. in Kingston total)	
New York Metro Area[N]	1,450,000
Bronx	83,700
Brooklyn	379,000
Manhattan	314,500
Queens	238,000
Staten Island	33,700
Nassau County	207,000
Suffolk County	100,000
Westchester County	94,000

State and City	Jewish Population
Niagara Falls	400
Olean	120
**Oneonta	250
Orange County	10,000
Pawling	105
Plattsburg	260
Port Jervis (also incl. in Orange County total)	560
Potsdam	200
*Poughkeepsie	6,500
Putnam County	1,000
**Rochester	22,500
Rockland County	83,100
Rome	205
Saratoga Springs	500
**Schenectady	5,200
South Fallsburg (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	1,100
Sullivan County	7,425
Syracuse[N]	9,000
Troy area	800
Utica[N]	1,900
Walden (incl. in Orange County)	
Watertown	120
Woodstock (incl. in Kingston total)	
NORTH CAROLINA	
Asheville[N]	1,350
**Chapel Hill-Durham	3,000
Charlotte[N]	4,000
Elizabethtown (incl. in Wilmington total)	
*Fayetteville area	300
Gastonia	240
Goldsboro	120
*Greensboro	2,700
Greenville	300
Hendersonville	1[illegible]
**Hickory	100
High Point (incl. in Greensboro total)	
Jacksonville (incl. in Wilmington total)	
Raleigh	3,000
Whiteville (incl. in Wilmington total)	
Wilmington area	500
Winston-Salem	440
NORTH DAKOTA	
Fargo	500
Grand Forks	150
OHIO	
**Akron	6,000
Athens	100
Bowling Green (also incl. in Toledo total)	120
Butler County	900
**Canton	2,400
Cincinnati[N]	23,000
**Cleveland[N]	65,000
*Columbus	15,600
**Dayton	6,000
East Liverpool	200
Elyria	200
Fremont (incl. in Sandusky total)	
Hamilton (incl. in Butler County)	
*Lima	365
Lorain	600
Mansfield	180
Marietta (incl. in Parkersburg, W.Va. total)	
Marion	110
Middletown (incl. in Butler County)	
New Philadelphia (incl. in Canton total)	
Norwalk (incl. in Sandusky total)	
Oberlin (incl. in Elyria total)	
Oxford (incl. in Butler County)	
**Sandusky	130
Springfield	200
*Steubenville	175
Toledo[N]	6,300
Warren (also incl. in Youngstown total)	400
Wooster	135
Youngstown[N]	4,000
*Zanesville	100
OKLAHOMA	
Norman (also incl. in Oklahoma City total)	350
**Oklahoma City	2,500
*Tulsa	2,750
OREGON	
*Corvallis	150
Eugene	2,300
**Medford	500
Portland	12,000
**Salem	250
PENNSYLVANIA	
Allentown	6,000
*Altoona	350
Ambridge[N]	350
Beaver Falls (incl. in Upper Beaver County)	
Bethlehem	810
**Bradford	100

State and City	Jewish Population
Bucks County (lower portion)[N]	14,500
*Butler	250
**Chambersburg	400
Chester (incl. in Phila. total)	
Chester County (also incl. in Phila. total)	4,000
Coatesville (incl. in Chester County)	
Easton area	1,200
*Erie	800
Farrell (incl. in Sharon total)	
Greensburg (also incl. in Pittsburgh total)	425
**Harrisburg	6,500
Hazleton area	300
Honesdale (incl. in Wayne County)	
Jeanette (incl. in Greensburg total)	
**Johnstown	415
Lancaster	2,100
*Lebanon	350
Lewisburg (incl. in Sunbury total)	
Lock Haven (incl. in Williamsport total)	
McKeesport (incl. in Pittsburgh total)	
New Castle	200
Norristown (incl. in Philadelphia total)	
**Oil City	100
Oxford-Kennett Square (incl. in Chester County)	
Philadelphia area[N]	250,000
Phoenixville (incl. in Chester County)	
Pike County	300
Pittsburgh[N]	45,000
Pottstown	700
Pottsville	250
*Reading	2,800
*Scranton	3,100
Shamokin (incl. in Sunbury total)	
Sharon (also incl. in Youngstown, Ohio total)	260
State College	550
*Stroudsburg	400
Sunbury[N]	200
Tamaqua (incl. in Hazleton total)	
Uniontown area	250
Upper Beaver County	200
**Washington (also incl. in Pittsburgh total)	250
Wayne County	500
Waynesburg (incl. in Washington total)	
West Chester (also incl. in Chester County)	300
Wilkes-Barre[N]	3,200
**Williamsport	350
York	1,500
RHODE ISLAND	
Cranston (incl. in Providence total)	
Kingston (incl. in Washington County)	
Newport-Middletown	700
Providence area	14,200
Washington County	1,200
Westerly (incl. in Washington County)	
SOUTH CAROLINA	
*Charleston	3,500
**Columbia	2,000
Florence area	210
Georgetown (incl. in Myrtle Beach total)	
Greenville	800
Kingstree (incl. in Sumter total)	
**Myrtle Beach	425
***Orangeburg County	105
Rock Hill (incl. in Charlotte total)	
*Spartanburg	320
Sumter[N]	175
SOUTH DAKOTA	
Sioux Falls	135
TENNESSEE	
Bristol (incl. in Johnson City total)	
Chattanooga	1,350
Johnson City	210
Kingsport (incl. in Johnson City total)	
Knoxville	1,350
Memphis	8,800
Nashville	5,600
Oak Ridge	200
TEXAS	
Amarillo[N]	140
*Austin	5,000
Bay City (incl. in Wharton total)	
Baytown	300

State and City	Jewish Population
Beaumont	800
*Brownsville	325
College Station-Bryan	400
*Corpus Christi	1,400
**Dallas	35,000
El Paso	4,900
*Ft. Worth	5,000
Galveston	800
Harlingen (incl. in Brownsville total)	
**Houston[N]	42,000
Kilgore (incl. in Longview total)	
Laredo	160
Longview	150
*Lubbock	225
Lufkin (incl. in Longview total)	
Marshall (incl. in Longview total)	
*McAllen	475
Midland-Odessa	150
Paris (incl. in Sherman-Denison total)	
Port Arthur	100
San Angelo	100
*San Antonio	10,000
Sherman-Denison	100
Tyler	450
Waco[N]	450
**Wharton	100
Wichita Falls	260
UTAH	
Ogden	150
*Salt Lake City	2,800
VERMONT	
Bennington	100
Brattleboro	150
Burlington	3,000
Montpelier-Barre	500
Newport (incl. in St. Johnsbury total)	
Rutland	550
**St. Johnsbury	100
VIRGINIA	
Alexandria (incl. Falls Church, Arlington, and Fairfax counties)	35,100
Arlington (incl. in Alexandria total)	
Blacksburg	300
Charlottesville	950
Chesapeake (incl. in Portsmouth total)	
Colonial Heights (incl. in Petersburg total)	
Danville	100
Fredericksburg	140
Hampton (incl. in Newport News)	
Harrisonburg (incl. in Staunton total)	
Lynchburg area	275
**Martinsville	130
Newport News-Hampton[N]	2,000
Norfolk-Virginia Beach	18,000
Petersburg area	550
Portsmouth-Suffolk (also incl. in Norfolk total)	1,900
Radford (incl. in Blacksburg total)	
Richmond[N]	8,000
Roanoke	1,050
Staunton[N]	375
Williamsburg (incl. in Newport News total)	
Winchester[N]	145
WASHINGTON	
Bellingham	300
Ellensburg (incl. in Yakima total)	
Longview-Kelso (incl. in Portland, Oreg. total)	
Olympia	300
Port Angeles	100
Pullman (incl. in Moscow, Idaho total)	
*Seattle[N]	29,300
Spokane	800
*Tacoma	1,100
Tri Cities[N]	180
Vancouver (incl. in Portland, Oreg. total)	
**Yakima	100
WEST VIRGINIA	
Bluefield-Princeton	225
*Charleston	1,000
Clarksburg	115
Fairmont (incl. in Clarksburg total)	
Huntington[N]	275
Morgantown	150
**Wheeling	300
WISCONSIN	
Appleton	250
Beloit	120
Green Bay	240
*Kenosha	200
LaCrosse	120
*Madison	4,500
Milwaukee[N]	28,000
Oshkosh	150
*Racine	375
Sheboygan	150
Superior (also incl. in Duluth, Minn. total)	100

State and City	Jewish Population
Waukesha (incl. in Milwaukee total)	
Wausau[N]	240
WYOMING	
Casper	100
Cheyenne	230
Laramie (incl. in Cheyenne total)	

Notes

CALIFORNIA

Long Beach—includes in L.A. County: Long Beach, Signal Hill, Cerritos, Lakewood, Rosmoor and [illegible]ian Gardens. Also includes in Orange County: Los Alamitas, Cypress, Seal B[illegible] and Huntington Harbor.

Palm Springs—includes Palm Springs, Desert Hot Springs, Cathedral City, Palm Desert, and Rancho Mirage.

Pomona Valley—includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, and Upland. Portion also included in Los Angeles total.

Sacramento—includes Yolo, Placer, El Dorado, and Sacramento counties.

San Francisco Bay Area—North Peninsula includes northern San Mateo County. South Peninsula includes southern San Mateo County and towns of Palo Alto and Los Altos in Santa Clara County. San Jose includes remainder of Santa Clara County.

COLORADO

Denver—includes Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, and Jefferson counties.

CONNECTICUT

Bridgeport—includes Monroe, Easton, Trumbull, Fairfield, Bridgeport, Shelton, Stratford and part of Milford.

Danbury—includes Danbury, Bethel, New Fairfield, Brookfield, Sherman, Newtown, Redding, Ridgefield, and part of Wilton; also includes some towns in neighboring Putnam County, New York.

Hartford—includes most of Hartford County and Vernon, Rockville, Ellington, and Tolland in Tolland County, and Meriden area of New Haven County.

Lower Middlesex County—includes Branford, Guilford, Madison, Clinton, Westbrook, Old Saybrook. Portion of this area also included in New London and New Haven totals.

Meriden—includes Meriden, Southington, Cheshire and Wallingford. Most included in Hartford total and a portion also included in New Haven total.

New Haven—includes New Haven, East Haven, Guilford, Branford, Madison, North Haven, Hamden, West Haven, Milford, Orange, Woodbridge, Bethany, Derby, Ansonia and Cheshire.

New London—includes central and southern New London County. Also includes part of Lower Middlesex County and part of Windham County.

Norwalk—includes Norwalk, Weston, Westport, East Norwalk, Darien, Wilton, part of Georgetown and part of New Canaan.

Valley Area—includes Ansonia, Derby, Shelton, Oxford, Seymour, and Beacon Falls. Portion also included in Bridgeport and New Haven totals.

Waterbury—includes Middlebury, Southbury, Naugatuck, Watertown, Waterbury, Oakville and Woodbury.

DELAWARE

Dover—includes most of central and southern Delaware.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Greater Washington—includes Montgomery and Prince Georges counties in Maryland, Arlington County, Fairfax County, Falls Church, and Alexandria in Virginia.

FLORIDA

Ft. Lauderdale—includes Ft. Lauderdale, Pompano Beach, Deerfield Beach, Tamarac, Margate, and other towns in northern Broward County.

Hollywood—includes Hollywood, Hallandale, Dania, Davie, Pembroke, and other towns in southern Broward County.

Orlando—includes all of Orange and Seminole counties, and part of Lake County.

GEORGIA

Augusta—includes Burke, Columbia, and Richmond counties and part of Aiken County, South Carolina.

ILLINOIS

Chicago—includes all of Cook and DuPage counties and Southern Lake County. For a total of Jewish population of the Chicago Metropolitan Region, please include Northwest Indiana, Joliet, Aurora, Elgin, and Waukegan totals.

Elgin—includes northern Kane County, southern McHenry County, and western edge of Cook County.

Quad Cities—includes Rock Island, Moline (Ill.), Davenport, and Bettendorf (Iowa).

Rockford—includes Winnebago, Boone, and Stephenson counties.

Southern Illinois—includes lower portion of Illinois below Carlinville, adjacent western portion of Kentucky, and adjacent portion of southeastern Missouri.

INDIANA

South Bend—includes St. Joseph and Elkhart counties and part of Berrien County, Mich.

KANSAS

Wichita—includes Sedgwick County and towns of Salina, Dodge City, Great Bend, Liberal, Russel, and Hays.

KENTUCKY

Lexington—includes Fayette, Bourbon, Scott, Clark, Woodford, Madison, Pulaski, and Jessamin counties.

LOUISIANA

Baton Rouge—includes E. Baton Rouge, Ascencion, Livingston, St. Landry, Iberville, Pt. Coupee, and W. Baton Rouge parishes.

South Central—includes Abbeville, Lafayette, New Iberia, Crowley, Opelousus, Houma, Morgan City, Thibadoux, and Franklin.

MAINE

Southern Maine—includes York, Cumberland, and Sagadahoc counties.

MARYLAND

Easton Park Area—includes towns in Caroline, Kent, Queen Annes, and Talbot counties.

MASSACHUSETTS

Andover—includes Andover, N. Andover, Boxford, Lawrence, Methuen, Tewksbury, Dracut, and town of Salem, New Hampshire.

Boston Metropolitan Region—includes all towns south and west of Boston within approximately 30 miles, and all towns north of Boston within approximately 20 miles. All towns formerly part of Framingham area are now included in Boston total.

Brockton—includes Avon, Brockton, Easton, Bridgewater, Whitman, and West Bridgewater. Also included in Boston total.

Lynn—includes Lynn, Saugus, Nahant, Swampscott, Lynnfield, Peabody, Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, Danvers, Middleton, Wenham, Topsfield, Hamilton, Manchester, Ipswich, Essex, Gloucester, and Rockport. Also included in Boston total.

New Bedford—includes New Bedford, Dartmouth, Fairhaven, and Mattapoisett.

Springfield—includes Springfield, Longmeadow, E. Longmeadow, Hampden, Wilbraham, Agwam, and West Springfield.

Worcester—includes Worcester, Northborough, Westborough, Shrewsbury, Boylston, West Boylston, Holden, Paxton, Leicester, Auburn, Millbury, and Grafton. Also included in the Worcester County total.

MICHIGAN

Mt. Pleasant—includes towns in Isabella, Mecosta, Gladwin, and Gratiot counties.

NEBRASKA

Omaha—includes Douglas and Sarpy counties. Also includes Pottawatomie County, Iowa.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Laconia—includes Laconia, Plymouth, Meredith, Conway, and Franklin.

NEW JERSEY

Cherry Hill—includes Camden, Burlington, and Gloucester counties.

Essex County—East Essex includes Belleville, Bloomfield, East Orange, Irvington, Newark, and Nutley in Essex County, and Kearney in Hudson County. North Essex includes Caldwell, Cedar Grove, Essex Fells, Fairfield, Glen Ridge, Montclair, North Caldwell, Roseland, Verona, and West Caldwell. South Essex includes Maplewood, Millburn, Short Hills, and South Orange in Essex County, and Springfield in Union County.

Middlesex County—includes in Somerset County: Kendall Park, Somerset, and Franklin; in Mercer County: Hightstown; and all of Middlesex County.

Northeastern N.J.—includes Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, Somerset, Union, Hunterdon, Sussex, Monmouth, and Ocean counties.

North Hudson County—includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, and Woodcliff.

Somerset County—includes most of Somerset County and a portion of Hunterdon County.

Trenton—includes most of Mercer County.

Union County—includes all of Union County except Springfield. Also includes a few towns in adjacent areas of Somerset and Middlesex counties.

Vineland—includes most of Cumberland County and towns in neighboring counties adjacent to Vineland.

NEW YORK

Elmira—includes Chemung, Tioga, and Schuyler counties. Also includes Tioga and Bradford counties in Pennsylvania.

Glens Falls—includes Warren and Washington counties, lower Essex County, and upper Saratoga County.

Kingston—includes eastern half of Ulster County.

New York Metropolitan Area—includes the five boroughs of New York City, Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk counties. For a total Jewish population of the New York metropolitan region, please include Fairfield County, Connecticut; Rockland, Putnam, and Orange counties, New York; and Northeastern New Jersey.

Syracuse—includes Onondaga County, Western Madison County, and most of Oswego County.

Utica—includes southeastern third of Oneida County.

NORTH CAROLINA

Asheville—includes Buncombe, Haywood, and Madison counties.

Charlotte—includes Mecklenberg County. Also includes Lancaster and York counties in South Carolina.

OHIO

Cincinnati—includes Hamilton and Butler counties. Also includes Boone, Campbell, and Kenton counties in Kentucky.

Cleveland—for a total Jewish population of the Cleveland metropolitan region, please include Elyria, Lorain, and Akron totals.

Toledo—includes Fulton, Lucas, and Wood counties. Also includes Monroe and Lenawee counties, Michigan.

Youngstown—includes Mahoning and Trumbull counties. Also includes Mercer County, Pennsylvania.

PENNSYLVANIA

Ambridge—includes lower Beaver County and adjacent areas of Allegheny County. Also included in Pittsburgh total.

Bucks County (lower portion)—includes Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Penndel, Warrington, Yardley, Richboro, Feasterville, Middletown, Southampton, and Holland. Also included in Philadelphia total.

Philadelphia—includes Philadelphia City, Montgomery County, Delaware County, Chester County, and Bucks County. For a total Jewish population of the Philadelphia metropolitan region, please include the Cherry Hill, Salem, and Trenton areas of New Jersey, and the Wilmington area of Delaware.

Pittsburgh—includes all of Allegheny County and adjacent portions of Washington, Westmoreland, and Beaver counties.

Sunbury—includes Shamokin, Lewisburg, Milton, Selinsgrove, and Sunbury.

Wilkes-Barre—includes all of Lucerne County except southern portion, which is included in Hazleton totals.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Sumter—includes towns in Sumter, Lee, Clarendon, and Williamsburg counties.

TEXAS

Amarillo—includes Canyon, Childress, Borger, Dumas, Memphis, Pampa, Vega, and Hereford in Texas, and Portales, New Mexico.

Houston—includes Harris, Montgomery, and Ft. Bend counties, and parts of Brazoria and Galveston counties.

Waco—includes Mclellan, Coryell, Bell, Falls, Hamilton, and Hill counties.

VIRGINIA

Newport News—includes Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg, James City, York County, and Poquosson County.

Richmond—includes Richmond City, Henrico County, and Chesterfield County.

Staunton—includes towns in Augusta, Page, Shenendoah, Rockingham, Bath, and Highland counties.

Winchester—includes towns in Winchester, Frederick, Clark, and Warren counties, Virginia; and Hardy and Jefferson counties, West Virginia.

WASHINGTON

Seattle—includes King County and adjacent portions of Snohomish and Kitsap counties.
Tri Cities—includes Pasco, Richland, and Kennewick.

WEST VIRGINIA

Huntington—includes nearby towns in Ohio and Kentucky.

WISCONSIN

Milwaukee—includes Milwaukee County, eastern Waukesha County, and southern Ozaukee County.
Wausau—includes Stevens Point, Marshfield, Antigo, and Rhinelander.

World Jewish Population, 1990

Updated Estimates

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS UPDATES, for the end of 1990, of the Jewish population estimates for the various countries of the world.[1] The estimates reflect some of the results of a prolonged and ongoing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry.[2] Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of a worldwide set of estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties.

Over 96 percent of world Jewry is concentrated in ten countries. The aggregate of these ten major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of the size of total world Jewry, estimated at 12.8 million persons in 1990. The country figures for 1990 were updated from those for 1989 in accordance with the known or estimated changes in the interval—migrations, vital events (births and deaths), and identificational changes (accessions and secessions). In addition, corrections were introduced in the light of newly accrued information on Jewish populations. Corresponding corrections were also applied retrospectively to the 1989 figures, which appear below in revised summary (see table 1), so as to allow adequate comparison with the 1990 estimates.

During the year 1990 under review here, operations of data collection and analysis relevant to Jewish population estimates were in planning or already under way in

[1]The previous estimates, as of 1989, were published in AJYB 1991, vol. 91, pp. 441–65.

[2]Many of these activities have been carried out by, or in coordination with, the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The authors acknowledge with thanks the collaboration of the many institutions and individuals in the different countries who have supplied information for this update. The paper was revised during DellaPergola's stay at the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

several countries. Some of this ongoing research is part of a coordinated effort to update the sociodemographic profile of world Jewry at the outset of the 1990s.[3] Two important sources recently yielded results on major Jewish populations: the official population census of the Soviet Union held in 1989, and the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) in the United States completed in 1990.[4] The respective results basically confirmed the estimates we had reported in previous AJYB volumes and, perhaps more importantly, our interpretation of the trends now prevailing in the demography of world Jewry. At the same time, these new data highlighted the increasing complexity of the sociodemographic and identificational processes underlying the definition of Jewish populations—hence the estimates of their sizes. While we address below some of these conceptual problems, users of population estimates should be aware of these difficulties and of the consequent limitations of the estimates.

Concepts and Definitions

In many respects Jewish populations share in the general difficulties met when trying to define, identify, and enumerate minority groups. Difficulties are augmented by the uniquely blended character of Jewry, with its religious, ethnic, cultural, historical, and other components, as well as by the wide geographical scatter and distinctive socioeconomic structure of Jewish groups.

In contemporary societies experiencing intense processes of secularization, acculturation, and social interaction, the ideational (and statistical) boundaries between different religious, ethnic, or cultural groups are no longer clearly and rigidly defined, as they may have been in the past. Multiple bases of identification between individual and community can coexist. Since group identity is not regulated by legal provisions, individuals may change their preferences during their lifetimes. Individuals of Jewish origin may feel varying degrees of personal attachment to Judaism or the Jewish community, and may choose to cut the respective links, whether or not formally adopting another group identity. These identificational changes are reversible: persons who disclaim being Jews at some stage of life may change their minds later. Even at the same time, some may admit or deny their Jewishness under different circumstances. Another element of this general picture

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[3]Following an international conference in 1987 on Jewish population problems, sponsored by the major Jewish organizations worldwide, an International Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) was established. Cochaired by Dr. Roberto Bachi of the Hebrew University and Dr. Sidney Goldstein of Brown University, ISAC's function is to coordinate and monitor Jewish population data collection internationally.

[4]The 1989–1990 National Jewish Population Survey was conducted under the auspices of the Council of Jewish Federations with the supervision of a National Technical Advisory Committee chaired by Dr. Sidney Goldstein of Brown University. Dr. Barry Kosmin of the North American Jewish Data Bank and City University of New York Graduate Center directed the study.

is the growing frequency of mixed marriage. Some of the couples in interfaith marriages prefer to unify the home, one of the partners adopting the group identity of the other; other couples do not. Children of these marriages are likely to be exposed to the different religious and cultural backgrounds of their parents, out of which their own eventual identities will be shaped.

These fluid and voluntaristic patterns of group identification imply that the concept of Jewish population is no longer simple and uniform but offers ground for alternative interpretations and even some confusion and misunderstanding—especially when large and heterogeneous amounts of data are handled and compared. In an attempt to clarify these matters, we briefly outline here one conceptual framework—applied throughout this article—that appears useful in the sociodemographic study of contemporary Jewries.

Core Jewish population. In contemporary social-scientific research on Jews, including demography, it is usual to consider as Jews all those who, when asked, identify themselves as such; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews. We define this aggregate as the "core" Jewish population. It includes all those who converted to Judaism or joined the Jewish group informally. It excludes those of Jewish descent who formally adopted another religion, as well as other individuals who did not convert out but currently disclaim being Jewish. This categorization is intentionally comprehensive, reflecting subjective feelings rather than halakhic (Rabbinic) or other legal definitions.[5] Our definition of a person as a Jew does not depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior—in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The core Jewish population is the conceptual target of our population estimates. In estimating the size of a Jewish population, we include, in principle, all marginal individuals who have not ceased to consider themselves Jewish.

Extended Jewish population. We adopt the term "extended" for the sum of the core Jewish population and all other persons of Jewish parentage who are not Jews currently (or at the time of investigation). These non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have themselves adopted another religion, even though they may claim to be still Jews ethnically; (b) other persons of Jewish parentage who disclaim to be Jews currently. In survey-taking it is usual, for both conceptual and practical reasons, to consider in this context parentage only and not any more distant ancestry.

Enlarged Jewish population. We designate by the term "enlarged" the sum of the

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[5]The definition of "Who is a Jew?" according to Halakhah constituted the cardinal criterion of Jewish identification across history. Normatively, it continues to bind all Orthodox and many other Jewish communities in contemporary times. The constraints typical of empirical research do not allow for ascertaining on a case-by-case basis the halakhic identity of each individual included in surveys. Therefore, it is usual in most social-scientific research to rely on the subjective criteria defined here.

core Jewish population and all other persons of Jewish parentage included in the extended Jewish population, as well as their non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). For both conceptual and practical reasons, this definition does not include any non-Jewish relatives living elsewhere.

These various definitions point to the importance of the household as the primary—and in social terms truly significant—reference unit for the study of Jewish demography. For demographic research purposes, "eligible Jewish households" are all those including at least one individual who is either currently Jewish or of Jewish parentage.[6] Ideally, information should be collected on all the members of Jewish households, Jews and others, to enable researchers to apply the above—and perhaps additional—definitions and to estimate the respective sizes of the various groups and subgroups involved.

In the past, core, extended, and enlarged Jewish populations tended to overlap; today, however, the respective sizes and characteristics may be quite different. One relevant example is provided by the findings of the U.S. NJPS reported below in the section on American Jewry. The time perspective employed in these definitions mainly relates to the two generations of the surveyed individuals and their parents. Other, more extended generational or time perspectives might be considered in the attempt to estimate the size of populations of Jewish origin, based on prolonged genealogical reconstructions. Such approaches, albeit of some interest for historical research, will not be considered here.

Another definitional framework stems from the special position of Israel as a country of destination for Jewish international migration, recently chiefly from the (former) Soviet Union. Israel's most distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants is provided by the Law of Return (*Hok Hashvut*), first passed in 1950 and amended in 1954 and 1970. That basic law awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights in Israel. According to the current, amended version of the Law of Return, a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform). Conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some "ethnic" Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for Law of Return purposes. Significantly, the law extends its provisions to all current Jews, and to their Jewish or non-Jewish spouses, children and grandchildren, as well as to the spouses of such children and grandchildren. It can readily be seen, therefore, that due to its three-generational time perspective and lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a wide population. This population may be of wider scope not only than the core but even than the enlarged Jewish population, as defined above.

Finally, it should be noted that the actual contents and patterns of Jewish identity and behavior may widely vary within the core Jewish population itself, from strongly committed to very marginal. The respective differentials are associated with

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[6]This approach was followed in the two U.S. National Jewish Population Studies of 1970–1971 and 1989–1990.

sociodemographic trends that may ultimately affect Jewish population size. These issues are, however, beyond the scope of the present article, which is mostly concerned with the bare attempt to estimate the size of core Jewish populations in the countries of the world.

Jewish Population Trends

The world's Jews are highly dispersed. In most countries their number is now rather small and they constitute no more than a minute fraction of the entire population. Consequently, though Diaspora Jews tend to cluster in large cities, they are greatly exposed to assimilation. While the major thrust of the assimilatory process tends to be associated with secessions from the Jewish population (whether formal or informal), there also are gains through accessions of non-Jewish-born persons. It is the net balance of these identificational changes that matters demographically. Outmarriages may involve demographic losses to the Jewish population if less than half of the children are themselves Jews. Moreover, in the longer run, the overall cohesion of a Jewish community may be affected, with consequences for its size as well. What counts in the demographic balance of Diaspora Jewries is "effectively Jewish" fertility and birthrate, including only those newborns who are Jews.[7]

The Jews in most countries of the Diaspora are characterized by very low fertility, which is the major cause for great population aging. An increased proportion of elderly in the population actually implies not only many deceased and a higher death rate, but also a reduced proportion of persons of reproductive age and therefore a relatively lower birthrate. While there are differences in the levels of these demographic factors between the Jews in various regions and countries, in all major Diaspora populations the joint balance of the natural and identificational changes is now close to nil or outrightly negative, with Jewish deaths frequently outnumbering Jewish births. These negative tendencies have been taken into account in updating the estimates of the Jews in many countries.

A notable paradox of Diaspora Jewish demography is that growth of an enlarged Jewish population—following intense outmarriage and an increasing number of persons in households with both Jewish and non-Jewish members—may go hand in hand with stagnation or even diminution of the respective core Jewish population. A case in point is provided by the recent demographic transformations of the Jewish population in the United States (see below).

With regard to the balance of external migrations, there is no regularity among the various Diaspora populations or even in the same population over time. In 1990, the overall volume of international migrations of Jews was much greater than in

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[7]A fuller discussion of the subject can be found in U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," AJYB 1981, vol. 81, pp. 61–117; and, by the same author, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984).

earlier years, after many of the previous restrictions on the outflow of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union were lifted. Where the migratory balance is positive—e.g., in North America—it counteracts or even outweighs any numerically negative influence of internal demographic developments. Where the migratory balance is negative, as in Eastern Europe, it may cause or aggravate the decrease of a Jewish population. Any attempt to understand the current and potential flow of Jewish international migration should make reference not only to the internal transformations of Jewish populations and societies but also to the major political and socioeconomic trends shaping world society in general.[8]

In contrast, in Israel the impact of outmarriage and secessions from Judaism is statistically negligible. The fact that Israeli society has a Jewish majority encourages accessions (formal or informal) of non-Jewish members in mixed immigrant households. A positive net balance of accessions and secessions results. Moreover, until the early 1980s and again since 1990 Israel had a positive migration balance.

Jewish fertility levels in Israel are comparatively high, and the Jewish age structure is significantly younger than among Diaspora Jews and the general populations of the other developed countries. The previously substantial fertility differentials between Jews ingathered in Israel from Asia-Africa and Europe-America are no longer in evidence. Remarkably, European Jews in Israel have not participated in the drastic fertility decline that has characterized the developed nations and particularly the Diaspora Jews during the last few decades, but have actually raised their fertility somewhat. In recent years, both major origin groups among Israel's Jews have displayed a fertility level surpassing not only the vast majority of Diaspora Jewry but also the general populations in other developed countries.

In the overall demographic balance of World Jewry, the natural increase of Israel has, so far, made up for the losses in the Diaspora. But such compensation will not be possible for much longer. As a consequence of the intensifying demographic deficit in the Diaspora, a trend toward some reduction in the total size of world Jewry is probably setting in. The relative share of Israel among that total is on the increase, regardless of *aliyah* and *yeridah* (immigration to, and emigration from, Israel), which obviously constitute only internal transfers within the global Jewish framework.

Sources of Data and Estimation Problems

Available demographic information on Jews is deficient in both quantity and quality. Besides the conceptual problems discussed above, difficulties involved in

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[8]Sergio DellaPergola, "*Aliyah* and Other Jewish Migrations: Toward an Integrated Perspective," in U.O. Schmelz and G. Nathan, eds., *Studies in the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi, Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. 30 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 172–209; and, by the same author, "Mass *Aliyah*: A Thing of the Past?" *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 51, 1989, pp. 96–114.

estimating the size of Jewish populations reflect the substantive complexity of Diaspora demography. Relevant aspects are the great geographical scattering of Jews—a factor that makes multiple data collection mandatory but also hinders its feasibility; and the Jews' unusually strong demographic dynamics in many respects—migrations, social mobility, family formation patterns (including outmarriage), etc. More specific difficulties in estimating the up-to-date size of Jewish populations are due to measurement problems.

Particular difficulties exist with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe, whose Jewish populations were drastically reduced during and after World War II. Prolonged antireligious policies in these countries have had a negative effect on the identity of genealogically Jewish persons, many of whom may have severed, insofar as it depends on themselves, all links with Jewishness. The resulting uncertainties have led to wishful thinking in terms of exaggerated estimates, and account for the widely differing numbers of Jews that have been circulated for these countries.

Figures on Jews from population censuses are unavailable for most Diaspora communities, though they do exist for some important ones. In general, the practice of self-determination is followed in relevant censuses and surveys which inquire into religion or ethnicity, thus providing results close to our definitions of a "core" or an "extended" Jewish population—the latter, if religion and ethnicity can be cross-classified, as in Canada. Even where census statistics on Jews are forthcoming, they are usually scant, because the Jews are a small minority of the total population. There have been instances where detailed tabulations on Jews were undertaken, through Jewish initiative, from official census material; examples are Canada, Argentina, and South Africa. In some countries where Jewishness is associated with actual or feared discrimination, individuals may prefer not to describe themselves as Jews. Elsewhere, as has happened in some Latin American countries, non-Jews may be erroneously included as Jews. These problems require statistical evaluation whose feasibility and conclusiveness depend on the relevant information available. Reliable figures are currently forthcoming for the Jews of Israel from official statistics.

Surveys are the major way of obtaining comprehensive information on Jewish populations in the absence of official censuses. In the Diaspora, Jewish-sponsored surveys have the additional advantage of being able to inquire into matters of specifically Jewish interest, e.g., Jewish education, religious practices, and attitudes. However, since they address themselves to a small and scattered minority with identification problems, surveys are not easy to conduct competently and may encounter difficulties with regard to both coverage and response, especially from marginal Jews. Again, these aspects require evaluation. Over the last decades, countrywide Jewish population surveys were undertaken in the United States, South Africa, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Local surveys were carried out in many cities of the United States, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and some smaller communities. However, these several initiatives have so far been uncoordinated with regard to content and method.

In certain countries or localities, Jewish community registers include the largest part of the Jewish population. Often the same communities keep records of Jewish vital events—especially marriages performed with a Jewish ceremony and Jewish burials. However, communal registers tend to cover mixed households insufficiently. In addition, although the amount and quality of updating varies from place to place, communal registers generally lag behind the actual situation of the respective Jewish populations.

Finally, many estimates of Jewish Diaspora populations for which no solid data from censuses or surveys exist are regrettably of unspecified or dubious source and methodology. This situation contrasts with the amount and quality of demographic information available for Jews in Israel. Israel took its latest census in 1983, but has constantly updated statistics of its Jewish population size and characteristics.

Besides the conceptual and measurement difficulties affecting baseline figures on Jewish population size, similar problems recur with regard to the updating information which should account for all the various types of changes in the time elapsed since that base date. Age-sex-specific models can be of use for vital events and identificational changes. They may be applied after studying the evolution of the respective or similar Jewish populations. With regard to the migratory balance in any updating interval, concrete information must be gathered, because of the above-mentioned irregularity, over time, in the intensity of many migratory streams.

Not a few Jews have some residential status in more than one country. This may be due to business requirements, professional assignments in foreign countries, climatic differences between countries, periods of prolonged transit for migrants, etc. The danger of double-counting or omissions is inherent in such situations. This is particularly critical regarding some countries in Central and tropical South America, Africa, and South or East Asia, where the relatively few Jews living permanently may be outnumbered by a floating population of temporary Jewish residents or tourists. As far as possible we have tried to account for such persons only once, giving precedence to the usual country of residence.

The problem is even more acute with regard to residential status in more than one locality of the same country. This may adversely affect—through omissions or, more likely, double-counting—the accuracy of national Jewish population estimates obtained by summing up reports for individual localities.

Presentation of Data

The detailed estimates of Jewish population distribution in each continent and country (tables 2–7 below) aim at the concept of "core" Jewish population as defined earlier in this article. The reader will recall that "extended" or "enlarged" Jewish populations, including Jews, non-Jews of Jewish parentage, and respective non-Jewish household members, may result in significantly higher estimates. Separate figures are provided for each country with at least 100 resident Jews. Residual estimates of "other" Jews living in smaller communities supplement some of the

continental totals. For each of the reported countries, the four columns in the following tables provide the United Nations estimate of mid-year 1990 total population,[9] the estimated end-1990 Jewish population, the proportion of Jews per 1,000 of total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate.

There is wide variation in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries it would be best to indicate a range (minimum-maximum) rather than a definite figure for the number of Jews. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. Yet, the figures actually indicated for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range of the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely to the accuracy of the estimate.

ACCURACY RATING

The three main elements which affect the accuracy of each estimate are the nature and quality of the base data, the recency of the base data, and the method of updating. A simple code combining these elements is used to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of the Jewish population figures reported in the detailed tables below. The code indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates: (A) base figure derived from countrywide census or relatively reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period; (B) base figure derived from less accurate but recent countrywide Jewish population investigation; partial information on population movements in the intervening period; (C) base figure derived from less recent sources, and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of Jewish population in the particular country; updating according to demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends; (D) base figure essentially conjectural; no reliable updating procedure. In categories (A), (B), and (C), the years in which the base figures or important partial updates were obtained are also stated. For countries whose Jewish population estimate of 1990 was not only updated but also revised in the light of improved information, the sign "X" is appended to the accuracy rating.

Distribution of World Jewish Population by Major Regions

Table 1 gives an overall picture of Jewish population for the end of 1990 as compared to 1989. For 1989 the originally published estimates are presented along with somewhat revised figures that take into account, retrospectively, the correc-

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[9]See United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *World Population Prospects 1990*, Population Studies no. 120 (New York, 1991). The figures reflect the 1990 UN revision of world population estimates.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, BY CONTINENTS AND MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS, 1989 AND 1990

Region	1989			1990		% Change 1989–1990
	Original	Revised				
	Abs. N.	Abs. N.	Percent	Abs. N.	Percent	
World	12,810,300	12,813,800	100.0	12,806,400	100.0	−0.1
Diaspora	9,093,200	9,096,700	71.0	8,859,700	69.2	−2.6
Israel	3,717,100	3,717,100	29.0	3,946,700	30.8	+6.2
America,						
Total	6,261,700	6,261,700	48.9	6,278,400	49.0	+0.3
North[a]	5,825,000	5,825,000	45.5	5,845,000	45.6	+0.3
Central	46,700	46,700	0.4	46,700	0.4	—
South	390,000	390,000	3.0	386,700	3.0	−0.8
Europe,						
Total[b]	2,558,400	2,558,400	20.0	2,307,300	18.0	−9.8
EC	1,019,200[b]	1,019,200[b]	8.0	999,600	7.8	−1.9
West, other	52,300[b]	52,300[b]	0.4	44,000	0.3	−15.9
East and Balkans[c]	1,486,900	1,486,900	11.6	1,263,700	9.9	−15.0
Asia, Total	3,750,700	3,750,900	29.3	3,979,400	31.1	+6.1
Israel	3,717,100	3,717,100	29.0	3,946,700	30.8	+6.2
Rest[c]	33,600	33,800	0.3	32,700	0.3	−3.3
Africa,						
Total	149,900	153,200	1.2	148,700	1.2	−2.9
North	12,700	11,000	0.1	10,600	0.1	−3.6
Central	22,100	27,100	0.2	23,100	0.2	−14.8
South[d]	115,100	115,100	0.9	115,000	0.9	−0.1
Oceania	89,600	89,600	0.7	92,600	0.7	+3.3

[a]U.S.A. and Canada.
[b]Including Jewish migrants in transit.
[c]The Asian regions of USSR and Turkey are included in "East Europe and Balkans."
[d]South Africa and Zimbabwe.

tions made in 1990 in certain country estimates, in the light of improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of the 1989 world Jewry's estimated size by 3,500, primarily due to a better estimate for Ethiopia. Some explanations are given below for the countries whose estimates were revised.

The size of world Jewry at the end of 1990 is assessed at 12,806,400. According to the revised figures, between 1989 and 1990 there was an estimated loss of 7,400 people, or about −0.1 percent. Despite all the imperfections in the estimates, it is clear that world Jewry has reached "zero population growth" or is slightly shrinking, with the natural increase in Israel barely or insufficiently compensating for the demographic decline in the Diaspora.

The number of Jews in Israel rose from a figure of 3,717,100 in 1989 to 3,946,700 at the end of 1990—an increase of 229,600 people, or 6.2 percent. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora declined from 9,096,700 (according to the revised figures) to 8,859,700—a decrease of 237,000 people, or 2.6 percent. These changes primarily reflect the upsurge of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. In 1990, the Israel-Diaspora estimated net migratory balance amounted to a gain of about 181,400 Jews for Israel. Internal demographic evolution produced further growth among the Jewish population in Israel and further declines in the Diaspora.

About half of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with over 45 percent in North America. Thirty-one percent live in Asia, excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey—nearly all of them in Israel. Europe, including the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey, accounts for less than one-fifth of the total. Less than 2 percent of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania. Among the major geographical regions listed in table 1, the number of Jews in Israel—and, consequently, in total Asia—increased in 1990. Moderate Jewish population gains were also estimated for North America and Oceania. Latin America, Europe, Africa, and the Asian countries other than Israel sustained decreases in Jewish population size. World Jewry constitutes about 2.4 per 1,000 of the world's total population. One in about 414 people in the world is a Jew.

Individual Countries

THE AMERICAS

In 1990 the total number of Jews in the American continents was somewhat more than six and a quarter million. The overwhelming majority (93 percent) resided in the United States and Canada, less than 1 percent lived in Central America (including Mexico), and about 6 percent lived in South America—with Argentina and Brazil the largest Jewish communities (see table 2).

United States. The 1989–1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS), sponsored by the Council of Jewish Federations and the North American Jewish Data Bank (NAJDB), provided the much awaited benchmark information about size and

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE AMERICAS, 1990

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Canada	26,521,000	310,000	11.7	B 1981–86
United States	249,224,000	5,535,000	22.2	A 1990
Total North America	275,865,000[a]	5,845,000	21.2	
Bahamas	253,000	300	1.2	C 1973
Costa Rica	3,015,000	2,000	0.7	C 1986
Cuba	10,608,000	700	0.1	C 1990
Dominican Republic	7,170,000	100	0.0	D
Guatemala	9,197,000	800	0.1	C 1983
Jamaica	2,456,000	300	0.1	B 1988
Mexico	88,598,000	35,000	0.4	C 1990
Netherlands Antilles	188,000	400	2.1	D
Panama	2,418,000	5,000	2.1	C 1990
Puerto Rico	3,480,000	1,500	0.4	C 1990
Virgin Islands	116,000	300	2.6	C 1986
Other	23,862,000	300	0.0	D
Total Central America	151,361,000	46,700	0.3	
Argentina	32,322,000	215,000	6.7	C 1990
Bolivia	7,314,000	700	0.1	B 1990
Brazil	150,368,000	100,000	0.7	C 1980
Chile	13,173,000	15,000	1.1	C 1988
Colombia	32,978,000	6,500	0.2	C 1986
Ecuador	10,587,000	900	0.1	C 1985
Paraguay	4,277,000	900	0.2	B 1990
Peru	21,550,000	3,300	0.2	B 1985
Suriname	422,000	200	0.5	B 1986
Uruguay	3,094,000	24,200	7.8	C 1990
Venezuela	19,735,000	20,000	1.0	C 1989
Total South America	296,716,000[a]	386,700	1.3	
Total	723,942,000	6,278,400	8.7	

[a]Including countries not listed separately.

characteristics of U.S. Jewry and the basis for subsequent updates. According to the official report of the results of this important national sample study,[10] the "core" Jewish population in the United States comprised 5,515,000 persons in the summer of 1990. Of these, 185,000 were converts to Judaism. An estimated 210,000 persons, not included in the previous figures, were born or raised as Jews but converted to another religion. A further 1,115,000 people, thereof 415,000 adults and 700,000 children below age 18, were of Jewish parentage but were not Jews themselves and followed a religion other than Judaism at the time of survey. All together, these various groups formed an "extended" Jewish population of 6,840,000. NJPS also covered 1,350,000 non-Jewish-born members of eligible (Jewish or mixed) households. The study's "enlarged" Jewish population thus consisted of about 8,200,000 persons.

Comparison with the results of the previous National Jewish Population Study, conducted in 1970–1971, is complicated by the fact that various versions were published of the 1970–71 results; moreover, there are margins of error when two sample studies are compared, especially if they were taken under differing circumstances 20 years apart. The 1990 Jewish population estimates are within the range of a sampling error of plus or minus 3.5 percent.[11] This means a range between 5.3 and 5.7 million for the core Jewish population. The 1970–71 estimates of the core Jewish population varied between 5.4 and 6.0 million persons.[12] Even if the lower 1970–71 estimate is preferred, it is sufficiently clear—and very relevant to the assessment of trends—that the core Jewish population hardly grew over the last 20 years, whereas the extended and especially the enlarged Jewish population in the United States increased significantly. This attests numerically to the strengthening of assimilatory trends and to intensifying sociodemographic integration of American Jews with the general population. The new data also reflect the use of more systematic random surveying methods, and the somewhat wider definition of eligible households in the 1989–1990 NJPS, in comparison to the 1970–1971 study. Referring again to our conceptual and definitional framework, it is worth noting that in

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[10]Barry A. Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg, Nava Lerer, Ariella Keysar, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1991).

[11]See Kosmin et al., p. 39.

[12]The 1970–1971 NJPS results were reported by the study director, Fred Massarik, in "National Jewish Population Study," AJYB 1974–75, vol. 75, pp. 296–97; and, by the same author, "The Boundary of Jewishness: Some Measures of Jewish Identity in the United States," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1973* (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 117–39. According to Massarik, the "core" Jewish population amounted to about 5.4 million, out of an "enlarged" Jewish population of about 5.9 million. A different set of estimates was prepared by the 1970–1971 NJPS chief statistician, Bernard Lazerwitz, in "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group: The U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography*, vol. 15, 1978, pp. 389–94. According to Lazerwitz, the U.S. Jewish population amounted to 5.8 million, plus or minus a sampling error of about 200,000. The matter was summarized in U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 32–36. Schmelz suggested a base figure of 5.6 million Jews for 1970.

1990 the core Jewish population comprised about two-thirds of the enlarged Jewish population in the U.S.; conversely, the latter exceeded the former by roughly one-half.

Over the whole 1970–1990 period, several hundred thousand Jews migrated to the United States, especially from the USSR, Israel, Iran, and Latin America. During fiscal years 1989 and 1990 alone, respectively 39,553 and 37,770 refugees from the Soviet Union were admitted to the United States.[13] The international migration balance of U.S. Jewry should have generated an actual increase of Jewish population size. The fact that the expected influence of international migration did not show up in the size of U.S. core Jewish population according to NJPS indicates that the balance of other factors of core population change over that whole 20-year period must have been somewhat negative. First detailed analyses of the new NJPS data actually provide evidence of low levels of Jewish fertility and the "effectively Jewish" birthrates, increasing outmarriage rates, declining rates of conversion to Judaism (or "choosing" Judaism), increasing rates of conversion from Judaism, rather low proportions of children of mixed marriages being identified as Jewish, and increasing aging among the Jewish population.[14] A recent temporary increase in the Jewish birthrate appears to have occurred, because the large cohorts born during the "baby boom" of the 1950s and early 1960s have been in the main procreative ages; however, this echo effect is about to fade away, as the much smaller cohorts born since the late 1960s reach the stage of parenthood.

Taking into account this evidence, our estimate of U.S. Jewish population size at the end of 1990 starts from the NJPS benchmark core Jewish population of 5,515,000; assumes that the current balance of demographic and identificational changes in the core Jewish population is overall close to nil; and attempts to account for Jewish immigration which arrived in the latter part of 1990, after completion of NJPS. Assuming a total net migration gain of about 50–60,000 from the USSR, Israel, and other origins for the whole of 1990, we apportioned 20,000 to the final months of 1990. We thus suggest a tentative estimate of 5,535,000 Jews in the United States at the end of 1990. This estimate is of course conditional on further detailed scrutiny and interpretation of the NJPS findings.

The research team of the NAJDB, which is responsible for the primary handling of NJPS data files, has also continued its yearly compilation of local Jewish population estimates. These are reported elsewhere in this volume.[15] NAJDB estimated the

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[13]Figures from U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1990, presented in unpublished table reported in Barry R. Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis of Their Linguistic and Economic Adjustment," paper prepared for the Sapir Forum, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Chicago, 1991); HIAS, news release, New York, Oct. 11, 1991.

[14]See the article by Sidney Goldstein in the present volume. See also U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in U.S. Jewish Demography*, Jewish Sociology Papers (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1988).

[15]The first in a new series of yearly compilations of local U.S. Jewish population estimates appeared in Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population

U.S. Jewish population in 1986 at 5,814,000, including "under 2 percent" non-Jewish household members. This was very close to our own pre-NJPS estimate of 5,700,000. The NAJDB estimate was updated as follows: 1987—5,943,700; 1988—5,935,000; 1989—5,944,000; 1990—5,981,000. These changes do not reflect actual sudden growths or declines, but rather corrections and adaptations made in the figures for several local communities. It should be realized that compilations of local estimates, even if as painstaking as in the case of the NAJDB, are subject to a great many local biases and tend to fall behind the actual pace of national trends. This is especially true in a context of vigorous internal migration, as in the United States. The new NJPS figure, in spite of sample-survey biases, provides a more reliable national Jewish population baseline.

Canada. In Canada the 1981 census enumerated 296,425 Jews according to religion. By adding 9,950 persons who reported "Jewish" as their single reply to the census question on ethnic origin, while not reporting any non-Jewish religion (such as Catholic, Anglican, etc.), the figure rises to 306,375. There were additional persons who did not report a non-Jewish religion but mentioned "Jewish" as part of a multiple response to the question on ethnic origin. It is likely that some of them were merely thinking in terms of ancestry and did not actually consider themselves as Jews at the time of the census. Yet, after including a reasonable portion of the latter group, a total core Jewish population of 310,000 was suggested for 1981. A further 5,140 Canadians who reported being Jewish by ethnic origin but identified with another religion were not included in our estimate.

The population census held in Canada in 1986 provided data on ethnic origins but not on religious groups. A total of 245,855 persons reported being Jewish as a single reply to the question on ethnic origin, as against 264,020 in the same category in 1981. A further 97,655 mentioned a Jewish origin as part of a multiple response to the 1986 question on ethnic origin, as compared to apparently 30,000–40,000 in 1981. Thus, a substantial increase in the number of Canadians reporting partially Jewish ancestry seemed to offset the decline in the number of those with a solely Jewish identification according to the ethnic criterion. Besides actual demographic and identificational trends, changes in the wording of the relevant questions in the two censuses may have influenced these variations in the size of the "ethnically" (or, in our terminology, "extended") Jewish population of Canada.[16]

The 1986 census data indicated that about 9,000 Jews migrated to Canada between 1981 and 1986; more immigration arrived in the following years. In the light of this admittedly partial evidence, and considering the increasingly aged Jewish population structure, it is suggested that a migratory surplus may have roughly

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in the United States, 1986," AJYB 1987, vol. 87, pp. 164–91. The 1991 update appears elsewhere in the present volume.

[16]Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada: Population: Ethnic Origin; Religion* (Ottawa, 1983, 1984); Statistics Canada, *Population by Ethnic Origin, 1986 Census: Canada, Provinces and Territories and Census Metropolitan Areas* (Ottawa, 1988).

offset the probably negative balance of internal evolution since the 1981 census. Consequently, the 1981 figure of 310,000 was kept unchanged throughout 1990. The 1991 census again included questions on both religion and ethnic origin, and its results will provide a new baseline for the estimate of Canada's Jewish population.

Central America. The estimate for Mexico was kept unchanged at 35,000. The official Mexican censuses have given widely varying figures—17,574 in 1950; 100,750 in 1960; 49,277 in 1970; 61,790 in 1980. It is generally admitted that the last three censuses mistakenly included among the Jews many thousands of non-Jews living outside the known regions of Jewish residence in that country. In 1990 a new census was undertaken, but the figure of Jews was not reported. A Jewish-sponsored population survey of Mexican Jewry was completed in 1991, and its analysis will contribute to refining the current estimate. Panama's Jewish population—the second largest in Central America—is estimated at about 5,000.

South America.[17] The Jewish population of Argentina, the largest in that geographical region, is marked by a negative balance of internal evolution. Since the 1960s, the balance of external migrations was strongly negative; after the restoration of a democratic regime in the early 1980s, emigration diminished and there was some return migration. In 1989, emigration increased again; in 1990, over 2,000 Jews migrated to Israel alone, while others possibly went to North America and Western Europe. Accordingly, the estimate for Argentinian Jewry was reduced from 218,000 in 1989 to 215,000 in 1990.

The official population census of Brazil in 1980 showed a figure of 91,795 Jews. Since it is possible that some otherwise identifying Jews failed to declare themselves as such in the census, a corrected estimate of 100,000 was adopted for 1980 and has been kept unchanged through 1990, assuming that the overall balance of vital events and external migrations was close to zero. The national figure of approximately 100,000 fits the admittedly rough estimates that are available for the size of local Jewish communities in Brazil.

On the strength of fragmentary information that is accumulating, the estimates for Uruguay and Peru were slightly reduced, while those for Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia were not changed.

EUROPE

Of the estimated over 2,300,000 Jews in Europe in 1990, 45 percent lived in Western Europe and 55 percent in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries—including the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey (see table 3). In 1990 Europe

[17]For a more detailed discussion of the region's Jewish population trends, see U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demography of Latin American Jewry," AJYB 1985, vol. 85, pp. 51–102; Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends of Latin American Jewry," in J. Laikin Elkin and G.W. Merks, eds., *The Jewish Presence in Latin America* (Boston, 1987), pp. 85–133.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE, 1990

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Belgium	9,845,000	31,800	3.2	C 1987
Denmark	5,143,000	6,400	1.2	C 1990
France	56,138,000	530,000	9.4	C 1990
Germany	77,573,000	40,000	0.5	C 1990
Great Britain	57,237,000	315,000	5.5	C 1990
Greece	10,047,000	4,800	0.5	B 1990
Ireland	3,720,000	1,800	0.5	B 1990
Italy	57,061,000	31,200	0.5	B 1990
Luxembourg	373,000	600	1.6	B 1990
Netherlands	14,951,000	25,700	1.7	C 1990
Portugal	10,285,000	300	0.0	B 1986
Spain	39,187,000	12,000	0.3	D
Total European Community	341,560,000	999,600	2.9	
Austria	7,583,000	7,000	0.9	C 1990
Finland	4,975,000	1,300	0.3	A 1990
Gibraltar	30,000	600	20.0	C 1981
Norway	4,212,000	1,000	0.2	B 1987
Sweden	8,444,000	15,000	1.8	C 1990
Switzerland	6,609,000	19,000	2.9	C 1980
Other	982,000	100	0.1	D
Total other West Europe	32,835,000	44,000	1.3	
Albania	3,345,000	300	0.1	B 1990
Bulgaria	9,010,000	3,100	0.3	C 1990
Czechoslovakia	15,667,000	7,800	0.5	D
Hungary	10,552,000	57,000	5.4	D
Poland	38,423,000	3,800	0.1	C 1990
Romania	23,272,000	17,500	0.8	B 1988
Turkey[a]	55,868,000	19,700	0.4	C 1990
USSR[a,b]	288,595,000	1,150,000	4.0	B 1990
Yugoslavia	23,807,000	4,500	0.2	C 1986
Total East Europe and Balkans	468,539,000	1,263,700	2.7	
Total	842,934,000	2,307,300	2.7	

[a]Including Asian regions.
[b]See also table 4.

lost about 10 percent of its estimated Jewish population, mainly through the emigration of over 200,000 Jews from the Soviet Union, and the final resettlement of another 28,000 who were staying in temporary accommodations in Italy and Austria at the end of 1989.

European Community. The twelve countries that form the European Community (EC) together had an estimated permanent Jewish population of about one million. Decline against the 1989 estimate of 1,019,200 reflects the final resettlement of about 19,000 Jewish migrants from the Soviet Union who were temporarily staying at Ladispoli and other localities near Rome. The process of economic and political integration of the EC countries is slowly moving ahead. The free movement of goods and manpower expected to become effective after January 1, 1993, and accompanying changes in occupational needs and opportunities within the EC, could affect geographical mobility, possibly altering the distribution of Jews among the respective countries. EC policies toward immigration from other, non-EC, countries may be affected as well.

France has the largest Jewish population in Western Europe, estimated at 530,000. Monitoring the plausible trends of both the internal evolution and external migrations of Jews in France suggests that there has been little net change in Jewish population size since the major survey that was taken in the 1970s.[18] A study conducted in 1988 at the initiative of the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU) confirmed the basic demographic stability of French Jewry.[19]

Periodic reestimations of the size of British Jewry are carried out by the Community Research Unit (CRU) of the Board of Deputies. Based on an analysis of Jewish deaths during 1975–1979, the population baseline for 1977 was set at 336,000, with a margin of error of plus or minus 34,000.[20] An excess of deaths over births is clearly shown by the vital statistical records annually compiled by the Jewish community. Allowing for emigration and some assimilatory losses, the update for 1984, as elaborated by the CRU, came to 330,000. Continuation of the same trends suggested an estimate of 320,000 for 1989. A new study of Jewish synagogue membership indicates a decline of over 7 percent between 1983 and 1990.[21] While this should not be taken as an automatic proxy for Jewish population decline, our reduced estimate to 315,000 in 1990 aims at characterizing the ongoing trend.

In 1990, the momentous process of German political reunion was formally completed. In the former (West) German Federal Republic, the 1987 population census

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[18]Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris, 1984).

[19]Erik H. Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive en France ou l'avenir d'une communauté* (Paris, 1991).

[20]Steven Haberman, Barry A. Kosmin, and Caren Levy, "Mortality Patterns of British Jews 1975–79: Insights and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, ser. A, 146, pt. 3, 1983, pp. 294–310.

[21]Marlena Schmool and Frances Cohen, *British Synagogue Membership in 1990* (London, 1991).

reported 32,319 Jews. Jewish community records reported about 28,500 affiliated Jews at the end of 1990—an increase over previous years. Immigration continuously compensated for the surplus of deaths over births in this aging Jewish population. From the scarce information that existed about the number of Jews in the former (East) German Democratic Republic, we gave an estimate of 500 for 1988. Our 1989 estimate for unified Germany was 35,000, the increase over the sum of Jewish populations in the previous West and East Germanys reflecting assumed recent immigration. In 1990, an estimated 5,000 Jewish migrants from the Soviet Union were admitted to settle in Germany, thus bringing the total Jewish population estimate to 40,000.

Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands each have Jewish populations ranging around 30,000. There is a tendency toward internal shrinkage of all these Jewries, but in some instances this is offset by immigration. In Belgium, the size of Jewish population is probably quite stable, owing to the comparatively strong Orthodox element in that community. In Italy, until 1984, Jews were legally bound to affiliate with the local Jewish communities, but then membership in these communities became voluntary. Although most Jews reaffiliated, the new looser legal framework may facilitate the ongoing attrition of the Jewish population.

Other EC member countries have smaller and, overall, slowly declining Jewish populations. An exception may be Spain, whose Jewish population is very tentatively estimated at 12,000.

Other Western Europe. Countries which are not EC members together account for a Jewish population of 44,000. Decline from the 1989 estimate of 52,300 reflects the departure of most of the Jewish migrants that were accommodated in transit in Austria. The estimate of Austria's permanent Jewish populaton was increased to 7,000. Switzerland's Jews are estimated at below 20,000. While there is evidence of a negative balance of births and deaths, connected with great aging and frequent outmarriage, immigration may have offset the internal losses. The Jewish populations in Scandinavian countries are, on the whole, numerically rather stable.

USSR. The demographic situation of East European Jewry is rapidly changing as a consequence of the extensive geopolitical changes in the region. The major event was the economic and political crisis that culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a state in 1991. Closely related to the same fateful complex of factors was the upsurge in Jewish emigration in 1990, which continued, slightly attenuated, in 1991. While mass emigration is an obvious factor in population decrease, the demography of East European Jewry has been characterized for years by very low levels of "effectively Jewish" fertility, frequent outmarriage, and heavy aging. Therefore the shrinking of the Jewish populations there must be comparatively rapid.

At the end of 1990, the timing of our present update, by far the largest Jewish population in Eastern Europe was still concentrated in the USSR, including its Asian republics. Data on "nationalities" (ethnic groups) from the Soviet Union's official population census, carried out in January 1989, revealed a total of 1,451,000

Jews.[22] The new figure confirmed the declining trend already apparent since the previous three population censuses: 2,267,800 in 1959; 2,150,700 in 1970; and 1,810,900 in 1979. Our own estimate of the number of Jews in the USSR at the end of 1988, projected from the 1979 population census, was 1,435,000; it thus deviated by only 1 percent from the new official baseline figure.

Our reservation about USSR Jewish population figures in previous AJYB volumes bears repeating: some underreporting is not impossible, but it cannot be quantified and should not be exaggerated. One should keep in mind the possible effects on census declarations of the prolonged existence of a totalitarian regime and also of societal preferences for other than Jewish nationalities in the various parts of the Soviet Union. As they are, the figures of successive censuses appear to be remarkably consistent with one another—taking into account also the known volume of emigration, on the one hand, and the probable internal demographic evolution of the Jewish population in recent decades, on the other. The latter was characterized by very low fertility and birthrates; high frequencies of outmarriage, especially in the Slavic republics, which have a large share of the total Jewish population; a preference for non-Jewish nationalities among the children of outmarriage; aging; and a clear surplus of Jewish deaths over Jewish births.[23] Viewed conceptually, the census figures represent the core Jewish population in the USSR. They provide a good example of a large and empirically measured core Jewish population in the Diaspora, consisting of the aggregate of self-identifying Jews.

The respective figures for the enlarged Jewish population—including all current Jews, as well as any other persons of Jewish parentage and their non-Jewish household members—must be substantially higher in a societal context like that of the USSR, which has been characterized by high intermarriage rates for a considerable time. It is not possible to provide an actual estimate of this enlarged Jewish population for lack of appropriate data. Nor can any information be derived about the ratio between Jews and non-Jews in an enlarged Jewish population in the USSR from the

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[22]First data from the 1989 census results, by "nationalities," appeared in *Goskomstat SSSR, Natsional'nii sostav naseleniia* (Moscow, 1989); "Po dannym goskomstata SSSR," *Gazeta Soyuz*, Mar. 11, 1990; Mark Kupovetzky, "Yidish-dos mame-loschen fun 150 toysent Sovetische yiden," *Sovetisch Heimland*, no. 3, 1990, p. 131.

[23]U.O. Schmelz, "New Evidence on Basic Issues in the Demography of Soviet Jews," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 16, no. 2, 1974, pp. 209–23; Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry Since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (Westport, 1987); Leonid E. Darski, "Fertility in the USSR: Basic Trends," paper presented at European Population Conference, Paris, 1991; Mark Tolts, "Jewish Marriages in the USSR: A Demographic Analysis," Moscow, 1991. Indeed, consistency between the censuses, i.e., the respective declarations of self-identification by Jews, was such that our estimate for 1975 turned out to fit well as a demographic interpolation between the results of the 1970 census and the subsequent one held in 1979. See Schmelz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections*.

statistics of immigrants to Israel. Due to the highly self-selective character of *aliyah*, non-Jews have constituted a relatively small minority of all new immigrants from the USSR.[24] It is obvious, though, that the wide provisions of Israel's Law of Return (see above) apply to virtually the maximum emigration pool of self-declared Jews and close non-Jewish relatives. Any of the large figures attributed in recent years to the size of Soviet Jewry, insofar as they are based on demographic reasoning, do not relate to the core but to various estimates of an enlarged Jewish population. The evidence also suggests that in the USSR, core Jews constitute a smaller share of the total enlarged Jewish population than in some Western countries, including the United States.

Just as the number of declared Jews remained consistent between censuses, the number of persons of Jewish descent who preferred not to be identified as Jews was rather consistent, too, at least until 1989. However, the recent political developments, and especially the emigration urge impressively illustrated by the exodus of 1990–1991, have probably led to greater readiness to declare Jewish self-identification by persons who did not describe themselves as such in the 1989 census. In terms of demographic accounting, these "returnees" imply an actual net increment to the core Jewish population of the USSR, as well as to world Jewry.

With regard to updating the January 1989 census figure to the end of 1990, Jewish emigration has played the major role among the intervening changes. An estimated 71,000, thereof about 60,000 declared Jews, left in 1989, as against 19,300 in 1988, 8,100 in 1987, and only 7,000 during the whole 1982–1986 period. In 1990, according to Soviet, Israeli, American, and other sources, an estimated 201,000 Jews left the Soviet Union.[25] For the first time since 1976, a substantial majority of the Jewish emigrants who left the Soviet Union in 1990 went to Israel rather than to another Western country, as in the preceding years. Concurrently, a further 28,000 emigrants from the previous year who were in temporary accommodations—19,000 in Italy and 9,000 in Austria—were permanently resettled, and the transit camps closed. In total, an estimated 229,000 Jews originating in the USSR were involved in these international migrations in 1990. Of these, 180,000 emigrated to Israel.

At the same time, the heavy deficit of internal population dynamics continued and even intensified due to the great aging which is known to have prevailed for many decades. Aging cannot but have been exacerbated by the significantly younger age

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[24]Israel's Ministry of Interior records the religion-nationality of each new immigrant for identification purposes. Such attribution is made on the basis of documentary evidence which is supplied by the immigrants themselves and is checked by competent authorities in Israel. According to data available from the Interior Ministry's Central Population Register, 94.2 percent of all new immigrants from the Soviet Union during the period Oct. 1989–Feb. 1991 were registered as Jewish. See Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Context of the Soviet Aliya," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 3 (16), Winter 1991, pp. 41–56.

[25]See Sidney Heitman, "Soviet Emigration in 1990," *Berichte des Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, vol. 33, 1991.

composition of the emigrants.[26] On the strength of these considerations, our estimate of the core Jewish population in the USSR was reduced from the census figure of 1,450,000 at the end of 1988/beginning of 1989 to 1,370,000 at the end of 1989, and to 1,150,000 at the end of 1990.

At the end of 1990, the Soviet Union still constituted one country, and it is referred to as such in our statistical presentation. However, in view of its subsequent political disintegration, it is relevant to review the distribution of Jewish population in the 15 former Soviet republics that were to become its independent successor states (see table 4).[27] Of the total estimate of 1,150,000 Jews, 30,500 lived in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which were the first to reach independence and international recognition in 1991; 920,000 in the three Slavic republics of Byelorussia (Belarus), Russia, and Ukraine; 50,000 in Moldavia (Moldova); 44,500 in the three trans-Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; and 105,000 in the five central-Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Other East Europe and Balkans. The Jewish populations in Hungary and Romania and the small remnants in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia are all reputed to be very overaged and to experience frequent outmarriage. In each of these countries, the ongoing processes of political liberalization have permitted greater autonomy of the organized Jewish communities and their registered membership. More Jews or persons of Jewish origin are known or believed to exist than previously thought, some having come out in the open after years of hiding their identity. Yet, the inevitable numerical decline of Jewish populations in Eastern Europe is reflected in reduced estimates for 1990. (In 1991, the entire Jewish community of Albania, amounting to some 300, emigrated to Israel.) The size of Hungarian Jewry—the largest in Eastern Europe outside the USSR—is quite insufficiently known. Our estimate of 57,000 only attempts to reflect the declining trend that prevails there, too, according to the available indicators. Comparatively large emigration of Jews continued to take place from Romania and was reflected in the

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[26]Age structures of the Jewish population in the Russian Federal Republic in 1970 and 1979 were reported in *Goskomstat SSSR, Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, vol. 4, table 33 (Moscow, 1973); *Goskomstat SSSR, Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda*, vol. 4, part 2, table 2 (Moscow, 1989). Data from the 1989 census are in the course of publication. Age structures of recent Jewish migrants from the USSR to the United States and to Israel are available, respectively, from: HIAS, Statistical Abstract, vol. 30, no. 4 (New York, 1990); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Immigration to Israel 1990, Special Series, no. 900 (Jerusalem, 1991).

[27]These estimates are based on the detailed geographical origins of new immigrants to Israel. They repeat, with minor adaptations, those of Yoel Florsheim, "Immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1990," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 2 (15), 1991, pp. 5–14. Our estimates of the total population of USSR republics in 1990 were adapted from Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Sociology, Center for Social Demography, *Selected Statistical Data on Demographic Processes in the USSR* (Moscow, 1991).

detailed community records available there. Romania's Jewish population was estimated at 17,500 in 1990.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE USSR, 1990

Republic	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Estonia	1,600,000	3,500	2.2	B 1990
Latvia	2,700,000	18,000	6.7	B 1990
Lithuania	3,700,000	9,000	2.4	B 1990
Byelorussia	10,295,000	75,000	7.3	B 1990
Russia	147,945,000	470,000	3.2	B 1990
Ukraine	51,780,000	375,000	7.2	B 1990
Moldavia	4,400,000	50,000	11.4	B 1990
Armenia	3,300,000	500	0.2	B 1990
Azerbaijan	7,095,000	21,000	3.0	B 1990
Georgia	5,495,000	23,000	4.2	B 1990
Kazakhstan	16,695,000	17,000	1.0	B 1990
Kirghizstan	4,400,000	5,000	1.1	B 1990
Tajikistan	5,300,000	11,500	2.2	B 1990
Turkmenistan	3,600,000	1,500	0.4	B 1990
Uzbekistan	20,290,000	70,000	3.4	B 1990
Total	288,595,000	1,150,000	4.0	

The Jewish population of Turkey, where a surplus of deaths over births had been reported for several years, was estimated at about 20,000.

ASIA

Israel accounts for 99 percent of all the nearly four million Jews in Asia, excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey (see table 5). By the end of 1990, Israeli Jews constituted 31 percent of total world Jewry. Israel's Jewish population grew in 1990 by about 230,000, or 6.2 percent. This was the highest rate of growth since the end of the initial wave of mass *aliyah* in 1951. About 79 percent of this

growth was due to the net migration balance; 21 percent to natural increase.[28] The total number of immigrants from all countries was 201,500, of whom 195,600 were Jewish. (This last is the second highest in Israel's history, and the highest since 1949, when 239,950 Jewish immigrants arrived.) Included in the figures are 185,000 immigrants from the USSR, of whom 180,000 were Jewish.

It is difficult to estimate the Jewish population of Iran for any given date, but it continues to dwindle. The estimate for 1990 was reduced to 19,000. In other Asian countries with small veteran communities—such as India—the Jewish population tends to decline slowly. On the basis of research conducted by recent visitors to Yemen, firm statistical evidence was obtained for the first time for the small remnant of the Jewish population in that country. Very small communities, partially of a transient character, exist in several countries of Southeast Asia.

AFRICA

Less than 150,000 Jews are estimated to remain now in Africa. The Republic of South Africa accounts for 77 percent of total Jews in that continent (see table 6). In 1980, according to the official census, there were about 118,000 Jews among South Africa's white population.[29] Substantial Jewish emigration after that was compensated in good part by Jewish immigration. Considering a moderately negative migration balance, and an incipient negative balance of internal changes, the Jewish population estimate for 1988 was reduced to 114,000. In 1989 and 1990, the numbers of emigrants, on the one hand, and immigrants and returning residents, on the other, possibly balanced—suggesting no considerable change in Jewish population size. A Jewish-sponsored survey of South African Jewry was completed in 1991, and results will be forthcoming along with the results of a new official population census.

In recent years, the Jewish community of Ethiopia has been at the center of an international effort of rescue. In 1990, over 4,000 Jews migrated to Israel. (In the course of 1991, the overwhelming majority of Ethiopian Jews—about 20,000 people—were brought to Israel, most of them in a one-day dramatic air-lift operation.) A few of these migrants were non-Jewish members of mixed households. In connection with these events, the size of Ethiopian Jewry could eventually be estimated on a more accurate basis than had been the case previously. Taking into account the numbers of those who subsequently left or yet remained in the country, it can be

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[28]Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1991* (Jerusalem, 1991). For a comprehensive review of sociodemographic changes in Israel, see U.O. Schmelz, Sergio DellaPergola, and Uri Avner, "Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look," AJYB 1990, vol. 90, pp. 3–204.

[29]Sergio DellaPergola and Allie A. Dubb, "South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile," AJYB 1988, vol. 88, pp. 59–140.

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ASIA, 1990[a]

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Hong Kong	5,841,000	1,000	0.2	D
India	853,094,000	4,800	0.0	C 1981
Iran	54,607,000	19,000	0.3	D
Iraq	18,920,000	200	0.0	D
Israel	4,822,000[b]	3,946,700	818.5	A 1990
Japan	123,460,000	1,000	0.0	C 1988
Korea, South	42,793,000	100	0.0	D
Philippines	62,413,000	100	0.0	C 1988
Singapore	2,723,000	300	0.1	B 1990
Syria	12,530,000	4,000	0.3	D
Thailand	55,702,000	200	0.0	C 1988 X
Yemen	9,196,000	1,700	0.2	B 1990 X
Other	1,810,938,000	300	0.0	D
Total	3,057,039,000	3,979,400	1.3	

[a]Not including Asian regions of USSR and Turkey.
[b]End 1990.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA, 1990

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Egypt	52,426,000	200	0.0	C 1988
Ethiopia	49,240,000	21,000	0.4	B 1990 X
Kenya	24,031,000	400	0.0	B 1990
Morocco	25,061,000	8,000	0.3	D X
South Africa	35,282,000	114,000	3.2	C 1980
Tunisia	8,180,000	2,400	0.3	D
Zaire	35,568,000	400	0.0	D
Zambia	8,452,000	300	0.0	D
Zimbabwe	9,709,000	1,000	0.1	B 1990
Other	394,162,000	1,000	0.0	D
Total	642,111,000	148,700	0.2	

estimated that the Jewish population was about 25,000 at the end of 1989, and 21,000 at the end of 1990. This implies an upward revision of 5,000 in comparison with our original estimate for 1989.

The remnants of Moroccan and Tunisian Jewry tend to shrink slowly through emigration. In the light of available information, our 1989 estimate was reduced retrospectively, and a further moderate decline was introduced in the estimates for 1990. It should be pointed out, though, that not a few Jews have a foothold both in Morocco or Tunisia and in France and other Western countries, and their geographical attribution is uncertain.

OCEANIA

The major country of Jewish residence in Oceania (Australasia) is Australia, where 95 percent of the estimated total of nearly 93,000 Jews live (see table 7). The 1986 census of Australia, where the question on religion is optional, enumerated 69,065 declared Jews but also indicated that about 25 percent of the country's whole population either did not specify their religion or stated explicitly that they had none.[10] This large group must be assumed to contain persons who identify in other ways as Jews. In addition, Australian Jewry has received migratory reinforcements during the last decade, especially from South Africa and the Soviet Union. At the same time, there are demographic patterns with negative effects on Jewish population size, such as strong aging, low or negative natural increase, and some assimilation. We raised our estimate for 1990 to a provisional figure of 88,000. The new census of 1991, as well as a Jewish survey now being planned, will hopefully provide firmer data on Jewish population size and trends in Australia. The Jewish community in New Zealand—now estimated at 4,500—attracted some immigrants, but incurred a negative migration balance with Australia.

TABLE 7. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN OCEANIA, 1990

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Australia	16,873,000	88,000	5.2	C 1986
New Zealand	3,392,000	4,500	1.3	C 1988
Other	6,216,000	100	0.0	D
Total	26,481,000	92,600	3.5	

[10]Walter M. Lippmann, *Australian Jewry 1986* (South Yarra, Victoria, 1987).

TABLE 8. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S JEWS, BY NUMBER AND PROPORTION (PER 1,000 POPULATION) IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES, 1990

Number of Jews in Country	Jews per 1,000 Population					
	Total	Below 1	1–4.9	5–9.9	10–24.9	25+
			Number of Countries			
Total	74[a]	49	15	6	3	1
100–900	24	19	4	—	1	—
1,000–4,900	18	17	1	—	—	—
5,000–9,900	6	4	2	—	—	—
10,000–49,900	15	8	6	1	—	—
50,000–99,900	2	—	—	2	—	—
100,000–999,900	6	1	1	3	1	—
1,000,000 and over	3	—	1	—	1	1
			Jewish Population Distribution (Absolute Numbers)			
Total	12,806,400[b]	375,100	1,408,000	1,229,200	5,845,600	3,946,700
100–900	9,600	7,400	1,600	—	600	—
1,000–4,900	47,500	43,000	4,500	—	—	—
5,000–9,900	40,700	29,300	11,400	—	—	—
10,000–49,900	346,100	195,400	126,500	24,200	—	—
50,000–99,900	145,000	—	—	145,000	—	—
100,000–999,900	1,584,000	100,000	114,000	1,060,000	310,000	—
1,000,000 and over	10,631,700	—	1,150,000	—	5,535,000	3,946,700
			Jewish Population Distribution (Percent of World's Jews)			
Total	100.0[b]	2.9	11.0	9.6	45.6	30.8
100–900	0.1	0.1	0.0	—	0.0	—
1,000–4,900	0.3	0.3	0.0	—	—	—
5,000–9,900	0.3	0.2	0.1	—	—	—
10,000–49,900	2.7	1.5	1.0	0.2	—	—
50,000–99,900	1.1	—	—	1.1	—	—
100,000–999,900	12.4	0.8	0.9	8.3	2.4	—
1,000,000 and over	83.0	—	9.0	—	43.2	30.8

[a]Excluding countries with fewer than 100 Jews.
[b]Including countries with fewer than 100 Jews.

Dispersion and Concentration

Table 8 demonstrates the magnitude of Jewish dispersion. The individual countries listed above as each having at least 100 Jews are scattered over all the continents. In 1990, more than half (42 out of 74 countries) had fewer than 5,000 Jews each. In relative terms, too, the Jews were thinly scattered nearly everywhere in the Diaspora. There is not a single Diaspora country where they amounted even to 3 percent of the total population. In most countries they constituted a far smaller fraction. Only three Diaspora countries had more than 1 percent Jews in their total population, and only nine countries had more than 5 Jews per 1,000 of population. The respective nine countries were, in descending order of the proportion, but regardless of the absolute number of their Jews: United States (22.2 per 1,000), Gibraltar (20.0), Canada (11.7), France (9.4), Uruguay (7.8), Argentina (6.7), Great Britain (5.5), Hungary (5.4), and Australia (5.2). The other major Diaspora Jewries, having lower proportions of Jews per 1,000 of total population, were the USSR (4.0), South Africa (3.2), and Brazil (0.7 per 1,000). Although by the end of 1990 the constituent republics of the Soviet Union were not independent states, and therefore were not reported as such in table 8, it may be noted that four had more than 5 Jews per 1,000 of population: Moldova (11.4), Belarus (7.3), Ukraine (7.2), and Latvia (6.7).

In the state of Israel, by contrast, the Jewish majority amounted to 818.5 per thousand in 1990, compared to 815.2 per thousand in 1989—not including the Arab population of the administered areas.

While Jews are widely dispersed, they are also concentrated to some extent (see table 9). In 1990 over 96 percent of world Jewry lived in the ten countries with the

TABLE 9. TEN COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATIONS, 1990

Rank	Country	Jewish Population	% of Total Jewish Population			
			In the World		In the Diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	United States	5,535,000	43.2	43.2	62.5	62.5
2	Israel	3,946,700	30.8	74.0	—	—
3	Soviet Union	1,150,000	9.0	83.0	13.0	75.5
4	France	530,000	4.1	87.1	6.0	81.5
5	Great Britain	315,000	2.5	89.6	3.5	85.0
6	Canada	310,000	2.4	92.0	3.5	88.5
7	Argentina	215,000	1.7	93.7	2.4	90.9
8	South Africa	114,000	0.9	94.6	1.3	92.2
9	Brazil	100,000	0.8	95.4	1.1	93.3
10	Australia	88,000	0.7	96.1	1.0	94.3

largest Jewish populations; and 83 percent lived in the three countries that had at least a million Jews each (United States, Israel, Soviet Union). Similarly, nine leading Diaspora countries together comprised over 94 percent of the Diaspora Jewish population; two countries (United States and Soviet Union) accounted for 75 percent, and the United States alone for over 62 percent of total Diaspora Jewry.

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